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A
FREE DISCUSSION
OF THE DOCTRINES OF
MATERIALISM,
AND
PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY,
IN A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DR. PRICE,
AND DR. PRIESTLEY.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,
BY DR. PRIESTLEY, *K*
An INTRODUCTION,
Explaining the Nature of the CONTROVERSY,
and LETTERS to several Writers who
have animadverted on his DISQUISITIONS RE-
LATING TO MATTER AND SPIRIT, or his
TREATISE ON NECESSITY.

Together let us beat this ample Field.
————— Be candid where we can,
But vindicate the Ways of God to Man.

POPE.

L O N D O N:
Printed for J. JOHNSON, No. 72, St. PAUL's CHURCH-YARD,
and T. CADELL, in the STRAND,
M.DCCLXXVIII.

THE DISCUSSION

MATERIALISM

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THE
DEDICATION.

To JOHN LEE, Esq.

OF

LINCOLN'S-INN.

DEAR SIR,

I TAKE the liberty to present to you, not in the character of an *advocate*, but in that of a *friend*, and a *judge*, a production that is in part my own, and in part that of our common and excellent friend Dr. Price. Though you are employed in the practice of a particular profession, your education, and studies, have by no means been confined

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fin'd to it, but you have extended your inquiries to all subjects that are interesting to *men*, to *citizens*, and to *christians*.

My object in the present publication, as well as in those which have preceded it, is to overturn, as far as my endeavours can effect it, what I deem to be a prejudice of the greatest antiquity, and the deepest rooted, of any that have contributed to debase christianity, and a corruption which, in this philosophical age, calls the loudest for reformation. And though this will necessarily destroy some flattering hopes respecting our prospects after death, they are such as are ill founded; and it will draw our attention more strongly to those *more certain*, though *more distant* prospects, that christianity holds out to us.

Our

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Our friend, however, considers my endeavours in a light unfavourable and hostile to christianity, and overturning not supposed, but real foundations. As truth will finally prevail over all opposition, time (though we may not live to see the issue) will discover whether my zeal in attacking, or his in defending, is better founded; and as our intentions, I believe, are equally upright, our discussion truly amicable, and consequently *truth*, not *victory*, our object, it will be equally (or, to make allowance for a little human frailty, it will, I hope, be as near as possible equally) acceptable to us both, on which side soever it be found. You, who have an equal friendship for us both, will not, on this account, be biased on one side more than on the other; and whichever way any of our friends incline, as we are confident we shall not
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lose their esteem, so, we can assure them, they will not lose ours.

Intricate as the discussion of such questions as these is, there is a peculiar pleasure attending the speculations ; and from the relation they bear to the greatest of all objects, they have a dignity and sublimity in them, and eminently contribute to inspire a *serenity* and *elevation of mind*, which both improves and enlarges it, and thereby enables us to look down upon the trifling but tormenting pursuits of a bustling world.

I have no occasion to describe to you the satisfaction that arises from the rational use of the human faculties, a freedom from vulgar and debasing prejudices, and the habitual contemplation of great and important subjects ; and also from such a course of reading, and such a choice
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of company, as tends to keep up that *right bent*, and *firmness* of mind, which a necessary intercourse with the world would otherwise *warp* and *relax*. He who can have, and truly enjoy, the society of such men as Dr. Price, Mr. Lindsey, and Dr. Jebb, cannot envy the condition of princes. Such fellowship is the true balsam of life; its cement is infinitely more durable than that of the friendships of the world, and it looks for its proper *fruit*, and complete *gratification*, to the life beyond the grave.

I think myself happy in being able to call myself one of such a fraternity; and wishing to perpetuate, as far as may be in my power, the memory of such friendships, and especially that with yourself, which is now of long standing, and
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has been strengthened by a variety of
ties, I subscribe myself,

Dear Sir,

Your countryman,

friend, and

fellow christian,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, Aug. 24,

1778.

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INTRODUCTION.

THIS work, it will be owned, exhibits an uncommon, if not a singular spectacle, viz. that of two persons discussing, with the most perfect freedom and candour, questions which are generally deemed of the greatest consequence in practice, and which are certainly so in theory. The occasion of it was as follows.

When my *Disquisitions*, &c. was printed off, I put it, as I have observed, into the hands of several of my friends, both well and ill affected

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to my general hypothesis, that I might take the advantage of their remarks, in an additional sheet of *Illustrations*, which is accordingly annexed to the first volume. Among others, Dr. Price was so obliging as to enter into a more particular discussion of several of the subjects of the work; and afterwards, imagining that I meant to write a direct answer to his remarks, he expressed a wish that I would print them at large, together with any notice that I should think proper to take of them.

This, I told him, did not fall within my views with respect to that particular publication, but that I would take the liberty to propose another scheme, which I thought would correspond with both our views, and be useful to others who might wish to see the arguments on both sides freely canvassed, without the

the mixture of any thing personal, or foreign to the subject, which often constitutes a great part of the bulk of controversial writings, and tends to divert the mind from an attention to the real merits of the question in debate. It was, that he should re-write his remarks, after seeing what use I had already made of them in my sheet of *Illustrations*; that I would then reply to them distinctly, article by article, that he should remark, and I reply again, &c. till we should both be satisfied that we had done as much justice as we could to our several arguments, frankly acknowledging any mistakes we might be convinced of, and then publish the whole jointly.

To this proposal he cheerfully acceded, chusing only that the remarks he had already sent should serve as a basis, and that, to avoid repetitions,

I might refer to my *Illustrations* in my first reply. He added, however, certain *Queries*, that by my answers to them he might perceive more distinctly in what respects my ideas really differed from his. Accordingly I replied to his remarks, and answered his queries, with as much explicitness as I possibly could ; and in the course of the correspondence proposed others to him, with the same view, and likewise, in order to bring into a small compass, my objections to the commonly received hypothesis. In this manner, at our leisure, and without communicating with any third person, we exchanged our *remarks* and *replies*, till it appeared to us needless to advance any thing farther. In this state we submit the result of our discussion to the judgment of the public, wishing that they may attend to it with the same

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same coolness and candour with which we ourselves have written.

Our readers will observe that this discussion respects all the subjects of my *Disquisitions*, except the doctrine of the *pre-existence of Christ*. But though this be the point to which all that I have written tends; it being the capital inference that I make from the doctrines of *materialism*, *penetrability of matter*, and *necessity* (these being, in my idea, parts of the same system) Dr. Price thought it was a subject that had been so much debated, that it would be needless to enter into it.

I will here acknowledge, that in proposing this scheme, I was not without a farther view, which was, that among so many angry opponents as I expected, I might secure a friendly one, and at the same time one who

could not but be acknowledged to be capable of doing ample justice to his argument as any writer of the age. I had pledged myself to go through with this business, replying to every thing that should appear deserving of notice ; and it was much more agreeable to me to urge all that I had to say in letters to a candid friend, than in tart replies to an angry disputant. And I thought that, according to the law of arms, and modern honour, when I had fairly engaged with one antagonist on this score, I should be more easily excused encountering another. The reader, however, will find that I have not entirely availed myself of this privilege ; for though I have not entered minutely into the argument, which would have been mere tautology, I have noticed such other opponents as have appeared since the publication of my work. And though

I think I may now be excused from replying to any others in a separate publication, I will promise that, in any new edition either of the *Disquisitions* themselves, or of this work, I will take more or less notice of every thing that shall come out in the mean time, and that shall appear to myself and my friends to deserve it; and I will publish all such *additions* separately. To do more would, I think, be tedious with respect to the Public, and unnecessary in itself.

As many persons unversed in controversies on the subject of religion (and I wish I could not say the same of some who are versed in them,) will be apt to entertain a confused notion about the *nature* and *importance* of the questions that are here discussed, it may not be amiss to explain, with some distinctness, though

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it should be pretty much at large, what the nature and importance of them really are, and to give our readers a plain rule by which to form a judgment in other cases of a similar nature.

I must assume as a maxim, that the object and end of all *speculation* is *practice*, and that, in matters of religion, opinions are on no other account worth contending for than as they influence the heart and the life. If this be allowed me, I think I can easily satisfy my readers, that they have no reason to be alarmed about the tendency or issue of this debate, notwithstanding all the clamour it has, in different ages, and even at present, excited.

That the general interests of virtue will be effectually secured by the belief of a *sufficient recompence in a future*

future life, for all that has been well or ill done in this, will hardly be denied. Now this is equally taken for granted both by Dr. Price and myself. We even believe this day of recompence to take place at the same period, viz. at the *general resurrection*; when “all that are in
 “the graves shall hear the voice of
 “the son of man, and shall arise;
 “some to the resurrection of life,
 “and others to the resurrection of
 “condemnation.”

The advantage, therefore, that either of our schemes can have over the other, must arise principally from the truth and consistency of such opinions as are used in support of the great doctrine of future retribution; on which account one of us may be supposed to give a more firm and unwavering assent to that practical doctrine, and to be in less danger
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of abandoning it. Or one set of opinions may be supposed to exhibit our maker, or ourselves, in a light more proper to excite and keep up a just sense of devotion; consisting of the sentiments of love, reverence and trust in God, and also to impress the mind with a stronger feeling of benevolence towards our fellow creatures.

It must be added, also, that one set of moral and metaphysical principles, by exhibiting every thing about which we are conversant, and to which our speculations can extend, in such a manner as shall impress the mind with ideas of *simplicity, comprehensiveness, symmetry, beauty, &c.* may give the mind more pleasure in the contemplation of it, and consequently create a stronger attachment to it, and in some measure heighten the finer feelings of virtue.

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But these are matters in which the bulk of mankind have certainly very little to do; and as the effect of these views of things depends, in a great measure, upon our own *persuasion* concerning them, it cannot be easy to determine what system of speculative opinions has the most of these lesser advantages. We all claim them, and are too apt to think the system of our adversaries destitute of them; so much so, that we often think it impossible to contemplate it with any degree of satisfaction, or without sensations of pain and disgust. Now the *fact* of this persuasion being generally *mutual* is a proof that there is a great deal of *imagination* in it. Why then should we dispute about these matters, with any other disposition, than that with which we usually discuss other subjects of *taste*; and we do not quarrel with our neighbours if they happen
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to think as favourably of our houses, gardens, pictures, wives, or children, as we do ourselves.

All that is worth considering, therefore, in this case, is whether any of the opinions contended for by Dr. Price and myself will, if proved to be false, weaken our faith in the great doctrine of a future state of retribution, or indispose the heart to the love of God or of man.

Having stated these preliminaries, let us consider separately the nature and effects of the different opinions we hold with respect to the *penetrability of matter*, the *doctrine of the soul*, and of *philosophical necessity*.

That matter has, or that it has not, the property of *impenetrability* has no aspect whatever with respect to morals and theology ; but as matter

ter being supposed to be possessed of it, may be considered as an argument against its being endued with the properties of *perception* and *thought*, those different properties being apprehended to be incompatible.

But I think it will be generally acknowledged, that there can be no objection to matter, as I describe and conceive of it, being capable of thought, so that one substance may admit of all the properties of man; and its being favourable to this hypothesis is the circumstance that gives me a bias towards it: because it is with reluctance that I can admit the intimate union and mutual action of two substances, so different from one another as *matter* and *spirit*, are defined to be, in the constitution of *one being, i. e. man*. To suppose man to be *all matter*, or *all spirit*, will, of itself, be allowed to be an advantage

tage in point of speculation, provided the thing itself be possible, and agreeable to appearances.

The proper advantage derived from the doctrine of *a soul*, or the hypothesis of the perceptive and thinking powers of man residing in a substance distinct from his body, is that it will not be affected by the death of the body, but will pass into a state of recompence when the body is in the grave. This doctrine is, therefore, in fact, nothing more than a provision against a failure in the arguments for the scripture doctrine of the *resurrection of the dead*, and consequently does not affect a christian, who, as such, firmly believes that doctrine.

On the contrary, the doctrine of a soul places the evidence of a future life on a foundation quite different from

from that on which revelation places it; which always represents the *resurrection of the dead* (founded on the promise of God, confirmed by the resurrection of Christ) as the object of all our future hopes, and never suggests the idea of the soul, or the percipient and active part of man, being in one place, and the body in another.

The doctrine of a soul is, indeed, generally represented as coming in aid of the christian doctrine of a future life, and that would be the case if it supplied another argument for *the same thing*; but here the things themselves are different: for the conscious state of the *separate soul* is not the resurrection of the *whole man*; and according to the scripture, the rewards of virtue and the punishments of vice do not *commence* till the day of judgment; so that the
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christian believes *one thing*, and the mere theist *another*.

This, however, has nothing to do with any thing in debate between Dr. Price and myself; the difference between us being chiefly this. He supposes that the powers of perception and thought reside in an immaterial substance, but that the exercise of these powers is made to depend on the organization of the body; whereas I suppose these powers to reside in the organized body itself, and therefore *must* be suspended till the time when the organization shall be restored. This I think can never be conceived to be a difference of much importance, all the *consequences* being the very same.

The consideration that biases me, as a christian, exclusive of philosophical considerations, against the doctrine

doctrine of a separate soul, is that it has been the foundation of what appears to me to be the very grossest *corruptions of christianity*, and even of that very *antichristianism*, that began to work in the apostles' times, and which extended itself so amazingly and dreadfully afterwards ; I mean the oriental philosophy of the *pre-existence of souls*, which drew after it the belief of the pre-existence and divinity of Christ, the worship of Christ and of dead men, and the doctrine of purgatory, with all the popish doctrines and practices that are connected with them and supported by them.

Among these I rank the doctrine of *atonement* for the sins of men by the sufferings or death of Christ. For I think it will be allowed, that had Christ never been considered as any other than a *mere man* (though the

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most distinguished prophet, or messenger from God to man) it would never have been imagined that his sufferings could have had the effect that has been ascribed to them, and consequently the doctrine of the proper *placability*, and *free-mercy* of God would not have been impeached. Also, what would it have signified to contend for the transmutation of bread and wine into the real body and blood of Christ, if Christ had been a mere man, and consequently his flesh and blood nothing more than the flesh and blood of Moses, John the Baptist, or any other man.

As a *Christian*, therefore, and a *Protestant*, I am an enemy to the doctrine of a separate soul. One who believes in a soul *may not*, but one who disbelieves that doctrine *cannot* be, a papist. At the same time I readily acknowledge that this bias
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may carry a man too far, even to reject doctrines essential to christianity, though held by papists. But this objection has no weight here.

I shall not enlarge upon this topic; but it would be easy to show, that almost every thing that has been represented as most absurd and mischievous in the faith of christians, and what, of course, has been the cause, or pretence, of a great part of the infidelity of the philosophical world, in the present age, must be laid to the door of this one article.

It is evident, therefore, that a christian has, at least, no reason to be biassed in favour of the doctrine of a soul, and may, without concern, leave it to philosophical discussion.

With those who do not believe the doctrine of an intermediate state,

and myself, the difference between *a soul* and *no soul*, in my opinion, nearly vanishes: for according to them, though it be a substance distinct from the body, it is altogether incapable of sensation, or action, but in conjunction with the body.

There only remains the doctrine of *necessity*, with respect to which the difference of opinion between Dr. Price and me can be thought of much importance. But even here our difference of opinion is not such as to affect our expectation of a future state of retribution. For whatever we apprehend to be the *foundation* or *ground* of future recompence, we equally believe both the *fact* and the *propriety* of it. To me it seems sufficient, that men be *voluntary agents*, or that motives, such as hopes and fears, can influence them in a certain and mechanical manner, to
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make it in the highest degree *right*, and *wise* in the Divine Being to lay such motives before them, and consequently to place them in a state of moral discipline, or a state in which rewards and punishments are distributed, so as to correspond to certain characters, and actions. By this means, and by this means only, can his great object, the happiness of his intelligent offspring, be secured. And one principal reason why I reject the doctrine of philosophical liberty, is that exactly in the degree in which we suppose the mind *not* to be determined by motives, in that very degree do rewards and punishments lose their effect, and a man ceases to be a proper subject of moral discipline.

At the same time that I secure this great advantage, which is of a practical nature, I think it is a con-

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sideration greatly in favour of the doctrine of necessity, that, according to it, all *effects*, even those dependent on the volitions of men, have an *adequate cause*, in their previous circumstances; which, being known, a being of competent understanding, may certainly foresee the effect. On this scheme therefore, there is a sufficient provision for a plan of *universal providence*, comprehending all events whatever; every thing being what God foresaw and intended, and which must issue as he wishes it to issue, *i. e.* as I suppose, in the greatest possible happiness of his creation.

Upon this scheme, therefore, we have, as it appears to me, every motive that can possibly influence the mind of man to exert ourselves to the utmost, to promote our own happiness and the happiness of others,
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at the same time that it lays the deepest foundation for the most intimate submission to the will of God, and an unbounded confidence in his affection and providential care, with respect to all things present, past, and future. It also, in my opinion, takes away all possible ground for envy and hatred towards men, and thus gives the freest scope to the growth of universal benevolence, and of all virtue.

In the eye of Dr. Price, however, this scheme, great and glorious as it appears to me, wears a very different aspect. He thinks we cannot justly be accountable for our conduct, and rewarded or punished for it, unless we be, in his sense of the word, *agents*, or the proper and ultimate causes of our own actions; that, therefore, since we are in a state of discipline, and a future state of retri-
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bution will take place, we must be possessed of a power of proper *self-determination*, not subject to the control of any being whatever; and that since God *does* govern the world, and has frequently foretold events dependent upon the volitions of men, he must have a power, incomprehensible as it is to us, of foreseeing *such* events.

This difference, however, though real, and important, has nothing to do with any thing that is within the apprehension of the bulk of mankind. Nay the difference between the doctrines of *liberty* and *necessity* is what few writers appear truly to have apprehended. No necessarian denies that, in a sufficiently proper sense, men have a power over their own actions, so that they can do what they please; and that without this power they could not be accountable

countable beings, or the proper subjects of rewards or punishments.

The charge of *Atheism* has been so much hackneyed in religious controversy, as to have passed almost into ridicule. It was the common charge against the primitive christians, and has hardly ever failed to be urged, on one pretence or other, against every man who has dissented from the generally received faith. But perhaps no character has suffered more generally, and at the same time more undeservedly on this account, than that of Mr. Hobbes; who, notwithstanding his heterodoxy in politics, appears to me, as far as I can judge from such of his writings as have fallen in my way, to have been no atheist, but a sincere christian, and a conscientious good man. See his Life in the *Biographia Britannica*.

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The same tremendous cry of atheism has not failed to be echoed against me also; but this cry has now been repeated so often, that, like other echoes, the sound is become feeble, and is by no means so terrific as formerly. In this case I think there is something unusually absurd and ridiculous in the charge; because it supposes that less power is requisite to create and animate mere matter and even to make matter intelligent, than to give life and intelligence to a spiritual and immaterial substance; that the former may start up into being of itself, but that the latter requires an author,

If I were disposed to retort upon my adversaries, I would say that a man who believes that *one effect* may exist without a cause (which I maintain to be the case with every person who denies the doctrine of necessity)

cessity) may believe that any *other* effect, and consequently that *all* effects may exist without a cause, and therefore that the *whole universe* may have none. And what might I not say of the Scotch defenders of the doctrine of *instinctive principles of truth*; who, disclaiming *argument*, rest this most sacred article of all religion upon a fallacious *instinct*; and especially of Dr. Oswald, who even professedly, and at large, endeavours to invalidate the only proper argument for the being of God, viz. from effects to causes, and to prove it to be altogether inconclusive.

I am very far, however, from charging either the oppugners of the doctrine of necessity, my Scotch opponents, or Dr. Oswald himself, with *actual atheism*; because, notwithstanding *atheistical conclusions* may be drawn from their principles, they themselves do not admit those conclusions,

clusions, and I am satisfied that, were they convinced of the justness of those conclusions, they would readily abandon the principles from which they were drawn. I claim the same candid construction for myself that I allow to others. With the *reasonable*, and the *candid*, I shall have it; and as to the *uncandid*, I thank God it is of little consequence, except to themselves, in what light they consider me.

Dr. Price's letter to me at the close of this Introduction, and which he obligingly insists upon my publishing just as he has sent it, shews that *all* those who even differ from me the most in these speculative points do not think so ill of their necessary effects, with regard to *character* and *morals*. Any testimony of mine in his favour, in return, would be impertinent; or I should cer-

certainly, having much more reason for it, not express less esteem and good-will for him than he has done for me. It is myself only, who avow such unpopular opinions, that stand in need of such a testimonial; and, on this account, it shews considerable *courage in friendship* to act as Dr. Price has done.

If he will allow me to speak so freely, I would say, that I see no reason for so particular an *apology* as he makes for a seeming want of respect in his manner of writing; as I really think he has nothing of this kind to apologize for. I am certain I might with more reason apologize for the manner in which I have expressed myself with respect to him. But, in my opinion, it is perfectly consistent with candour, and even with friendship, to express the strongest disapprobation of any *opi-*
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nions whatever; and freely to say that we think them *inconsistent*, *contradictory*, or even *absurd*, or *dangerous*, if, after an attentive consideration, they really do appear so to us.

All that candour requires is, that we never impute to our adversary a *bad intention*, or a *design to mislead*, and also that we admit his *general good understanding*, though liable to be misled by unperceived biases and prejudices, from the influences of which the wisest and best of men are not exempt. And where *particular friendship* is not concerned, there certainly are occasions that will justify even great asperity, indignation or ridicule in controversial writing. This is often the best method of repressing extreme conceit and arrogance, joined, as it often is, with as great weakness in supporting a bad cause,

cause, even when there is no proper want of sincerity.

A man must be very criminal indeed, who can maintain what he, at the same time, believes to be ill-founded. There are very few, I hope, so much abandoned. But there may be a great degree of guilt short of this. For the disposition may be so vitiated by a wrong bias, that the most frivolous reasons shall appear to have the force of demonstration, when a favourite hypothesis is concerned, and arguments, in themselves the most perfectly conclusive, shall appear to have no weight at all when urged against it. The truly candid will consider not the *manner* of writing only, but also the *occasion* of it, and all the *circumstances* attending it. What can exceed the indignation and zeal with which Paul often writes, the severity with
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which the meek apostle John expresses himself, or the vehement invectives even of our Saviour himself on just provocation.

The letters which I have addressed to my other opponents are written differently, according as I felt myself disposed towards them at the time of writing. I do not suspect that any thing will be objected to the manner in which I have expressed myself with respect to Dr. Kenrick, or Dr. Horseley; and my address to Mr. Whitehead is, I think, as respectful as he deserves. I had also addressed a letter to the anonymous author of *An Essay on the immateriality and immortality of the soul*; but as I could not help treating him with a good deal of levity and contempt, I was advised by my friends not to insert it in the present publication, as not suiting the

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the gravity with which the rest of the work is written.

Besides, I am not without hopes that this neglect may serve to keep back other equally ignorant and self-sufficient answerers, and thereby leave the field more open to the truly *able*, who are generally, at the same time, the most *candid*. And as the subject is of great importance, I still profess myself ready to argue it with any person who shall appear to me to have ability, and learning equal to the discussion; and to such a one it would give me but little pain to make any concession, or retraction, that I might be convinced was necessary. They must, however, go on other ground than that of Dr. Price, who has certainly done all possible justice to his argument.

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As the *Sheet of Illustrations*, subjoined to the *Disquisitions*, is frequently referred to in this work, and as it is suspected that some of the copies may have been sold without it, it is here reprinted, with *additions*, written for the satisfaction of some of my friends, who wished me to discuss some questions that they proposed to me.

It may be proper to observe, that in this publication I confine myself to the consideration of particular *objections* and *difficulties*; and that the proper arguments in support of my hypothesis are to be looked for in the *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, and the *Treatise on Necessity*.

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L E T T E R
F R O M
Dr. P R I C E,
T O
Dr. P R I E S T L E Y.

NEWINGTON-GREEN, May 14, 1778.

DEAR SIR,

I AM obliged to you for sending me your last replies. I have read them with a desire to be as open as possible to conviction; and even not without wishing for an opportunity of shewing candour by retracting any mistakes into which I may have fallen. But more perhaps through

a fault in me, than in you, my views and sentiments continue the same.

I must leave you to manage the publication as you please. You must be sensible that my *first remarks* were written without the most distant view to publication; and this, I hope, will be an excuse for the incorrectnesses and want of order which will be found in them. There is also in some parts of these first remarks, a turn of expression which carries an appearance not sufficiently respectful; and which I should have avoided had I written them with a view to publication, and been more on my guard. I know your candour has engaged you to overlook this, but I cannot reflect upon it without some concern.

I shall be very happy should this publication answer any valuable ends; but I am afraid the discussion it contains will be too dry and metaphysical to be generally acceptable. Some good ends, however, it may probably answer. It will afford a proof that two persons may differ totally on points the most important and sacred, with a perfect esteem for one another; and it may likewise give a specimen of a proper manner of carrying on religious controversies. There is nothing that offends me more than that acrimony of spirit with which controversies in general, and particularly religious ones, are commonly conducted. In religion there is nothing so essential as charity, candour, and benevolence. How inexcusable then is that cruel

zeal which some religious people indulge; and how melancholy is it to see them, in the very act of contending for religion, losing what is most valuable in religion? Will you give me leave, Sir, here to add, that your opinions give a striking proof of a truth, which, could it be stamped on every human mind, would exterminate all bigotry and persecution; I mean the truth, that worth of character, and true integrity, and consequently God's acceptance, are not necessarily connected with any particular set of opinions. Many think yours to be some of the most dangerous possible; and yet the person who holds them is known to be one of the best men in the world; and I ardently wish my soul may be united to his at the time
when

when all that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the son of man, and come forth; they who have done good to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil to the resurrection of damnation. Our agreement in expecting this awful period makes it of little consequence in what we differ.

With great respect and affection,

I am,

Dear Sir,

ever yours,

RICHARD PRICE.

Dr. P. R. ESTLEY

When all this was over, I
will have the same of the
and some other things, and
sent to the same. I have
that who have been sent to the
attention of the same. I have
things in expecting the same
make it of little consequence in what
we differ.

With great respect and attention

I am, Sir, your obedient servant

Dear Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst.

and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

J. H. [Name]

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ADVER.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Reader has been already informed (*Introduction* p. 36) that a great part of the following Remarks (to p. 178) has been written by Dr. PRICE, without any view to publication. He thinks it necessary to add here, that his ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS (from p. 327 to 359) are the result of a deliberate review of the whole controversy, as it had been previously printed; and have, therefore, been composed, with more care and attention. This controversy having been made too prolix, he has left every person to judge for himself, of the force of Dr. PRIESTLEY's Replies to these Additional Observations, (from p. 363, to p. 405) chusing to take leave with the short Note at the end of this volume.

ADVERTISEMENT

THE Reader has been already informed
(Introduction p. 12) that a great part of
the following Researches (pp. 128) has been
written by the French, without any view to
publication. The English is merely a
translation of his *Recherches*. The
author (from p. 128) and the whole con-
stitute a systematic review of the whole con-
troversy, as it had previously existed,
and has therefore been compiled, with
more care and attention. This controversy
having been made too prolix, he has left
every reader to judge of the utility of the
force of Dr. Parr's replies to these
Arguments. (from p. 128) to
be going through to take leave with the
author at the end of the volume.

7 DE61

R E M A R K S

B Y

DR. P R I C E

ON SEVERAL PASSAGES IN

DR. P R I E S T L E Y'S

DISQUISITIONS ON MATTER AND SPIRIT.

WITH

DR. PRIESTLEY'S REPLIES.

P A R T I.

R. E. M. A. R. K. S.

Dr. P. R. I. C. E.

ON SEVERAL PASSAGES IN



Dr. P. R. I. C. E. Y. S.

Dispositions of the

WITH

Dr. P. R. I. C. E. Y. S.

P. A. T. I.

CURSORY REMARKS,

I N

Reading Dr. Priestley's *Disquisitions*
on Matter and Spirit.

P A R T I.

N. B. In reading these Remarks, great Allowance must be made for a Want of Order, and many Repetitions, occasioned by the Manner in which they have been written.

CURSORY REMARKS



W. B. In reading these Remarks given
Allowance must be made for a Want of
Order; and many Repetitions, occasioned
by the Manner in which they have been
written.

P A R T I.

Remarks concerning THE PENETRABILITY
OF MATTER.

THE FIRST COMMUNICATION.

DR. Priestley observes in *Disquisitions*,
(page 2, 3) “ *that it is asserted that*
“ *matter is necessarily solid, and of itself desti-*
“ *tute of all powers whatever, as those of at-*
“ *traction and repulsion, &c. or that matter*
“ *is possessed of a VIS INERTIÆ, and indif-*
“ *ferent to rest or motion but as it is acted*
“ *upon by a foreign power—I do not won-*
“ *der (adds Dr. Priestley) that the vulgar*
“ *should have formed these notions, &c.*”

DR. PRICE’S Remark.

That matter is *inert*, or that it will con-
tinue in that state of rest or motion which
it possesses till some foreign cause alters that
state ; and that this alteration of state must
be in proportion to the impressed force, &c.
These positions are the foundation of all

that is demonstrated by natural philosophers concerning the laws of the collision of bodies. They are, in particular, the foundation of Sir *Isaac Newton's* Philosophy. The three laws of motion with which he begins his *Principia* have no meaning, or evidence, if they are only *vulgar prejudices*. To me they appear to be *self-evident truths*——“That matter is “of itself destitute of all powers” may be said with much more truth of matter according to Dr. Priestley's ideas of it, than of matter according to the common ideas. *Solid* matter has the power of acting on other matter by impulse, and the effects of this *action*, in all cases, have been demonstrated by mathematicians, particularly in the *laws of motion*, and the corollaries, at the beginning of the *Principia*. But un*solid* matter, that is, matter which admits other matter into its place without resistance, cannot act at all by impulse; and this is the only way in which it is capable of acting.—See the next, and some of the following remarks,

ANSWER,

ANSWER, *by* DR. PRIESTLEY.

All the laws relating to what has been called the *collision of bodies* are necessarily the very same, whether their separation from each other be supposed to take place at the point of contact, or at any given distance from it, occasioned by a power of repulsion, extending so far beyond the real surface. The *laws of motion* are only general rules, to which the facts relating to the approach of bodies to each other, and their receding from each other, are reducible, and are consistent with any *cause* of such approaching or receding.

Unsolid matter is here said to admit other matter into its place *without resistance*; but this is directly contrary to the hypothesis, which makes matter to be a substance, which, though penetrable, is possessed of a power of repulsion, which, if an approaching body be not able to overcome, effectually prevents it from coming into its place. If it was not possible for matter to act but by impulse,

it could not be true that rays of light are reflected from bodies at a distance from their surfaces, which Sir Isaac Newton has shewn to be the fact.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 4. “The resistance of
“matter is never occasioned by its *solidity*,
“but by a *power of repulsion*, always acting
“at a real distance from the body.”

But suppose it solid, or impenetrable, in the common sense, could we not conceive of its being brought into contact with other matter; and would there not then be resistance, and action? Does Dr. Priestley here mean that one particle of matter can act upon another without contact and impulse; or in other words, that matter can, *by its own proper agency*, attract or repel other matter which is at a distance from it? If this is true, a maxim hitherto universally received must be false, That *nothing can act where it is not*. If matter can act at the least distance from itself, it may at the greatest.

Sir

Sir Isaac Newton, in his letters to Dr. Bentley, calls the notion that matter possesses an innate power of attraction, or that it can act upon matter at a distance, and attract and repel by its own agency, “an absurdity into which, he thought, no one could possibly fall.”—Shall I here beg leave to refer to what I have written on this subject in the *Dissertations on Providence*? (p. 39, &c.)

ANSWER:

I do not say that, supposing matter to have solidity, it could not act upon other matter by impulse; but that there is no evidence *from fact*, that resistance is ever occasioned by any thing absolutely impenetrable. It is undeniable, that, in *all known cases*, resistance is owing to some *other cause*, and therefore it is contrary to the acknowledged rules of philosophizing to suppose resistance in *any case* to be owing to this cause.

The difficulty respecting matter *acting where it is not* is precisely the same, whe-

§ OF THE PENETRABILITY OF MATTER,

ther it be supposed to be penetrable or impenetrable. Let any person explain how it is that the sun acts upon the earth, or how the parts of solid bodies are kept at a distance from each other *upon any hypothesis*. For a more particular discussion of this subject, I refer the reader to the sheet of *Illustrations*, subjoined to the *Disquisitions*.

At the close of this remark, Dr. Price refers me to his *Dissertations on Providence*. (p. 39, &c.) I have read the whole passage with care, but find nothing in it that appears to me to bear harder upon my hypothesis than on the common one. For it only shows, though in a very clear and masterly manner, that the present laws of nature require an *intelligence*, and an *energy*, of which what we usually call matter is not capable. Now I certainly admit an intelligent and active cause in nature, and have no objection to supposing that this intelligent cause has even more to do in the execution of the laws of nature than Dr. Price is willing to allow.

DR. PRICE.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 14. "The particles of
"light never impinge on any solid parts in
"passing through glafs, &c." How does
this appear? All the light never passes
through glafs. Part of it probably im-
pinges, and is lost. This was Sir Isaac
Newton's opinion. *Opticks*, p. 241.

ANSWER.

That the particles of light never impinge
on the solid part of glafs, &c. is evident
from none of them being observed to be
deflected from their course after they have
entered it, provided the substance be per-
fectly transparent. Newton's supposition
of particles of light being lost by their
impinging on the solid particles of bo-
dies, is neither probable in itself, nor coun-
tenanced by any *fact*. The most probable
effect of such impinging would be a re-
flexion, and not a cessation of motion.

DR. PRICE.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 17. “Matter has in fact no properties but those of attraction and repulsion.”

This is frequently asserted in the course of these *Disquisitions*; and matter is declared to be nothing but powers. And yet in p. 25, the property of *extension* is expressly ascribed to matter, *by which it occupies a certain portion of space*. And in p. 19, it is said to consist of *physical points* only, (that is, small parts of extension) *endued with powers of attraction and repulsion taking place at different distances*—— This is not consistent; but let us examine it particularly, and consider what matter is.

Matter, if it be any thing at all, must consist of solid particles or atoms occupying a certain portion of space, and therefore *extended*, but at the same time *simple* and *uncompounded*, and incapable of being resolved into any other smaller particles; and it must be the different form of these *primary* particles and their different combinations

binations and arrangement that constitute the different bodies and kinds of matter in the universe——This seems to have been Sir Isaac Newton's idea of matter. See his *Opticks*, p. 375, &c.

Mr. Baxter's notion that these particles are themselves composed of other particles which cohere by divine agency; and, for the same reason, these others of others still smaller which cohere by the same cause, and so on; this notion appears to me absurd. According to the account just given, each of these particles is a *monad*, or a *solid continuum*, void of pore, and, as such, endued with resistance and impenetrability, and capable of receiving and communicating motion by impulse, according to the laws of collision explained by *Keil*, *Newton*, and others.

If this is not a right account, then matter must be either *mere* extension; or it must be something more, which is entirely unknown to us. If the former is true, then matter is nothing but space. Instead of
having

having pores, it is all pore. Like space, it must be necessary and infinite, and a vacuum must be impossible. This was Descartes's notion of matter, and also Spinoza's, who has founded upon it a system of atheism.

On the other hand, if it is asserted that the elementary parts of matter have in them something more than extension, but that this something, not being *solidity*, is unknown to us, it will follow, that, being ignorant what matter is, we cannot reason about it, or determine any more concerning it than that, wanting solidity, it is incapable of acting or re-acting in any way on other matter.

It must not be said, that the property which matter has more than extension, is a power of attracting and repelling. This would be saying that void space attracts and repels. Besides, it has been shewn that the particles of matter cannot, according to any conception of them, have such a power. When two particles not in contact, are said to attract one another, all that is meant, is, that there is some force that
drives

drives them towards one another, according to a certain law. That force, it is certain, cannot be their own force, for the reason already assigned. It must then be the *impulse* of surrounding particles, or (if that is not possible) some other *foreign* force. The power, therefore, of attraction and repulsion ascribed to matter, is demonstrably a *foreign* property. I say *demonstrably*; for nothing can be demonstrated, if a position can be false which is implied in a maxim so clear as that, "nothing can act where it is not."

In short. Matter, according to the idea of it into which I am enquiring, being an *unknown extended something* which makes no opposition to any thing that would take its place, and not being capable of acting beyond the space which it occupies, can have no powers. It can be of no use. It is as superfluous in nature as Dr. Priestley in p. 65, &c. represents matter to be according to Mr. Baxter's account—But more than this may be said. From Dr. Priestley's account of matter it may be inferred, not only that it is of no use, but that it must be

14 OF THE PENETRABILITY OF MATTER,

be a *non-entity*. It has, he asserts repeatedly, no other property than the power of attracting and repelling ; and the argument in *Disquisitions*, p. 5 and 6, obliges him to assert this. But it has been proved that this is a property that cannot belong to it. It must, therefore, be *nothing*.

Let it, however, be allowed the property of *extension*. If not *mere* extension, it must be something that has shape and form, and is circumscribed within a certain portion of space. It must, therefore, consist of parts. These parts must be held together by some power ; and the same must be true of the *parts* of these *parts*, and so on. But we cannot go on thus *in infinitum*. The existence of matter, therefore, is impossible,

Should it be said in answer to this, that the primitive particles of matter may be extended and figured, and yet not be divisible, or want any attracting force to keep them from resolving themselves into nothing. Should this be said, I will say the same of
a *solid*

a *solid continuum*, or the *monads* which constitute matter, and the argument in *Disquisitions*, p. 5, &c. will be overthrown.

But to return to the assertion that matter has no other property than the power of attraction and repulsion. All power is the power of something. What is that something in the present case?—Is it a power of attraction and repulsion only that perceives, thinks, reasons, &c. Is it only powers that circulate in our veins, vibrate in the nerves, revolve round the sun, &c.—I will add what seems particularly worth Dr. Priestley's consideration. According to his own system, the attraction and repulsion of matter, (performed with a skill that gives the world its order and beauty) cannot be its own actions. They must be the effects of some action upon it. But of what action are they effects? Let this be explained. If the effects of such action as that of ideas and motives on conscious and thinking beings, then since all matter attracts and repels, all matter must be conscious and intelligent. ○

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

It is very possible that, in defining matter in different places in a large treatise, with a view to different objects, I may sometimes have omitted some particulars, to which it was not then necessary to attend. The complete definition is evidently this, viz. that *matter is an extended substance, possessed of certain powers of attraction and repulsion.*

That “matter wanting solidity must be incapable of acting or re-acting in any way on other matter” cannot be asserted, without taking it for granted, that a substance defined as matter is defined above, is in itself impossible. Now, it is rather extraordinary, that the only *proof* of impenetrability should be *actual impulse*, and yet that no clear case of actual impulse can be assigned; and that a definition of matter framed purposely to correspond to *facts only*, should be deemed impossible, that is, *contrary to fact.*

The reasoning in this remark goes upon the idea that matter must be nothing at all, if it have not the property of *impenetrability*,

bility, a property which no one fact requires, and therefore which ought not to be admitted by any philosopher. It also seems to have arisen from a want of considering, that the term *thing*, or *substance*, signifies nothing more than that to which properties are ascribed, and is itself absolutely unknown, and incapable of suggesting any idea whatever. For when we exclude all properties, we, at the same time, exclude from our minds all idea of substance, and have nothing left to contemplate. Thus, a mass of gold is defined to be a substance of a certain length, breadth, and thickness, of a certain colour, weight, &c. But take away all colour, weight, length, breadth, thickness, with every other sensible quality, and where is the substance of the gold? Impenetrability is only a property, or something that is *affirmed* concerning material substances, and therefore must not be affirmed without proof, any more than penetrability, or any other property. Now what I demand, is, *a proof from fact*, that any material substance is impenetrable to other material substances. Till this be

B

produced,

produced, I cannot, as a philosopher, admit that matter has such a property. On the contrary, analogy obliges me to suppose, that, since all the evidence of bodies being impenetrable, when rigorously examined, *i. e.* by actual experiments, (as optical, electrical, &c.) appear to be cases in which bodies are prevented from coming into actual contact by *powers*, acting at a distance from their surfaces, that *all* resistance is of this kind only.

If the reasoning in the last part of this remark be just, it will not follow that, because all the powers of matter may be analyzed into modes of attraction and repulsion, all particular substances must have the very *same modes* of attraction and repulsion, and consequently that there is no difference between *acids* and *alkalis*, *metals* and *earths*, &c. The powers of perception and thought, in how great a degree soever they be unknown to us, may be the result of a certain state of the brain, and certain motions taking place within it, though they could not result from

from matter of a different form, texture, or consistence.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, page 81 and 104. *Matter has no other powers than those of attraction and repulsion.*

What is it that attracts and repels, and that is attracted and repelled? Till I am informed of this, no more is told me of matter, than would be told me of the inhabitants of *Jupiter*, by saying that they have no other powers than those of *moving* (or rather *being moved*) *to* and *from* one another. And to make the idea of matter to consist in being thus moved; or to say, that it has no other power or property, and at the same time to ascribe to it the powers of thought, sensation and reason—This seems to me indeed extraordinary—How totally different are attraction and repulsion from perception, consciousness and judgment? What connexion can there be between them?

B 2

ANSWER,

ANSWER.

It is impossible to know more of matter than can be inferred from the *phenomena* in which it is concerned. The relation that attractions and repulsions bear to several modes of thought, may be seen in *Hartley's Observations on Man*. But though the *mode* of the connection be ever so much unknown, the *reality* of the connexion is evident from fact. Perception, and all the modes of thinking, as much depend upon the brain, as the power of giving a blow to a stick. Is not the *reality* of the union of the soul and body, on the common hypothesis, always asserted, without any person pretending to have the least idea of the *mode* of such an union?

DR. PRICE.

Page 105. “ When we attempt to form
 “ an idea of the substance of matter ex-
 “ clusive of the powers of attraction and
 “ repulsion which it has, and exclusive of
 “ impenetrability

“ impenetrability which it has not, absolutely nothing is left”—This is very true, and the just conclusion from it is, that matter does not exist.

Exclusive of attraction and repulsion, it is here said, matter is absolutely nothing. But it has been demonstrated that it does not attract and repel, therefore it must be nothing. Besides, allow it the power of attracting and repelling, yet if, as here asserted, it is nothing but this power, it must be the power of nothing, and the very idea of it is a contradiction—What a strange thing indeed is matter according to Dr. Priestley’s ideas? Its essence, it seems, consists in impelling (without touching, or exerting any force that is conceivable) other matter, *towards* itself and *from* itself. Take this away; set it at rest, or remove its neighbours, so as that it may have nothing to act upon, and it becomes nothing. The whole of it may be crowded into the very space that is now occupied by the smallest of its component parts, or into any compass not so little as a mathematical point,

and in consequence of this, having nothing to attract or repel it would be nothing.

ANSWER.

What a strange thing, indeed, is matter, according to Dr. Price's construction of my meaning; but such matter as he here describes I never had in contemplation. The matter of which I treat is a substance possessed of certain powers of attraction and repulsion. These powers may be exerted more or less, or not at all, according to circumstances. To matter thus defined I cannot conceive that any of these remarks do in the least apply.

A QUERY BY DR. PRICE.

If matter is not solid extension, what is it more than mere extension?

ANSWER.

If, as Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price suppose, *Spirit* be extended, but not solid, what is
that

that more than mere extension? If Spirit can act upon matter, as they suppose, it must have the very power of attraction and repulsion with respect to matter that I ascribe to unsolid matter. If they chuse to call my matter by the name of *Spirit*, I have no sort of objection. All that I contend for is such a *conjunction of powers in the same thing*, or substance, by whatever term it be denominated, as we find by experience always go together, so as not to multiply substances without necessity.

THE

THE SECOND COMMUNICATION.

OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, *containing Remarks by Dr. Price on Dr. Priestley's Replies to the first Communication; with Dr. Priestley's second Replies.*

DR. PRICE'S *Observations on the Reply*, p. 5.

THE laws of the collision of bodies, as determined by mathematicians, relate to two sorts of bodies; *elastic* and *unelastic*. The laws which govern the collisions of the latter suppose no repulsion between them; and are founded entirely on the consideration of matter as *solid* extension, and consequently *inert*, and endowed with all those properties expressed by Sir Isaac Newton in his three laws of motion—The laws also which govern the collisions of the latter sort of bodies, suppose matter to possess solidity, or a *momentum* in moving, proportioned to its quantity

quantity and velocity, independent of its power of repulsion—For example, When an elastic body at rest is struck by another equal elastic body, the effect of the collision will be that the latter will lose its whole motion, and the other move forward with the very velocity which the impelling body possessed before collision. But if both bodies were void of solidity, or nothing but figured and moveable extensions repelling one another, the impelling body would move *back*, and the other would move *forward* as soon as they began to repel one another. It would be impossible for them to enter into the sphere of one another's repulsion, because they wanted that *solidity* which gives *momentum*.

It is not, in my opinion, consistent with Dr. Priestley's own system to intimate (as he seems to do in the passages in his *Disquisitions*, to which I have referred in my first remark) that "matter possesses "powers", and that it is a vulgar error to think it "indifferent to rest or motion "but as it is acted upon by some foreign cause." If matter can move without

out being acted upon by a foreign cause, it must move itself; but this Dr. Priestley cannot allow. He must, therefore, say that it is entirely a torpid and passive thing. This, without doubt, is the matter which is the object of natural philosophy: and it is this property that, in my opinion, forms one of the fundamental differences between it and spirit.

When I say that *unsolid* matter will admit other matter into its place “without resistance,” I mean, “without any resistance given by itself;” and I suppose *contact*, which Dr. Priestley must grant to be at least *conceivable*. The resistance arising from repulsion, being always made at a distance, is not the resistance of the matter itself that is said to repel, but of some foreign cause: and this I apprehend to be just as certain as that nothing can act on another thing without being present to it. When a ray of light is reflected from a body *before* contact, it is certainly not that body itself that reflects the light: nor did Sir Isaac Newton, who discovered the fact, ever mean

mean to assert this; on the contrary, he has called this an absurdity which no one can receive. He professes to have discovered only certain facts in the constitution of nature: the causes he has left others to investigate.

A N S W E R.

I cannot conceive any difference between the case of *elastic* and *non-elastic* bodies, with respect to the hypothesis in question; since whatever may be supposed concerning the parts of a *solid*, may be said concerning that *sphere of repulsion*, which, on the new hypothesis, is to be substituted in the place of such solid parts. It is denied that solidity is necessary to give *momentum*, since a sphere of resistance may, in certain circumstances, be as impenetrable as any supposed solid substance. It is not solidity, but the *resistance* occasioned by it that is the immediate cause of *momentum*.

I readily admit the inaccuracy that Dr. Price observes. But I could not mean to give to a stone the self-determining power which
I had

I had denied to man. My meaning through the whole was, that matter, to be what it is, must be possessed of what has been denominated a *power*, viz. attraction, especially that of cohesion. All that I mean by a repulsion at a distance from the surface of a body, is, that which Sir Isaac Newton proves to be the case with respect to light ; so that whatever solution may be found for the difficulty in his case, will serve for mine. His too is the case of an elastic substance.

DR. PRICE's *Observations on the Reply*, p. 7, 8.

Dr. Priestley, in his *Illustrations*, (see the *Disquisitions*, p. 350.) says, that Newton considered attraction and repulsion as “ powers inhering *in* and properly belonging to “ matter.” With great deference to Dr. Priestley's superior knowledge on this subject, I would observe, that I have never met with any assertion in Sir Isaac Newton's works that can be fairly construed to imply this ; and that it is scarcely possible that he should have used any expressions which will bear this interpretation, except when
speaking

speaking loosely, and by way of accommodation to vulgar conceptions. I have quoted a passage from the letters that passed between him and Dr. Bentley, in which he says the contrary very strongly. In the same letters he says to Dr. Bentley, "Pray don't ascribe the notion of *innate* gravity to me." And, in an advertisement prefixed to his *Treatise on Optics*, he informs the public, that he had, in the second edition of this treatise, added a question concerning the cause of gravity, on purpose to shew that he did not take it to be an essential property of bodies. And what he thought of the attraction or gravitation of matter he certainly thought likewise of its repulsion; and would have acknowledged concerning the repulsion of that æther which (merely in the way of conjecture and illustration) he has supposed to be the cause of gravity.

Dr. Priestley here takes notice of the difficulty there is in accounting for the attractions and repulsions of bodies on *any hypothesis*. But the maxim that "nothing
" can

“can act where it is not,” proves more than a difficulty in this case. It proves that since these attractions and repulsions are always performed at a distance, and sometimes the *greatest* distance from the surfaces of bodies, it is impossible they should be the actions of the bodies themselves; and consequently, that they are not properties inhering in bodies, or that belong to the nature of matter as matter.

If nothing can act where it is not, matter cannot attract or repel where it is not. It cannot, therefore, have the *power* of attraction and repulsion: and it must be an absurdity to include such a power in the definition of it; or to make it *an essential property* of matter. In short, this seems to me the same absurdity, that it would be to ascribe to man actions done by a higher order of beings; and when it is asked what he is, to describe or define him by these.

No light (see p. 9.) that falls perpendicularly on an uniform transparent surface can be deflected in passing through it. But
how

how does it appear that any substance can be made so transparent as to stop *none* of the light that enters it?

DR. PRICE'S *Observations on Reply*, p. 16.

What has been said under the last head is all I would say with respect to the first part of this *Reply*. As to the latter part of it, I would observe, that we ascribe impenetrability or solidity to matter partly because we find that we never can make one body occupy the place of another without removing it. The reason of this appears indeed in some instances to be, that they repel one another: but in most instances no such repulsion appears: and the true reason may be, that they are brought into contact, and will not penetrate one another in consequence of that essential property which we call *solidity*, and which we find ourselves under a necessity of ascribing to matter, in order to distinguish it from *mere extension*, or void space. Even in the collisions of elastic bodies, the probability is, that there is contact and impulse; and that the reason of their flying off from one
another,

another, or rebounding, is, that their parts, by impinging, are bent inwards, and afterwards unbent: agreeably to the reasonings of natural philosophers. I am, however, of opinion, that we derive our ideas of the solidity of bodies, not so much from experience, as from another more important inlet of ideas, which I have endeavoured to explain in the first chapter of my *Treatise on Morals*. But I may be very wrong: and I refer all my disquisitions on these and other subjects, to the candid attention of those who may think it worth their while to consider them.

When I say that "Matter wanting solidity must be incapable of acting, or re-acting on other matter," I mean, by any action of its own. Two equal solid bodies moving towards one another in contrary directions, and with equal velocities, will meet and impinge and stop one another: but if *unsolid* they would not act at all on one another, but pass through one another, just as if there had been nothing in their way. Dr. Priestley, in a subsequent reply, (see P. 22) says,

says, if I understand him, that matter sometimes neither attracts nor repels "according to circumstances." It is of *such* matter I here speak.—Sir Isaac Newton calls that *vis inertiae* and *solidity*, which he says experience teaches us to ascribe to all bodies, even the minutest, *the foundation of all philosophy*. See his comment on his third rule of philosophizing.

DR. PRICE'S *Observations on Reply*, p. 22.

In the passage which has occasioned the remark to which Dr. Priestley makes this reply, it is said, that matter without the power of attraction and repulsion is nothing; and in p. 5, &c. he asserts, that this power is necessary to the very being of matter. I must insist upon it that matter cannot possess this power; and that, consequently, according to Dr. Priestley's account of matter, it is *nothing*. Let it be as clearly proved that matter cannot possess *solidity*, and I will say the same of my own account of matter.

C

Dr.

Dr. Priestley, in this reply, seems to acknowledge that, in particular circumstances, matter neither attracts nor repels: and it is very obvious that there must be such circumstances; how then can attraction and repulsion be its essential property? Would not one think that if it is essential to it to attract, it cannot be also essential to it to repel? What is matter when it neither attracts nor repels, different from void space? I wish for a direct answer to this question. How does matter know *when*, and *where*, and with *what precise degree of force*, at different distances, to attract and repel other matter? Or were there a possibility of its being *knowing* enough for this, how can it have the *power*, when perhaps the matter it is said to act upon, is at the distance of millions of miles from it? Even the Deity knows all things, and acts upon all things, only by being present with all things. “Deus est omnipresens (says Newton at the end of the *Principia*) non per *virtutem* solam, sed per *substantiam*; nam *virtus* sine *substantia* subsistere non potest.” But I have
perhaps

perhaps repeated these arguments too often : and however decisive they appear to me, I am afraid Dr. Priestley will think I mean to tease him, and to wrangle with him. But I am as far as possible from having any such intention.

I am glad to learn from his Reply (p. 8.) that he approves of the reasoning I have used in the *Dissertation on Providence*, to prove that the laws of nature are derived from an intelligence, and a constant energy, of which matter is not capable. With this is connected a truth the most important and joyful of all truths : I mean, that there exists an All-wise Providence, or a benevolent and perfect direction of all events. Our agreement in these things should make us regard less our differences on other points.

In answer to a query of mine which follows this reply, Dr. Priestley asks, p. 22, " If *spirit* be extended, what is it more than " mere extension ?" I answer, consciousness, perception, thought, &c. If this is likewise what matter is *more* than mere ex-

tenſion, then *matter* and *ſpirit* are the ſame ; and our controverſy is at an end. But the truth ſeems to be, that not extenſion, but ſolidity, inertneſs, figure, diſceptibility, &c. are the properties which diſtinguiſh matter : and that, on the contrary, ſenſation, perception, ſimplicity, ſelf-determination, judgment, &c. are the properties which diſtinguiſh ſpirit. I am entirely in the dark with reſpect to the *extenſion* of ſpirit, and therefore chuſe to enter into no diſpute about it. All I am ſure of, is, that it poſſeſſes locality. The *manner* I do not comprehend.

A N S W E R.

If certain effects invariably take place in any caſe in which bodies are concerned, as on their mutual approach when placed at a given diſtance, the analogy of language requires us to ſay, that thoſe bodies are poſſeſſed of the power of approaching or attracting one another. But by ſaying that bodies have certain properties, philoſophers, I apprehend, only mean to expreſs the unknown cauſe of the known effects. As to
real

real *agency*, a necessarian can allow of no more than one proper seat or source of it.

If, in any case, “no light can be deflected in passing through an uniformly transparent substance”, whether we can by art make it perfectly so or not, (p. 5.) it is all that my hypothesis requires.

By matter attracting, or not attracting, I could only mean, either that, in certain circumstances, attraction and repulsion may be so balanced, as that no effect would be apparent, or that leaving out the consideration of attraction of cohesion, there might be no foreign body to be attracted. Take away all attraction of cohesion, and let any person say whether any thing will be left to correspond to our common definition of matter, which is my ground for saying that, in that case, it will *cease to be*. There would, in that case, be an actual division *in infinitum*. Attraction and repulsion may be, and probably are, in reality, the same power; and some philosophers

are inclined to think it to be the one, and some the other.

As to the question to which Dr. Price requires a direct answer, viz. "How matter can *know* when and where to act," I reply, that the answer will be the very same as to this question: How do the rays of light, or the bodies to which they approach, know at what distance they are to begin to recede from each other? Whatever shall be deemed a sufficient cause in this case, I shall admit to be sufficient in the other. In my hypothesis I only mean to combine known *facts*, without entering into the doctrine of *causes*.

Dr. Price says, that besides extension, spirit is possessed of *consciousness*, *perception*, &c. I answer, that besides extension body possesses a power of attraction, &c. He says, take away attraction, and what is *body* but mere extension; I also say, take away consciousness, perception, &c. and what is *spirit* but mere extension?

THE THIRD COMMUNICATION.

OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, *containing Remarks by Dr. Price on Dr. Priestley's Replies in the Second Communication, (p. 27 and 36.) with Dr. Priestley's third Replies.*

MATTER that is not solid is the same with *pore*: it cannot therefore possess what natural philosophers mean by the *momentum*, a *force of bodies*, which is always in proportion to the quantity of matter in bodies, void of pore. *Momentum* is the cause of resistance, and not *vice versa*.

I must here repeat (see p. 36, 37, &c.) the following propositions, which I think have been demonstrated; that matter has not the power of attracting and repelling—That this power is the power of some foreign

cause, acting upon matter according to stated laws—and that, consequently, attraction and repulsion, not being actions, much less inherent qualities of matter, it ought not to be defined by them.

A N S W E R.

I by no means allow, that though matter have not the property called *solidity*, or *impenetrability*, it must be all *pore*, i. e. have no properties at all, or be nothing but empty space. If so, it would follow that *no substance* destitute of *solidity* can be any thing at all. Even every thing that has been called *spirit* would be a non-entity.

If what Dr. Price calls *spirit*, a substance without *solidity*, and consequently without *momentum*, can nevertheless act upon bodies; e. g. the brain, surely the substances that I term material, though they be not impenetrable, may have the same power with respect to each other.

Article

Article II. Every thing that exists must be defined by its properties, or to speak more exactly, by the circumstances respecting it. Thus if I describe a magnet, I must mention, as peculiar and *belonging* to it, the kinds of attraction and repulsion that take place when it is introduced, whether those attractions and repulsions, strictly speaking, necessarily accompany it, or be caused by the Deity, or some intermediate unknown agent.

THE

THE FOURTH COMMUNICATION.

OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, *by Dr. Price, with Dr. Priestley's Answer.*

IT is, in my opinion, particularly incumbent on Dr. Priestley, to give a more explicit answer than he has yet given to the question, “What the true idea of “matter is?” or “what inherent and essential property it possesses that distinguishes it from mere space?”—I must repeat here what I have said in my first remarks, and insist upon it as of particular importance, that no answer is given to this question, by saying, that matter is SOME-THING which is attracted and repelled; or, in other words, that it is *something* which is continually acted upon by a foreign force —What is it that is so acted upon?—

Not

Not mere space. That is absurd——Not a *solid* substance. There is no such thing according to Dr. Priestley——Not the subject of consciousness and thought. That would imply there is nothing but spirit in nature——The attractions and repulsions which take place between different bodies are only *external circumstances* which distinguish one parcel of matter from another (a magnet, for instance, from other substances) but they enter not into the idea of matter *as* matter. There are circumstances in which matter neither attracts nor repels; as, particularly in the limit between the sphere of attraction and repulsion.

But this leads me to the chief observation I intended to make——If I understand Dr. Priestley, all bodies at a small distance repel one another, so as to make contact between them impracticable. Within the sphere of repulsion, the *attraction of cohesion* takes place; and this is the power which, according to Dr. Priestley, *unites* the parts of matter, and gives it existence. But, since matter is penetrable, will not
this

this attraction drive all the parts of it into one another, and cause them to coalesce into nothing?—This effect must follow, unless there exists, beyond the sphere of attraction and nearer to matter, a second sphere of repulsion, which again prevents contact. The argument which Dr. Priestley draws from the effect of cold in contracting bodies, and of heat in swelling them, makes it probable that this is his opinion. And, if true, the elementary parts of matter possess just the contrary principle to that which he asserts to be necessary to preserve their existence.

In short, since we cannot go on assigning a sphere of repulsion beyond a sphere of attraction, and a sphere of attraction beyond a sphere of repulsion *in infinitum*; either no power at all acts on the elements of matter, or, if a power does act, it must be either a power of attraction, or a power of repulsion. Dr. Priestley asserts, that if no power at all acts to keep matter together, it must *crumble* into *nothing*. And it appears evident to me, that if a power of attracting acts, it must *contract* itself into nothing; and that

that if a power of repulsion acts, it must *dissipate* itself into nothing.

What can be done in this dilemma? The truth seems to be, that there is an absurdity in supposing the elements of matter to consist of parts actually distinct and separable, which require a foreign agency to unite them. For the same reason that these elements must consist of such parts, the elements of those elements must consist of such parts, and so on for ever. I have observed in my first remarks, that we must terminate in parts, each of which is a solid *continuum* incapable of division.—Indeed, every real existence or substance must be a *monad*. We are sure this is true of the beings we are best acquainted with; I mean, *ourselves*, and all conscious and sentient beings. And if it be not true of matter, I know not what it is.

ANSWER.

With respect to the *definition of matter*, I really am not able to be more explicit than I have been. A definition of any particular *thing*, *substance*, or *being* (call it what you will) cannot be any thing more
than

than an enumeration of its known *properties*; and in all cases whatever, as with respect to *matter*, *spirit*, &c. &c. if we take away all the known properties, nothing will be left, of which we can possibly have any idea at all; every thing else being merely *hypothetical*, and the terms *substance*, *thing*, *essence*, &c. being, as I have observed, nothing more than a help to expression; it being a convenience in speech to have certain words of this universal application.

Solid *atoms*, or *monads of matter*, can only be hypothetical things; and till we can either touch them, or come at them, some way or other, by actual experiment, I cannot be obliged to admit their existence. Admitting the existence of these solid atoms, they do not help us, in the least, to explain any of the known properties of matter. All the *effects* are reducible to attractions or repulsions. Now what connection is there between *solidity*, and *attraction*, or even repulsion at a distance from the surface of a body; and though resistance at the point of contact might be explained by it,

no

no such thing as *real contact* can be *proved*; and most of the known repulsions in nature, do certainly take place in *other circumstances*, and therefore must have some *other cause*.

In reply to Dr. Price, I must observe, that the limit between a sphere of attraction and another of repulsion, cannot be a place where neither of these powers are exerted, but where they balance each other. It does not follow that because a beam is in equilibrio, there are no weights in the scales.

That there are spheres of attraction and repulsion within each other is evident from fact, as in electricity, magnetism, &c. nor can the cohesion of bodies, the parts of which (as is demonstrable from the phenomena of cold) do not actually touch each other, be explained without it. The parts of bodies must therefore attract each other at one distance, and repel at another; and in the limit between both they must remain; and by this means bodies retain their form and texture.

PART

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P A R T II.*Of the Nature of MIND or SPIRIT.*

THE FIRST COMMUNICATION,

By Dr. Price, with Dr. Priestley's Answers.

I N answer to the several arguments in the *Disquisitions*, Sect. III. and IV. it seems enough to say, that a *connection* and *dependence* by no means prove *sameness*. We are conscious of the contrary in the present case. Seeing depends on our eyes, but *we* are not our eyes, any more than the eye itself is the telescope through which it looks, or the artist is the tool which he uses.

A N S W E R.

This is by no means a just state of the argument. I infer that the business of thinking is wholly carried on *in*, and *by*
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the brain itself, because all the effects from which we infer the faculty of thinking, can be traced to the brain, and *no farther*. I conclude that the ultimate perceptive power relating to objects of sight is not in the eye, because, though the eye be necessary to acquire ideas of sight, they remain *somewhere* when the eye is destroyed. But I have no reason whatever to refer this perceptive power to any thing beyond the brain, because when the brain is destroyed, there is, to all appearance, an end of all sensation and thought. To suppose that when the brain is destroyed the ideas remain in *something else*, is a mere hypothesis, unsupported by any fact whatever.

A philosopher supposes no more *causes* than are necessary to explain *effects*. He finds the business of thinking to be dependent upon the brain, and therefore he concludes that the brain itself is competent to this business, whatever it be. To suppose any thing farther is mere hypothesis, and utterly unphilosophical. What I maintain then is, that, according to the established

blished rules of philosophizing, we are not authorized to suppose any thing *within the brain* to be the seat of thought. If we do, we may just as well suppose it to reside in something within that, and in something again within that, and so on without end; and just as the Indians are said to place the earth upon an elephant, the elephant upon a tortoise, and the tortoise on they knew not what.

DR. PRICE.

In the *Disquisitions*, page 37 and 102, it is asserted, that ideas are certainly divisible. This seems to me very absurd. It would be as proper to assert ideas to be hard or round. The idea of an object is the apprehension, view, or notion of it; and how can this be divisible?—Perception is a single and indivisible act. The object perceived may be divisible; but the *perception* of it by the mind cannot be so.

ANSWER.

What appears to Dr. Price to be *very absurd*, I cannot help thinking, after the

most deliberate review, to be very certain, and very clear. What correspondence can there be between an idea and its archetype, if the archetype consist of parts, and the idea have no parts. He seems to have been misled, by not distinguishing between the *power*, or rather the *act* of perception, and the thing (*i. e.* the *idea*) perceived. The object of perception, he acknowledges to be divisible, but *the perception of it by the mind* cannot be so. True, because perception is either a faculty, or an act of a faculty, to which divisibility is not applicable; but the thing about which the perceptive power is employed (which is not the object itself, but the idea, or representation of it in the mind) must be as divisible as the archetype of that idea. If the mind be a simple and indivisible substance, it cannot be possessed of more than a single idea, and that the idea of something to which division is not applicable. However, I do not see why Dr. Price should object to a *repository of divisible ideas* in a mind which he supposes to be actually extended,

extended, and consequently to have room enough for that purpose.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, page 44, &c. 74, &c. Mr. Baxter, and other ingenious men, have undoubtedly said a great deal that is very groundless about the union of the body to the soul; its being a clog; its leaving the soul more capable of exerting its powers when separated from it, &c. Were all that has been said on these subjects true, there would be no occasion for a resurrection. Nay, it would be a calamity, not a benefit. A false philosophy has, in this instance, contradicted nature and experience, as well as revelation. Thus far I agree entirely with Dr. Priestley; but some of the objections in Sect. V. have little weight with me, and cannot easily be answered on any hypothesis. If it must be taken for granted that brutes, or the sentient principles in brutes, are annihilated at death, as seems to be hinted sometimes by Dr. Priestley, I am afraid it will not easily be

believed that the same is not true of men. And if true, there will be a complete end of us: a resurrection will be a contradiction—But it will come in my way to say more to this purpose.

ANSWER.

My only reason for not supposing that *brutes* will not survive the grave, is, that there is no hint of it in revelation, where only it is that we are informed that *men* will rise again. It may, however, be true, though we have not been informed of it, and the analogy between men and other animals, makes it not very improbable.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 54. Dr. Priestley here, and throughout a great part of this work, argues on the supposition, that, according to the ideas of modern metaphysicians, spirit can have no relation to place, and is incapable of being present any where. This seems to me a mistake. I do not know what modern metaphysicians Dr. Priestley

Priestley means, except the Cartesians. I am certain Dr. Clarke, and some others of the best modern writers, did not entertain these ideas of spirit. It is a maxim that cannot be disputed, that *time* and *place* are necessary to the existence of all things. Dr. Clarke has made use of this maxim, to prove that infinite space and duration are the essential properties of the Deity; and I think he was right. Sir Isaac Newton thought in the same way, as appears from some passages at the end of his *Principia*, and in the queries at the end of his *Opticks*. As far, therefore, as Dr. Priestley combats a notion of spirit that implies it has no relation to space, and exists no where, he combats an absurdity and contradiction which deserves no regard — What the nature is of the relation of spirit to place, or in what *manner* it is present in space, I am utterly ignorant. But I can be sure that, if it exists at all, it must exist *somewhere*, as well as in *some time*.

Dr. Clarke was not for excluding expansion from the idea of immaterial thinking substances.

substances. See his *first defence of an argument to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul*, in answer to *Collins*. —Has Dr. Priestley read this controversy? or has he read the chapter on a Future State, with which *Butler's Analogy* begins? —If he had, I fancy he would have writ differently in some parts of this book. Dr. Clarke is, without all doubt, the best and ablest of all writers, on the subjects of the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul, and also on *Liberty and Necessity*. What he says on these subjects in his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, is but inconsiderable, compared with what he has said in his *Answer to Dodwell*, his *Controversies with Collins*, and the *Letters between him and Leibnitz*.

I think it of little consequence, whether it *can*, or *cannot*, be determined, whether the subject of consciousness and thought in man is matter, if by matter is meant not solid extension, but an unknown something, that has a relation to place; and it was hardly worth while to write a book to prove this.

Matter

Matter is incapable of consciousness and thought, not because it is *extended*, but because it is *solid*, and as such inert and capable of being divided without being annihilated.

Solid extension; and *perception*, *thought*, *volition*, &c. are totally different things; and it is just as clear that the latter cannot be the figure, motion, and arrangement of the parts of the former, as that any one thing cannot *be* another; that a square, for instance, cannot *be*, or be *made to be*, sound, or colour. Our ideas of *figured*, *extended*, *solid substances*, and of *conscious*, *perceiving*, *thinking substances*, are, according to Mr. Locke's observation, equally clear and distinct. It seems, therefore, very unreasonable to confound them, or to talk of superadding one of them to the other.

Dr. Clarke makes use of the instance of *space*, to prove that there is no necessary connection between extension and discernibility. *Moveantur partes spatii de locis suis & movebuntur de seipsis.* Newton's *Princip. Lib. I. Schol. Defin. 8.*

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

I consider Mr. Baxter as having been one of the most consistent of all the Immaterialists. That such a scheme as his is the only consistent one, is, I think, sufficiently proved by Dr. Watts. Some of his arguments I have referred to p. 221, and other reasons for this opinion I have suggested, p. 55, &c.

If, as Dr. Clarke supposes, spirits have real extension, they must be of some shape, and therefore their relation to space cannot be a thing of which we are *utterly ignorant*. We may not know *where* they are, or *how much space* they occupy, (whether, for instance, *more*, or *less* than the bodies they belong to) but they must occupy *some space*, as well as bodies.

I will farther observe, that if, according to Dr. Clarke, the Divine Being has infinite extension, and finite spirits a limited one, they must mutually penetrate each other; and these spiritual substances being
of

of *the same nature*, the difficulty attending it must be just as great as that which attends the mutual penetration of material substances.

I have carefully read all Dr. Clarke's metaphysical works, but thought it sufficient to quote his *Demonstration*, as the *best known* of all his writings, and containing a summary of his strongest arguments on all the topics that I have had occasion to discuss. I have also read *Butler's Analogy*, but this work does not stand so high with me as it does with Dr. Price. I did not think that, with respect to any thing that I have written, it was at all necessary to consider any passages of Dr. Clarke's writings, or any of Butler's; but if Dr. Price thinks otherwise, I will give particular attention to any thing, in either of them, that he shall be pleased to point out to me.

Dr. Price admits, that if matter be not solid and impenetrable, it may be capable of thought, but wonders that I should have written a book to prove this. My book
was

was not written to prove this, but to prove that, whatever matter be, *thinking* is the result of a modification of it, or that this faculty does not belong to an invifible fubftance, different from the body, which I apprehend to have been the fource of the greateft corruptions of the fyftem of revelation. Effectually to explode this notion, originally borrowed from heathenifm, and thereby to difcharge from Chriftianity many enormous errors, that now diffigure it, and make it appear abfurd in the prefent enlightened age of philofophy, appears to me to be rendering it the moft important of all fervices. Whether I have in any meafure *fucceeded*, fuch, if I know my own heart, have been my views in writing both the *Disquisitions* themfelves, and this defence of them.

I wifh Dr. Price would inform me what is the connection between *a capacity of confcioufnefs*, and *being indivifible without being annihilated*. Alfo, if fpirits be extended, and fomewhat more than fpace, whether they may not be divifible, and difcerptible, as well as matter.

Dr.

Dr. Hartley has shewn that all the faculties of the human mind may be the result of vibration, except that of *simple perception*; but this, though *different* from the other known properties of matter, may not be *incompatible* with them. The facts alledged in Sect. III. do, I apprehend, prove, that according to the established rules of philosophizing, it is a property that must *in fact* belong to the brain, whether we ever be able to conceive *how* it results from the structure of the brain, or not. In my opinion there is just the same reason to conclude that the brain *thinks*, as that it is *white*, and *soft*.

Though Mr. Locke was of opinion that our ideas of thinking substances are as distinct as those of solid ones, he was likewise of opinion, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, thinking *may* be the mere property of a solid substance.

Dr. Clarke should have shewn not only that *extension*, but that *a capacity of motion from place to place* is not necessarily connected

nected with discerptibility. It appears to me very clear, that, if spirit be a thing that is extended and moveable, one part of it may be conceived to be moved, and the other part left behind, whether the property of *consciousness* would be destroyed in consequence of it, or not.

DR. PRICE.

In *Disquisitions*, p. 72, Dr. Priestley says, that “it is demonstrable that matter is infinitely divisible”—Can he say that the being he calls *himself* is likewise infinitely divisible. What would be the result of such a division? Would it not be an infinite number of *other* beings? But does not this imply a contradiction? Can there be such a thing as *half* a self?—Or can the being I call *myself* be split into two *others*? Impossible! This would not be to *divide*, but to *annihilate* me—And the truth is, that in this case division cannot be imagined without annihilation—In another place Dr. Priestley intimates, that matter consists of *indivisible points*, p. 23. How then can it be infinitely divisible?

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

The matter of which I consist may be divisible, though the *actual* division of it might so disarrange the parts of it, that the property of thinking (which is the result of a particular modification of them) would be destroyed. A whole brain may think, but half a brain may be incapable of it. I see no sort of difficulty in this case. Also, may not an extended spirit be conceived to be divided without annihilation, as well as an extended solid substance? To the imagination it is equally easy.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 92. *The percipient power may as well belong to one system as to one atom.*

—See likewise the answer to the fourth Objection in p. 88. *I am one person, but it does not follow that I cannot be divided: A sphere is one thing, but it does not follow that it consists of indivisible materials*—But if matter consists of *indivisible points* (as is said in p. 23.) and the soul is matter, then the
soul

soul consists of indivisible materials. But not to insist on this. Can any one believe of *himself* that he is one thinking being only as a great number of bodies forming a sphere are one sphere? If this is true, he must be either the parts themselves that compose the sphere; and if so, he is a *multitude* of beings; or he must be their *sphericity*; and if so, he is nothing but an *order* or *relation* of parts, and can never remain the same any longer than that order is preserved. As any change in the surface of a sphere would destroy the sphericity, and convert it into some other figure, so would any change in that *order* of parts which constitutes *myself*, destroy *me*, and convert me into some *other person*.

A N S W E R.

If I say that matter consists of indivisible points, I use a common expression, though perhaps not a correct one. But as every sensible part of matter consists of an *infinity* of such points, it is plain that the substance can never be exhausted by any division.

To

To infer from this, that the soul (consisting of matter) consists of an indivisible substance, seems to me to be a play upon words.

If a thinking being be a material substance of a particular texture and form, as I define it, it cannot follow, as is here asserted, that it is *a mere order or relation of parts*. A disarrangement of this texture would destroy all *power of thought*, but would not make *another person*.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 89. “It is impossible to say *a priori*, whether a single particle, or a system of matter, be the seat of perception, but *fact* proves the latter.” If a system of matter is the seat of perception, then the system is the percipient being. But the percipient being is *one*. A system consists of *many* beings.

It is inconceivable to me how any person can think that many substances united can be one substance or that all

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the parts of a system can perceive, and yet no single part be a percipient being.

ANSWER.

A system, though consisting of many beings or things, is nevertheless but *one system*. A brain, though consisting of many parts, is but one brain; and where can be the difficulty of conceiving that no single part of a brain should be a whole brain, or have the properties of a whole brain?

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, Sect. IX. It seems evident that Dr. Priestley's principles go to prove, that the Deity is material, as well as all inferior beings. He would otherwise have no common property with matter, by which it would be possible for him to act upon it—But at the same time would there not be something shocking in saying of the Deity, that he is nothing but a power of attraction and repulsion?

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

By what construction am I made to assert that the divine essence is *material*, that is, of *the same kind of substance* with what we generally term *matter*, when I suppose it to have quite *different properties*, on account of which I expressly say, that it ought to have a quite *different name*, and not receive its denomination from the mere negation of the properties of matter, which is, in fact, no definition at all? Let all beings, and all things, be defined by their *known properties*, and no mistake can possibly arise; for then our knowledge and our language will always correspond to one another. It would certainly be something shocking to say that "the Deity is nothing but a power of attraction and repulsion," but it would be saying what is directly contrary to the doctrine of my treatise, as must, I think, be obvious to the most superficial attention.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 103. I am surprized Dr. Priestley should here say, that it is almost

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universally

universally acknowledged that, according to the Scriptures, the Deity is *incapable of local presence*, when it is so well known that some of the first Christian writers have believed *infinite space* to be an attribute of the Deity.

A N S W E R.

What I maintain, is, that according to the only consistent scheme of immaterialism, the Divine Being, as well as other immaterial substances, have no *local presence*, and it is the opinion that till lately I held myself. That the Divine Being has a proper omnipresence, and consequently a proper extension, I now admit, but should not chuse to say with any person, though ever so justly called the *first Christian writer in other respects*, that space is merely an *attribute of the Deity*; because, supposing that there was no Deity, space would still remain. It cannot be annihilated even in *idea*.

DR.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 102, &c. *But till we know something positive concerning this supposed immaterial substance, &c.*—What is similar to this may be more properly said of matter, according to Dr. Priestley's account of it—Whatever the soul is, it must, if it is to exist for ever, be somewhat so substantial as to have no tendency to decay, or wear out. But this cannot be true of any thing compounded.

ANSWER.

If, as Dr. Price supposes, a spiritual substance be extended, it must consist of an aggregation of parts, and therefore may be as liable to be dissolved as a homogeneous corporeal substance.

DR. PRICE.

When it is asserted that the soul is *naturally immortal*, the meaning is, that being

a *substance* and not a *mode*, it will go on to exist, till by some positive act of the Creator it is annihilated. In the same sense it may be said of the *atoms*, or *elements* that compose our bodies, that they are naturally immortal: for it is, I think, a general truth, that only the power that brought any substance into being can put it out of being. Does Dr. Priestley deny the natural immortality of the soul in this sense? If he does, and if he really means when he says, “that the whole man becomes extinct at death,” that death destroys, or annihilates the thinking substance; and if also this is the dictate of nature and reason, then the doctrine of a resurrection is contradictory to nature and reason; and Dr. Priestley, by maintaining the natural mortality of the soul, injures revelation. But it is certain he means the contrary. He must, therefore, acknowledge, that death does not naturally destroy the soul; or, in other words, that it preserves its existence at death; and that what then happens to it, can be no more than a suspension

suspension of the exercise of its faculties, or an *incapacitation* from which it will, by the power of Christ, be delivered at the resurrection. If he acknowledge this, he and I, and many other zealous immaterialists, are agreed. If he does not mean this, the resurrection will be, not a *resurrection*, but a *creation* of a new set of beings. If death annihilates us, there can be no future state. This is self-evident. A being who has lost his existence cannot be recovered. It is very improper here to mention the renewal of the flame of a candle after extinction; for the substance of the candle is not affected by the extinction of the flame, just as the substance of the soul is not affected by the suspension of its powers at death. It should be considered also, that the flame of a candle, being nothing but a current of hot and shining vapour, that is constantly passing away, like the water of a river, it never continues a moment the same; and that, consequently, the *renewed* flame is properly a *new* and *different* flame.

ANSWER.

I am surpris'd at these conjectures concerning my meaning, which is, I think, always express'd with sufficient clearness, viz. that the faculty of thinking is the result of a certain arrangement of the parts of matter; so that the disarrangement of them by death is neither the *extinction*, nor the *annihilation* of them, and the re-arrangement of them after death, is (if any thing can be so called) a proper *resurrection*. It is as much so, as that of a seed sown in the ground, the *germ* of which does not perish, but rises again in the form of a new plant, though the greatest part of the bulk of the seed (being merely nutritious, and *extraneous matter*) does not properly rise again.

DR. PRICE,

If I understand what is said in the beginning of Sect. XIII. on *Personal Identity*, the drift of it is to shew that a being may be the same with a *former* being, though their *substances*, and consequently all their *properties*,
are

are different.—It is likewise implied, that the men who are to be raised from death, will be the same with the men who have existed in this world, *only* as a river is called the same, because the water, though different, has followed other water in the same channel; or as a forest is called the same, because the present trees, though new, have been planted and grown up on the same spot, in the room of other trees which had been cut down and consumed—Did I believe this to be all the identity of man hereafter, I could not consider myself as having any concern in a future state.

The assertion that the man or the agent may be the same, though his substance, or every component part of him, is different, appears to me very extraordinary indeed. I am a different person from my neighbour, though organized in the same manner, because the organized matter is different—If, therefore, man after the resurrection will be, not only a different system of matter, but also a system of matter differently organized, and placed in a different world,
what

what will there be to make him the same with man in this world?—I think, therefore, that Dr. Priestley should, by all means, keep to what he advances towards the conclusion of this 13th Section. It is essential to his scheme to maintain the resurrection of the *same body*, or that the very matter that composes man at death, will be collected at the resurrection, and compose him again in another world, and for ever,

But what am I saying? Man a composition of substances! It is utterly impossible. The thinking substance would then be not *one being*, but a *multitude*; nor is it possible to evade this consequence, without denying that the soul is a substance, or any thing more than a modification of a substance, or an arrangement and order of the parts of substances. Can this be true? Is the subject of thought and perception; is what every one calls *himself*; not a *being*, and *one being*; but a mere result from the figure, motion, and order of a system of material beings?—In short, if the soul
is

is material, it must certainly be one of the primary atoms of matter. No where else in the corporeal world can we find any thing like that unity and substantiality which belong to the soul of man; and if it is an atom, it must have existed from the first creation of matter, unless there are new atoms created every time an animal is generated.

A N S W E R.

In Sect. XIII. I professedly speculate upon principles that are not my own. It is intended to prove, that there may be such an *identity of person*, as will be a foundation for future *expectation, obligation, &c.* though every particle of the man should be changed. The reasoning in this section I must take the liberty to say, I do not think to be invalidated by Dr. Price's remarks, though to him it appears so very extraordinary.

The remainder of this remark has been obviated again and again, in the course of my work, and also in the preceding parts of this. What I call *myself* is an organized system

system of matter. It is not, therefore, myself, but my *power of thought*, that is properly termed the result of figure, motion, &c.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 160, &c. “*What is there*
 “*in the matter that composes my body, that*
 “*should attach me to it more than to the matter*
 “*that composes the table on which I write?*”
 This is a surprizing question from Dr. Priestley. If the matter which composes my body is myself, I certainly have as much reason to prefer it to the matter of a table, as I have to prefer *myself* to a *table*. To assert, as Dr. Priestley does, that the matter of the body is the soul, and at the same time to suppose, as he does, in this 13th Section, that the soul may remain the same, though the whole matter of the body is changed, appears to me indeed so apparently inconsistent, that I cannot help suspecting I must greatly misunderstand him. Should he say, that the soul is not strictly the *matter* of the body, but the *organization* of that matter; this, as I have already observed
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more than once, is making the soul a modification, an order and juxtaposition and connection of parts, and not a *being*, or *substance*. But is it possible to conceive of any thing more substantial than the soul? Can there be a *being* in nature, if the sentient principle, the subject that feels pleasure and pain, that thinks and reasons, and loves and hates, is not a *being*? Suppose it, however, if you can, to be merely the organization of the body; would not a change in the matter of the body make *another* body? And would not *another* body make *another* soul, though the same organization should be preserved? If not, then may not I and Dr. Priestley be the same man, since the organization of our bodies is the same, and only the matter different? Would not, in short, any number of living bodies be one soul, one sentient principle, supposing their organization the same?

ANSWER.

The beginning of this remark relates to the speculation abovementioned, which goes upon other principles than my own. To
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the question at the end of the remark, viz:
 “ Would not any number of living bodies
 “ be one soul, one sentient principle, sup-
 “ posing their organization the same,” I
 answer, that different systems of matter,
 organized exactly alike, must make dif-
 ferent beings, who would feel and think
 exactly alike in the same circumstances.
 Their minds, therefore, would be exactly
similar, but numerically different.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 123. It seems to be hinted
 here, that the soul, after death, is as little of
 a substance (that is, as truly nothing) as
 matter would be without extension.—It is
 added, *if together with the cessation of thought*
they will maintain the real existence of the
soul after death, it must be for the sake of
hypothesis only, and for no real use whatever.
 Does Dr. Priestley then really mean that
 the soul loses its existence at death?

How can it be said to be of no use to
 maintain the existence of the soul after death,
 when without this, a resurrection must be
 impossible?

ANSWER,

ANSWER.

I say, that they who maintain the cessation of thought after death, cannot maintain the separate existence of the soul, except for the sake of an hypothesis, and for no real *use* whatever, for this plain reason; that, during this entire cessation of thought, the soul is, in fact, of no use, no phenomena indicating that any such thing exists. Had not the persons who maintain such an insensible state of the soul, believed a resurrection of the body, they would naturally have concluded that the soul, or the thinking part of man, *ceased to be*, because its existence would never more be manifested by any *effect*.

How is it true, that there can be no resurrection, unless there be a soul distinct from the body? If the soul be the same thing with the body, or a part of the body, may not the body, or this part of it, rise again without the aid of *another substance*? On the contrary, I think that a resurrection, properly so called (because this
can

can be only a resurrection of something that *had been dead*, viz. the body) is manifestly useless, upon the supposition of there being a soul distinct from the body; it being upon this hypothesis, the soul, and not the body, that is the seat of all perception, and the source of all action.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 224. *It was unquestionably the opinion of the Apostles, that the thinking powers ceased at death.*

If, indeed, the Apostles (as is here asserted too positively) thought that the powers of sensation were destroyed at death, or as Dr. Priestley speaks in p. 248, that death is the utter extinction of all our percipient and intellectual powers; if, I say, the Apostles thought thus, they believed a contradiction in believing a resurrection. If these powers are not destroyed, they must remain, and it can be only the *exercise* of them that ceases at death. Certainly Dr. Priestley should have guarded better his language on this subject, which is often such as implies that the soul loses its
existence

existence at death. Indeed, I never knew before that any believer in a future state could assert, not only that *thought* and *perception* cease at death, but that there is then a total extinction of the very *powers* themselves. In short, Dr. Priestley should be explicit in saying which it is he believes, the *sleep*, or the *non-existence* of the soul after death. There is no less than an infinite difference between these two things. The former may be the truth, and it implies the natural immortality of the soul; but if the latter is true, there is an end of all our hopes. Talking of the restoration of man after death, will be talking of the restoration of a non-entity. Dr. Priestley calls this, (in *Disquisitions*, p. 125.) *an extraordinary assertion*; but it appears to me self-evidently true. Of what use, Dr. Priestley asks, is an existence after death, without thought and perception? I have given a plain answer to this question. It is of infinite use, by making a future state, or a restoration of man, possible. Would it not be strange to say of a man who is fallen

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into

into a swoon, that since he is insensible it makes no difference whether he is in a swoon or dead?—Would it not be proper to say in answer, that if he is only in a swoon he may recover, but if he is dead he will never recover.—Just so; if a man at death is only *disabled*, he may be restored. But if his existence is gone, he never can be restored.

A N S W E R.

I cannot help expressing my surprise at this remark. As far as I see, my language upon this subject is always uniform, and strictly proper. I suppose that the powers of thought are not merely suspended, but are *extinct*, or *cease to be*, at death. To make my meaning, if possible, better understood, I will use the following comparison. The power of *cutting*, in a razor, depends upon a certain cohesion, and arrangement of the parts of which it consists. If we suppose this razor to be wholly dissolved in any acid liquor, its power of cutting

cutting will certainly be *lost*, or *cease to be*, though no particle of the metal that constituted the razor be annihilated by the process; and its former *shape*, and *power of cutting*, &c. may be restored to it after the metal has been precipitated. Thus when the body is dissolved by putrefaction, its power of thinking entirely ceases; but, no particle of the man being *lost*, as many of them as were essential to him, will, I doubt not, be collected, and revived, at the resurrection, when the power of thinking will return of course. I do not, therefore, think that any thing that I have advanced implies that *the soul*, that is, *the man* loses his *existence* at death, in any other sense than that the man loses his *power of thinking*.

I really do not know how I can be more explicit than I have been through the whole of my treatise on this subject, with respect to which Dr. Price complains that I am not explicit enough. The latter part of this remark I have replied to before.

DR. PRICE.

Disquisitions, p. 96. *All the exertions of the soul are as much produced by sensations and ideas as any one effect in nature can be produced by its proper cause. They have a proper impelling force. They are moving powers.* p. 97.—An idea, therefore, is an *agent*, and the soul is passive under its action in the same manner a ball is passive when impelled by another.—But what is an idea? Nothing but a *perception*, or *judgment* of the mind; that is, of the being that acts. How can this impel? What can it be more than the *occasion* of action?

There must be somewhere a *self-moving power*. For one thing cannot move another, and that another *in infinitum*—And if there is one self-moving power in nature, why may there not be many?

ANSWER.

Dr. Price should distinguish between a *perception*, or *judgment*, which is an *act* of the mind, and the *idea* perceived and judged of

of by the mind, which must be different from the *mind itself*, or any of its *acts*. I maintain that ideas, whatever they be, have a proper *impelling power*, because men are invariably impelled to action in consequence of them; but as to a *self-motive power*, I deny that man has any such thing, for the reasons that are alledged in the *Treatise on Necessity*.

DR. PRICE.

Upon the whole, it may perhaps be possible to convince me that there is no such thing as *matter*, and Dr. *Priestley* has contributed a little to it; but I cannot be convinced that there is no such thing as *spirit*, meaning by spirit such a thinking intelligent nature as I feel myself to be. I am indeed full of darkness about myself; but in the midst of this darkness I am taught the following particulars by an irresistible consciousness, which will not suffer me to doubt, 1st. That I am a *being*, or a *substance*, and not a *property*, or a mere *configuration of parts*.

2dly, That I am *one being*, and not *many* beings, or a *system*.

3dly, That I am a *voluntary agent*, possessed of powers of *self-motion*, and not a passive instrument.

4thly, That my senses and limbs, my eyes, hands, &c. are *instruments* by which I act, and receive information; and not *myself*; or *mine*, and not *me*.

ANSWER.

If, by *spirit*, Dr. Price means nothing more than a thinking and an intelligent substance, I have the same consciousness of it that he has. I also believe with him that I am a *being*, or *substance*; also that I am a *single being*, and a *voluntary agent*, though not possessed of a self-motive power; and that my limbs and senses are instruments by which I act, and not *myself*, or *me*. So that, if these be all the essential articles of Dr. Price's faith, and he seems to enumerate them as such, we are very nearly agreed, though in *words* we have differed so widely.

QUERIES

QUERIES *by* DR. PRICE.

1. Is not the *soul*, or what I call *myself* a being, or substance, and not merely a mode, or accident.

2. Does the soul lose its existence at death, or am I, the subject of thought, reason, consciousness, &c. to be annihilated?

3. If I am to lose my existence at death, will not my resurrection be the resurrection of a non-entity, and therefore a contradiction?

4. If I am not to lose my existence at death, may it not be properly said that I am *naturally immortal*?

ANSWER.

I consider myself as a being consisting of what is called matter, disposed in a certain manner. At death the parts of this material substance are so disarranged, that the powers of perception and thought, which

depended upon that arrangement, cease, At the resurrection they will be re-arranged, in the same, or a similar manner, as before, and consequently the powers of perception and thought will be restored. But this will require a miraculous interposition of divine power, and therefore it cannot be said that thinking beings are *naturally* immortal, (*i. e.* as thinking beings) though the parts that compose them are so.

THE

THE SECOND COMMUNICATION,

*Containing Dr. Price's Observations on the
Replies to the First Communication, with
Dr. Priestley's second Replies.*

Of the Nature of MIND or SPIRIT.

Observations on Dr. Priestley's Reply, p. 49, &c.

WHEN the eye is destroyed we cannot see. So likewise when the brain is destroyed we cannot reason. If from hence it follows that it is the brain that reasons, why should it not also follow that it is the eye that sees? From the dependence of actual sensations and thought on the brain, we have, I think, no more reason to conclude that the brain is the mind, than a savage who had never heard the music of a harpsichord, and did not see the hand that played upon it, would have to conclude, that it played on itself, and was *the* musician; because he could trace all the sounds to the instrument, and found that when the strings
were

were out of order, the music was disturbed or destroyed.

What experience teaches us, is, that the *exercise* of the mental powers *depends* on the brain and the nerves; not that the mind *is* the brain and the nerves. Common sense exclaims against such a conclusion as much as against concluding that there is pain in the point of a sword. We are sure the mind cannot be the brain, because the brain is an assemblage of beings. The mind is *one* being. Nothing seems to me more unphilosophical in this case than to rest our ideas in the organ, and to confound it with the being whose organ it is. This, I have said, is like thinking that a musical instrument plays on itself. But to go higher, It is not unlike resting our ideas in this visible world, and supposing it the same with that Deity who made, and actuates, and governs it. The laws of nature seem to terminate in matter. But is it philosophical, in order to avoid multiplying causes, to conclude they have no other cause than matter itself; and, with

with the French philosophers, to make *nature* the only Deity? In short, I am fully of opinion, that if that *mass of flesh and blood* which we call the *brain*, (no one part of which, or part of any part, touches another) may be that sentient and intelligent being we call the *mind*; then that mass of corporeal substances which we call the *world*, may be *God*; and it must be unphilosophical to search farther than *itself* for its cause. Dr. Priestley, I know, is far from being sensible of this: But such indeed is the tendency of his principles, and manner of reasoning. The very foundation of this atheistical conclusion, is totally subverted by the demonstration which, I think, I have given, that the laws which govern matter, or its attractions and repulsions, are not the actions or properties of matter itself, but effects of the constant operation of a higher cause.

ANSWER, *by Dr. Priestley.*

I cannot help expressing some surprize that my reasoning on this subject should not seem to be understood, and that such strange
conclusions

conclusions should be drawn from it. If, upon examination, nothing could be *found*, or *reasonably conjectured*, to move the strings of the harpsichord, it would be philosophical to conclude, that the cause of the music that came from it was *within itself*. But when we open it, and see the strings to be moved in such a manner as similar strings are never known to be moved but by *human means*, there is reason to conclude, from analogy, that these strings also are moved, though we do not see *how*, by the same, or a similar cause.

In like manner, when we see the parts of which the universe consists, to be arranged in such a manner, as, from analogy, we have reason to believe, that no other than an intelligent being could arrange them, we conclude that an intelligent being, visible or invisible, *has* arranged them.

I conclude, that there is nothing within the brain itself that is the cause of perception, because, for any thing that I know, perception may be the property
of

of that material, as well as of any supposed immaterial substance; the relation of *perception* to *material* or *immaterial* substances being equally unknown. If the faculty of *playing* *could* be supposed to belong to the harpsichord, it would be unphilosophical to inquire for any *concealed musician*; so also if the power of arranging and moving the component parts of the universe *could* belong to themselves, it would be unphilosophical to inquire for a superintending mind, or God. But it is denied that the laws of nature do *seem* to terminate in the visible parts of the universe.

For the same reason that perception is ascribed to some immaterial substance within the brain, it seems to me that attraction ought to be ascribed to some immaterial substance within the earth, the sun, &c. because, according to Dr. Price, *attraction* is a power quite foreign to the nature of matter, as well as *perception*.

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DR. PRICE.

Observations on Dr. Priestley's Reply, p. 51, 52.

I had said that it is very absurd to imagine that ideas are divisible. Dr. Priestley here says, that after the most deliberate review, the contrary is very clear to him. Others must judge. What is the *idea* of an object? Is it not the *notion* or *conception* of the object? A line is infinitely divisible. Is the mind's *idea*, or *conception* of a line also infinitely divisible? But I find Dr. *Priestley* thinks ideas to be the bodies themselves in miniature, which they represent, or models and delineations of external objects, distinct from the mind, but contained in it, like maps and globes in a chamber. And I suppose he will go so far as to ascribe all the properties of bodies to them, and particularly attraction and repulsion; and maintain, that in volition they act upon and impel the mind containing them, as one body acts upon and impels another. The bare representation of such an opinion seems sufficient to confute

fute it. But if not, it must be in vain to argue about it.

ANSWER.

If ideas be nothing distinct from the mind, or modifications of the mind, varying as their archetypes vary, a mind *with ideas*, and a mind without *ideas*, would be the same thing; and if the ideas of compound objects be not compounded things, and consist of as many parts as the objects of which they are the ideas, I am unable to conceive any thing about ideas. That motions, or volitions of the mind, do depend upon ideas, or, in other words, that the mind is *influenced*, or *acted upon* by them, is a certain *fact*, whether the representation confute itself or not. No person acquainted with the principles of *Hartley's theory*, can be at a loss to know what I suppose ideas to be, and in what manner they operate.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on Dr. Priestley's Reply, p. 58, &c.

I have already said, that I know nothing of the extension of spirit. I only wish to distinguish

distinguish on this subject between what is certain, and what is uncertain. I think it *certain*, that whatever the subject of consciousness may be in other respects, it is incapable of being divided without being annihilated.

I do not expect that the chapter in *Butler's Analogy*, on a future State, which I have wished to recommend to Dr. Priestley's attention, can appear to him as weighty as it does to me. *Butler* and *Clarke* are with me two of the first of all writers. In p. 222 of the *Disquisitions*, &c. to which Dr. Priestley refers me, the contradictory account of spiritual beings, which makes them to exist no where, or to have no relation to place, is said to be "the only
" consistent system of immaterialism, held
" by Mr. Baxter, and all the most approved
" modern writers on the subject." Can it be right to say this, when there are such men as Dr. Clarke and Newton who have entertained different ideas, and extended them even to the supreme Spirit? I do not
believe

believe that even Mr. Baxter entertained any such notion. It is, however, the notion of Spirit which is combated through the greatest part of Dr. Priestley's work.

Dr. Priestley's view in writing, was, to prove that there is no distinction between matter and spirit, or between the soul and body: and thus to explode what he calls the heathenish system of christianity, by exploding the doctrines of Christ's præ-existence, and an intermediate state. But if in doing this, it comes out that his account of matter does not answer to the common ideas of matter; or that it is not *solid* extension, but something *not solid* that exists in space; it agrees so far with spirit: And if such matter is, as he asserts, the only matter possible, what he has proved will be, not that we have no *souls* distinct from our *bodies*, but that we have no *bodies* distinct from our *souls*. Matter which possesses solidity, or impenetrability and inertness, is certainly the only matter that is the object of natural philosophy. This, *Newton* has said, in a passage I have quoted from

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him

him. If such matter is impossible, it will follow that all in nature is Spirit.

Dr. Priestley, in this reply, p. 60, mentions his *views*. They are, I doubt not, the purest and best possible. There is no one of whose heart I have a higher opinion. But at the same time my fixed apprehension is, that he is one of those great and good men who have pushed on too eagerly in the pursuit of truth, and who, in endeavouring to serve the best of all causes, have run upon bad ground, and, without knowing it, employed means of the most dangerous tendency.

A N S W E R.

To this I have nothing particular to say. My quotations from various writers prove, that besides the professed Cartesians, many other philosophers and metaphysicians have supposed that *spirit bears no relation to space*. Dr. Watts, without having ever been refuted that I know of, has shewn that this is the only consistent idea of an immaterial being. I have added some additional arguments

guments to prove the same thing, and this was my own idea while I held the doctrine of immaterialism. This idea, therefore, I have *chiefly* combated; but not this only, but also every other idea of immaterialism that I have met with, that appeared to me to deserve particular notice.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on the Replies, p. 65 and 66.

A thinking being, Dr. Priestley says, is a material substance of a particular texture; not a mere order or relation of parts. Does it not then follow, that the destruction of the order or texture of the parts; that is, their dis-arrangement, cannot be the destruction of the thinking being?

“A system,” it is farther said, “though consisting of many *beings*, is but one *system*: and a brain, though consisting of many *parts*, is but one *brain*; no single part of which can be the whole.” But it is self-evident, that a system, consisting of many beings, though *one as a*

system, in the same sense that an army is one as an army, must be a *multitude* of beings; and can no more be one being than an army can be one man. In like manner, though a brain consisting of many material substances, not one of which, according to Dr. Priestley, is in contact with another; though I say such a brain may be one as a *brain*, it cannot certainly be one *substance*. But the soul is one *substance*, one being. This Dr. Priestley grants at the end of these replies, and it is impossible he should deny it. He cannot, therefore, think the brain to be the soul. All that he can believe, is, that the soul's *thinking* depends on the order and texture of the brain. Experience proves this; and it is indeed, as I have before said, all that experience teaches us.

A N S W E R.

I cannot see any thing in this remark that is not merely verbal. A man, in my idea, is *one thinking being*, and not two thinking beings, let this thinking being consist

consist of as many substances, or *unthinking beings* as any person pleases.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on the Reply, p. 67.

“By what construction am I made to
“assert, that the Divine Essence is ma-
“terial; that is, of the same kind of sub-
“stance with what we generally term
“matter, when I suppose it to have *quite*
“*different properties, &c.*?”

I have mentioned this only as an inference from Dr. Priestley's principles; and particularly from a principle which he has argued upon as a maxim, namely, “that nothing can act upon another without having *common properties* with it.” If this is true, the Deity must have *common properties* with matter; and matter being a power of attraction and repulsion united to extension, the Deity must be the same. If, in order to avoid this consequence, Dr. Priestley should acknowledge

this maxim not to be universally true, it will follow that Spirit may act upon matter without having any other common property with it than being locally present to it; and one of his chief arguments for the materiality of the soul will be given up.

Indeed, I cannot imagine how it is possible for him to maintain this maxim without asserting the impossibility of the *creation* of the world out of nothing: For what common property can the Creator have with *nothing*? It would not satisfy me to be told here, that the Divine Nature possessing peculiar properties, we can draw no argument from it. The contrary is true in many cases: Particularly in the following. — The Deity acts on matter, without having any common property with it; therefore such action is possible. — The Deity is an immaterial being; therefore immaterial beings are possible: And the negation of matter is not the same with the negation of all existence. — In like manner, the Deity is an intelligent being; therefore intelligent beings are possible. — He pos-

sesses

sesses the powers of self-determination; therefore such powers are possible.—He is an agent; therefore there may be other agents.—All these conclusions appear to me to be just.

I have by no means designed to charge Dr. Priestley with maintaining that the Deity is nothing but a power of attraction and repulsion. I only mean to say, that if the Deity be a material being, and matter (as Dr. Priestley contends) is nothing but such a power, then the Deity must also be nothing but such a power. I know that Dr. Priestley asserts the immateriality of the Deity. I only doubt about the consistence of this with the other parts of his theory.

Dr. Priestley says, p. 68, that he does not chuse to call space an *attribute of the Deity*; because, supposing there was no Deity, “space would still remain; it “being impossible to be annihilated even “in idea.”

According to Dr. Clarke, the impossibility of annihilating even in idea, *space* and *time*, is the same with the *necessary existence* of the Deity, whose attributes they are. Instead therefore of saying, “was” “there no Deity *space* would still remain,” we should say “*space* will still remain;” “and therefore the Deity will still remain,” “and his non-existence cannot be imagined without a contradiction.” It appears to me, that whatever cannot be annihilated, even in idea, must be an attribute of the Deity. This may be applied not only to *space* and *time*, but to *truth*, *possibles*, &c. as I have done in my *Treatise on Morals*. *Eternity*, *immensity*, *infinite truth*, &c. cannot be conceived not to exist. All existence presupposes *their* existence. That is, there exists necessarily an eternal and omnipresent intelligence, the parent of all things.—I am afraid Dr. Priestley will not like this; but I am as much satisfied with it as he is with any part of Dr. Hartley’s Theory.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

What is attraction or repulsion but a power of moving matter in a certain direction? If, therefore, the Deity *does* thus act upon matter, he must have that power, and therefore *one* property in common with matter, though he be possessed of ever so many *other* powers of which matter is incapable.

Dr. Price's argument, that because God is a *self-determined being*, there may be other self-determined beings, and because God is an *agent* there may be other agents, &c. &c. may, I am afraid, carry us too far. For may it not be said also, that because God is a *self-existent being*, there may be other self-existent beings, and because God can *create out of nothing*, &c. &c. other beings may have the same powers?

I cannot, I own, see any thing conclusive in Dr. Price's argument for the being of a God, *a priori*. I do not see
why

why it should be taken for granted, that
 “ whatever cannot be annihilated, even in
 “ idea, must be an attribute of the Deity.”
 This appears to me to be quite an arbitrary supposition. That *space, duration, truth, possibles, &c.* should be denominated *attributes*, sounds very harsh to me. If the infinite space occupied by the Deity be an attribute of his, I should think that the finite space, occupied by finite minds and things, should be called *their* attributes, and also the portions of duration to which they are co-existent, another of their attributes, &c. so that the same individual portions of space and time, must be attributes both of the Deity and of created beings. Also mere attributes of things cannot, in idea, be separated from them; whereas nothing is easier than to form the idea of *mere space*, without any thing to occupy it. But this is not my subject.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on Reply, p. 69.

I must repeat here what I have already said, that I know no more of the extension
 of

of spirit, than that it possesses local presence, and is at the same time indiscerptible. Let any one reflect on himself, or on the immensity of the Divine Nature, and deny the possibility of this if he can.

Space has parts, but they are only *assignable* parts. A separation of them from one another implies a contraction.

ANSWER.

If a finite spirit occupy a finite portion of space, one part of that spirit may be *conceived* to be removed from another, as well as one part of solid matter from another; though this is not true of the Deity, who necessarily fills *all space*.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on Reply, p. 75.

Dr. Priestley here says, that he intended in Sect. XIII. to prove, “ that there may
“ be such an identity of person as will be
“ a foundation

“ a foundation for future *expectation*, obligation, &c. though every particle of “ the man should be changed.” In answer to this I have observed, that if every particle that constitutes the man is to be different at the resurrection, the *man* must be different; and that, consequently, the men who exist in this world can have no such concern in what is to happen to the men who are to exist hereafter, as lays a foundation for expectation, obligation, &c. because those men will not be *them*, but *other* men. In answer to this, Dr. Priestley must say, either that a man may be the same, though every particle that constitutes him is different; or he must say, that men in this life are obliged to act with a view to *their own* existence in another life, though there is to be no such existence.

I am sensible that in this section he reasons on the opinions of *others*; but, if in reasoning on these opinions, he attempts to prove what is plainly impossible, the reasoning must be so far wrong.

ANSWER,

ANSWER.

I still say that I have nothing to add on this subject. I professedly argue on an hypothesis that is not my own, and submit the force of the argument to the judgment of the reader.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on Reply, p. 79.

It is here said, that “ if the cessation of
“ thought at death is allowed, it can be of
“ no use whatever to maintain the separate
“ existence of the soul.” I have given
what appears to me a full answer to this
observation, by saying, that if the soul
does not *exist* after death, there can be no
restoration of it : And that, consequently, it
must be of the utmost use to maintain that
it does so exist, though perhaps in an *inca-*
pacitated state. There is an infinite dif-
ference between the *annihilation* of the soul
at death, and its *incapacitation*. One who
believed the former could not possibly en-
tertain the hope of a future state, but one
who

who believes the latter, might reasonably entertain such an hope. He might think that a period would come when it should be restored. He might even think of men, as Dr. Priestley (*Disquisitions*, p. 239) seems to think of brutes, that their resurrection may be a part of the course of nature.

Dr. Priestley here adds, that “a resurrection is manifestly useless, if there is a soul distinct from the body.” He well knows, that according to Mr. Locke, and many others, the future resurrection taught in the Scriptures, is to be the resurrection not of the *body*, but of the *soul*. It is to be the restoration of the *man* (incapacitated by the destruction of the organization by which he here acted, and received information) to the exercise of all his powers, in a new state of being, by furnishing him with another, and (if virtuous) a more durable and perfect organization. All then that can be said with any propriety, is, that a resurrection of the *same body* is useless, if there is a soul distinct from the body; and, in saying this, some of the most zealous Christians

Christians and immaterialists will agree with him.

ANSWER.

What I say of the resurrection being manifestly useless, if there be a soul distinct from the body, is upon the common hypothesis; according to which the soul is the only source of action, and the body is so far from being necessary to its exertions as to be a *hindrance* to them. This is the original and genuine hypothesis of *a soul*, as a substance distinct from the body, though the phenomena have at length compelled those who cannot yet persuade themselves to give up the notion of a soul altogether, to acknowledge its necessary dependance upon the body, unaccountable as the mutual connection and dependance of substances so very different in their nature must appear. It has been in consequence of finding more and more of the phenomena of the mind to depend upon the body, that myself and others conclude, that *every thing* belonging to man is corporeal. And I cannot help thinking that the general persuasion

persuasion of the soul being incapable of any perception or action without the body, and therefore that all its faculties are in a perfectly dormant state from death to the resurrection, must gradually abate men's zeal in the defence of the doctrine of a soul, and prepare the way for the general belief, that the hypothesis is altogether unnecessary.

DR. PRICE.

Observations on Reply, p. 82, and the following.

In p. 75, at the top, Dr. Priestley says, "What I call myself, is, *an organized system of matter.*" Is not every atom of the matter that composes a *system*, a distinct *substance*, or being? Does not, therefore, Dr. Priestley, here call himself a *system* of beings?—But waving this, because perhaps it has been too often repeated, I will here beg leave to state, as briefly as I can, the whole question relating to the nature of the human soul and its mortality, according to my ideas. Should

I be

I be wrong in any instance, Dr. Priestley will, I hope, be so good as to set me right.

The soul, that is, the being that thinks and acts, must, if an organized system of matter, be either the material substances themselves which compose that system; or it must be their organization, their texture, motion, arrangement, &c.

If the latter is true, it will follow :

First, That man is not a substance or a being, but a *mode*. For texture, motion, and arrangement of parts, are not substances, but modes of substances.

Secondly, It must follow, that any number of men, having the same organization, have the same soul, or are the same man; just as points having the same arrangement round a center, make the same figure.

Thirdly, It must follow, that the same systems of matter organized differently, will make different souls, or new men; just as the same points, arranged differently round a center, will make different figures.

H

Now

Now it should be remembered, that at the resurrection, man being to live in a new state, the organization of his body must be new: And this, if man be that organization, must make a new man.

But I need not urge these consequences; because Dr. Priestley has allowed, that the man is the matter itself which constitutes the man, and not its form or arrangement: And two systems of matter organized alike, he expressly says, would make two men thinking, indeed, alike, but *numerically different*. The former, therefore, of the two accounts I have mentioned, must be his account of the soul of man, and it will follow from it.

First, That the man will always remain while the matter which constitutes him remains; however different its organization, or arrangement may be.

Secondly, That since death does not destroy the matter which constitutes man, it does not destroy the man: And that, consequently,

sequently, he goes on to exist after death; or is naturally immortal.

Thirdly, That in order to the resurrection of the same man, the same matter must arise; and that for this reason, if the contrary is intended to be proved in *Disquisitions* Sect. XIII. it cannot be right.

Fourthly, That it is no less possible for man to have existed *before* his *birth*, than it is that he should *exist* after his *death*: And that, consequently, all the support to the Socinian scheme, which Dr. Priestley derives from his sentiments of materialism, falls to the ground. Indeed, man must have existed, according to this account, before his birth, if the matter that constitutes him existed before his birth: And his birth, or rather his conception, could have been nothing but putting that matter together, or new arranging it after it had been dis-arranged in some former state.

But this leads me to the main inference from this account of the soul; namely, that the organization of the matter which

constitutes man, since it is not the being that thinks, can only constitute actual thinking; and, consequently, that it is only *actual thinking*, or the *exercise* of our powers, that depends on the bodily organization, and which can cease at death. Even his own simile in p. 82, implies that he means no more. For matter formed into a razor, would not lose its *existence*, but its *cutting power* only, by being dis-arranged. And, though, supposing the same matter formed into a *bullet*, we should say the *razor* was destroyed, yet we should mean no more than that the matter which constituted it had assumed another shape, and could no longer cut. To this issue I wished to bring this dispute: Dr. Priestley agrees with me in believing that the soul does not lose its existence at death, p. 83. He, therefore, believes what I mean by the natural immortality of the soul: And I fancy he will go even farther with me, and allow that the being which thinks, cannot *then* cease to exist, without a positive act of the Creator to destroy it, like that which first brought it into existence.

In

In return, I am ready to concede to Dr. Priestley, what he seems in p. 88, to give as the whole of his meaning, that “as *thinking* beings we are not immortal;” that is, “that sometimes we fall into an *unthinking* state.” Sound sleep may be such a state. *Death*, being the destruction of the whole machinery that connects us with this world, may be a more remediless state of the same kind; and the chief difference between these two states may be, that whereas there are *natural* and *ordinary* means by which we are recovered from the one, there may be no such means by which we can be recovered from the other. Dr. Priestley, indeed, seems to be doubtful about this. But does it not deserve his consideration, whether he has not, by expressing such a doubt, contradicted a sentiment on which he has laid great stress, namely, that “since man becomes extinct “at death, our only hope of surviving the “grave is derived from revelation?” For if the resurrection may be, as he says, (*Disquisitions*, p. 239) *within the proper course of nature*: that is, if there may be natural

means by which the dead may be hereafter restored, why may there not be arguments from reason which make it probable that it is fact? He has mentioned, in the passage to which I have just referred, one argument which he thinks may lead to such a hope with respect to *brutes*. Why may there not be likewise arguments which, independent of revelation, may reasonably produce the same hope with respect to *men*?

I am of opinion, however, that all appearances are against the existence of any such *natural* and *ordinary* means; and I will take this opportunity to add, that the scripture doctrine seems to be, that death is a distress in which our species has been involved by *extraordinary* causes; and from which we have obtained the hope of being saved by the most *extraordinary* means; I mean, by the interposition of *Jesus Christ*; who by taking upon him our nature, and *humbling himself to death*, has acquired the power of *destroying death*; and is on this account styled *the Saviour of the World*.

Reply,

Reply, p. 84. Dr. Price should distinguish, &c.

With respect to what is here said by Dr. Priestley, I must refer to what I have said in p. 51, 84, 94; and what will be said on the subject of the Doctrine of Necessity at the end of this correspondence.

A N S W E R.

Admitting, as I do, that a man is a material system, so organized as to perceive and think, I must believe that the *materials* of which he is made had a pre-existence, and, consequently, those of *the man Jesus*. But this is certainly a very different *kind* of pre-existence from that of those who make Christ, or rather the principal part of him, to have pre-existed in an active state, and to have afterwards entered into the embryo of the child of Mary. The belief that Christ was the maker of all things, the doctrine of a purgatory, and the worship of the dead, could never have arisen from my hypothesis; but these, and many other

corruptions of the christian system, arose but too easily from the other. As a christian, (though it is not every body that, like Dr. Price, has the candour to allow me to be one) I think I have the greatest reason to be jealous of this kind of pre-existence, but none at all of the mere pre-existence of the parts of which, men, animals, and even plants are composed.

I am happy to concur with Dr. Price in the bulk of what he says under this head. My idea of the state of man between death and the resurrection, is, in fact, no way materially different from his. It is a state of *inaction* and *insensibility*, from which we shall not recover till the resurrection; which, whether it will be brought about in a manner that may be said to be *within the laws of nature extensively considered*, or not, I cannot tell, and I am sometimes inclined to one opinion, and sometimes to the other. But though I should decide for the former, the *evidence* for it is not so strong; but that I think myself

self justified in saying, "that our only hope
 "surviving the grave is derived from re-
 "velation." For *hope* implies a *prepon-*
derance of the arguments in favour of a
 desirable event, which preponderance of
 evidence *nature* does not appear to me to
 furnish. What the amount of that evi-
 dence, in my opinion, is, I have stated in
 my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Re-*
ligion, Vol. I.

THE

P A R T II.

THE THIRD COMMUNICATION.

Containing Remarks by Dr. Price on Dr. Priestley's Replies to the second Communication with Dr. Priestley's third Replies.

Observations on Dr. Priestley's Reply, p. 91.

MOST certainly the attraction of the earth, the sun, the planets, &c. (See page 93.) not being the action of the *matter itself* that is said to attract, ought to be ascribed to the action of some other substance *within* the earth, the sun and planets—Does not Dr. Priestley himself acknowledge this?—And does he not, by maintaining God to be the source of all the motions in the world, allow a *soul* to the *world*, though he will not to *men*?

A N S W E R,

My argument goes to prove, that for the same reason that *man* has been supposed
to

to have a soul, every *particular substance* to which any powers or properties are ascribed, may have a *separate soul* also.

DR. PRICE.

Ibid. It is here said, that *perception is the property of the brain*. I must again repeat, that the being that perceives is *one*. The brain consists of *many* substances. It is not, therefore, the brain that perceives. —In p. 100, it is said, *that though man is one thinking being, he may consist of many unthinking beings*——Nothing can be more incomprehensible to me than this. Is it not the same with saying, that *many* beings who want reason, may make *one* being who has reason? Or that a perfection may exist in the whole which does not exist in any of the parts? If this can be true, why may not the component parts of this material world, though all of them separately un-intelligent, make one supreme intelligent being?

ANSWER.

A N S W E R.

I find no difficulty in conceiving that *compound substances* may have properties which their *component parts* cannot have. But it does not, therefore, follow, that all the conjoined parts of any *particular whole*, *e. g. the universe*, can have the peculiar attributes of the being that we call *God*; though they may have various properties that cannot be affirmed of any of the parts separately taken.

D R. P R I C E.

If I understand Dr. Priestley, he says in page 105, that the Deity has a common property with matter, because, like matter, he has the power of attracting and repelling. But I have all along denied that matter has this power. According to Dr. Priestley himself, no being in nature *acts* but the Deity,

A N S W E R.

If the supposed immaterial principle in man can really act upon the brain, it must necessarily

neceſſarily be in the manner that we term attraction or repulſion: becauſe theſe comprise all the poſſible affections of body; and what may be predicated of a finite mind, in this reſpect, may alſo be predicated of the infinite mind.

DR. PRICE.

Does not Dr. Priſtley's manner of arguing in p. 92, imply, that it is *poſſible* for a harpſichord to play on itſelf, and that there are circumſtances in which it would be philoſophical to draw this concluſion?

ANSWER.

My argument only proves, that, in certain *given*, but *impoſſible circumſtances*, there could be no *apparent ground* to conclude that the muſic came from any thing but the harpſichord itſelf.

What can we reaſon but from what we know?

DR. PRICE.

It is ſaid, in p. 95, that *if ideas are not things diſtinct from the mind, a mind with ideas,*

ideas, and a mind without ideas, would be the same——I maintain, that ideas are not distinct from the mind, but its conceptions; or not themselves *things*, but *notions* of things. How does it follow from hence, that a mind with or without ideas, is the same? It would seem that this follows much more from the contrary assertion.

A N S W E R.

By a *thing* I mean whatever has properties. Now ideas have many properties, and a mind may have ideas, or be without them. According to Dr. Hartley's Theory, however, ideas are only *vibrations in the brain*, which corresponds to what Dr. Price might call *modifications of the mind*; so that on this subject our opinions are not materially, if at all, different.

PART

P A R T III.

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

THE FIRST COMMUNICATION.

QUERIES, *by Dr. Price.*

1. **D**O we not necessarily ascribe our volitions and actions to ourselves?
2. Do we not determine ourselves?
3. If we do not determine ourselves, are we not deceived when we ascribe our actions to ourselves, and for that reason reckon ourselves accountable for them?

A N S W E R.

By the principle of association we do ascribe our volitions and actions to ourselves,

selves, and therefore we *necessarily* do so; but not in such a manner as to exclude *motives* from being necessary to every determination; and if we suppose that our volitions and actions have no cause foreign to themselves, that is, to our wills, we deceive ourselves, as in various other wrong judgments.

By being *liable to punishment* for our actions, and *accountable* for them, I mean its being wise and good in the Divine Being to appoint that certain sufferings should follow certain actions, provided they be *voluntary*, though *necessary* ones; such a connection of voluntary actions and sufferings being calculated to produce the greatest ultimate good.

DR. PRICE.

Query 4. Does it follow from its being certain that we shall determine ourselves in a particular way, that we do not in that instance determine ourselves at all?

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

I consider all *self-determination*, properly so called, as an impossibility, implying, that such a determination has, in fact, *no cause at all*. If the determination be *certain*, it must have a *certain or necessary cause*, arising from views of things present to the mind. For the illustration of this argument, I refer to my *Treatise of Necessity*, Sect. II. and to the *Letter to Dr. Horsley*.

THE

I

THE SECOND COMMUNICATION,

On the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

*Observations on Dr. Priestley's Answers to
the Queries in p. 127 and 128, by*

DR. PRICE.

IN order to bring the dispute between me and Dr. Priestley as much to a point as possible, and to discover how far we *agreed* and *differed*, I sent to him, after my first communication, on the nature of matter and spirit, and the immortality of the soul, the following Queries:

1. Can any thing act on another without being *present* to it?

2. Can, therefore, matter act on other matter without contact and impulse?

3. Is

3. Is not the *soul*, or what I call *myself*, a *being*, or *substance*; and not merely a *mode* or *property*?

4. Does the soul lose its existence at death? Or am I, the subject of thought, reason, consciousness, &c. to be then annihilated?

5. If I am to lose my existence at death, will not my resurrection be the resurrection of a non-entity; and therefore impossible?

6. If I am not to lose my existence at death, may it not be properly said that I am naturally immortal?

7. Do we not necessarily ascribe our volitions or actions to ourselves?

8. Do we not determine ourselves?

9. If we do not determine ourselves, are we not deceived when we ascribe our actions to ourselves; and, for that reason, reckon ourselves accountable for them?

10. Does it follow from its being certain, in any instance, that we shall determine ourselves in a particular way, that we do not, in that instance, determine ourselves at all?

In answer to these queries, I wished for no more than a simple affirmation, or negation; thinking it would be a matter of some curiosity, should it appear that our minds were so differently framed, as that one of us would write an *yes* where the other would write a *no*. But I find that we are more nearly agreed than I expected. To the two first queries, Dr. Priestley has given no direct answer; but what he has said in different places, seems to imply that he would agree with me in answering them in the negative. The 3d query he has in p. 86 and 87, answered, as I should, in the affirmative; and the 4th and 6th in the negative. It appears, however, I think, that I had some reason for expecting that he would not grant the soul to be a *substance*; much less *one single substance*. For the obvious inference from hence, is, that the

the soul cannot be, either any system of substances, or the *organization* of any system; and, therefore, not such an assemblage of substances as the brain, or the organization of the brain.

To the 7th query it appears also, (see p. 127) that he answers in the affirmative, and yet that to the 8th he answers in the negative. In other words, he acknowledges that we necessarily ascribe our determinations to ourselves, but denies that we do *really* determine ourselves; asserting in answer to the 9th query, that we are deceived when we imagine that our volitions are not produced by a cause foreign to our wills, and *on that account* believe ourselves responsible for them; all self-determination being impossible; and *accountableness* or *liableness* to punishment, being only the connexion which divine wisdom, in order to produce the greatest ultimate good, has established between certain *voluntary* though *necessary* actions, and certain sufferings.

In several passages in my *Review of Morals* (p. 301 to 304, and p. 349 to 352,

second edit.) I have stated, in the best manner I am able, the question concerning Liberty and Necessity. Dr. Priestley, in his second volume (Sect. 5th and 6th) has replied to what I have said in most of those passages, with *candour* and *ability*: But I cannot say that I think he has done it with *success*. He seems to misunderstand me, and, therefore, I will endeavour to give a more distinct account of my ideas on this subject. If they are wrong, I shall rejoice to see them proved to be so. If they are right, it will be easy to form a judgment of all Dr. Priestley's arguments in his second volume, and to determine how far we agree, and differ.

After Dr. Clarke, I define Liberty to be "a power to act", or "a power of *self-motion*, or self-determination." On this definition I would make the following observations.

1. That liberty is common to all *animals*, as well as to all *reasonable beings*; every animal, as such, possessing powers of *self-motion*, or *spontaneity*.

2. There

2. There are no *degrees* of liberty, because there is no medium between *acting*, and *not acting*; or between possessing self-motive powers, and not possessing them.

3. The liberty now defined is possible. One thing cannot move another, and that another *in infinitum*. Some where or other there must exist a power of beginning motion, that is, of *self-motion*. This is no less certain than that since one thing cannot produce another, and that another *in infinitum*, there must be a *first* cause.

This argument seems to me decisive, not only for the *possibility*, but the *actual existence* of liberty. But farther. We are conscious of it in ourselves. I can say nothing to convince a person who will declare that he believes *his* determinations do not originate *with himself*, or that he has no power of moving or determining himself. It is another question, whether he moves himself *with* or *without* a regard to *motives*. Asserting self-determination with a regard to motives, (and no one ever yet asserted the contrary) is asserting *self-*
I 4 *determination,*

determination, and, therefore, it is the same with asserting liberty. Dr. Priestley often says, that self-determination implies an effect without a cause. But this cannot be justly said. Does it follow that because I am *myself* the cause, there is no cause?

4. This definition implies, that in our volitions, or determinations, we are not *acted upon*. *Acting*, and being *acted upon*, are incompatible with one another. In whatever instances, therefore, it is truly said of us that we *act*, in those instances we cannot be *acted upon*. A being in receiving a change of its state, from the exertion of an adequate force, is not an *agent*. Man therefore would not be an *agent*, were all his volitions derived from any force, or the effects of any mechanical causes. In this case it would be no more true that he ever acts, than it is true of a ball that it *acts* when *struck* by another ball. But the main observation I would make is the following.

5. "The liberty now defined is consistent with acting with a regard to motives." This has been already intimated ;
but

but it is necessary it should be particularly attended to and explained.

Supposing a power of self-determination to exist, it is by no means necessary that it should be exerted without a regard to any end or rule. On the contrary, it can never be exerted without some view or design. Whoever acts, means to do somewhat. This is true of the lowest reptile, as well as of the wisest man. The power of determining ourselves, by the very nature of it, wants an *end* and *rule* to guide it; and no probability, or certainty, of its being exerted agreeably to a rule, can have the least tendency to infringe or diminish it. All that should be avoided here, is, the intolerable absurdity of making our reasons and ends in acting the physical *causes* or *efficients* of action. This is the same with ascribing the action of walking, not to the feet (or the power which moves the feet) but to the eye, which only *sees the way*. The perception of a reason for acting, or the judgment of the understanding, is no more than seeing the way. It is the eye of the mind,

mind, which informs and directs ; and whatever *certainty* there may be that a particular determination will follow, such determination will be the *self-determination* of the mind ; and not any change of its state stamped upon it, over which it has no power, and in receiving which, instead of being an *agent*, it is merely a *passive subject* of agency.

In a word. There is a distinction here of the last importance, which must never be overlooked. I mean the distinction so much insisted on by Dr. Clarke, between the *operation* of *physical causes*, and the *influence* of *moral reasons*. The views or ideas of beings may be the *account* or *occasions* of their acting ; but it is a contradiction to make them the *mechanical efficient*s of their actions. And yet I suspect that Dr. Priestley will avow this to be his opinion. Ideas he makes to be divisible and extended. He ascribes an impulsive force to them : And asserts that they act by mechanical laws on the mind, as one material substance acts upon another. See his *Replies*, p. 52, 85, 95 ; and the *Disquisitions*, p. 38.

In

In order better to explain the distinction I have mentioned, I will beg leave to give an account of the following particulars, in which it appears to me that *physical* and *moral* causes differ,

1. The one are *beings*; the others are only the *views* of beings,

2. The one always *do*, and the other *may* produce a certainty of event. But the certainties in these two cases differ essentially. It is, for instance, *certain* that a man dragged along like a piece of timber, will follow the superior force that acts upon him. It may be also *certain*, that a man invited by the hope of a reward, will follow a guide. But who sees not that these certainties, having different foundations, are of a totally different nature? In both cases the man might in common speech be said to *follow*; but his following in the one case, however certain in event, would be *his own* agency: In the other case, it would be the agency of *another*. In the one case, he would really *follow*: But in the other case, being dragged, he could not properly be said

said to *follow*. In the one case, superior power moves him : In the other, he moves himself. In short; to ascribe a necessary and physical efficiency to motives, is (as Dr. Clarke has observed) the same with saying, that *an abstract notion can strike a ball*.

3. The certainty of event arising from the operation of *physical* causes is always equal and invariable, but the certainty of event arising from *moral* causes, that is, from the views and perceptions of beings, admits of an infinite variety of degrees; and sometimes passes into *probability* and *contingency*.

Supposing contrary reasons equally balanced in the mind, it may be *uncertain* how a being will act. If, for instance, a temptation to an act of wickedness comes in the way of a man whose love of virtue is nearly equal to the strength of his passions, it may be doubtful which way he will determine. If his love of virtue exceeds the influence of passion, there will be a *probability* of his acting virtuously, proportioned

portioned to the degree in which the love of virtue prevails within him : And it may be so prevalent as to make it *certain* that he will always follow his perceptions of virtue.

4. In the operation of physical causes, it is always implied that there is not in any sense a power to produce, or a possibility of producing any other effect than that which is produced; but the contrary is true of effects dependent on the wills, and occasioned by the views of free agents. A benevolent man will *certainly* relieve misery when it falls in his way; but he has the *power* of not relieving it. On the contrary, a stone thrown from the hand *must* move. There is no sense in which it can be said, that it possesses the power of not moving in the precise direction in which it is thrown. The reason of this is, that the benevolent man *acts*: The stone only *suffers*. Were the determination to give relief in the former case, and the motions of the stone in the latter, both alike *sufferances*, (if I may so speak) or both effects of a force which could not be resisted, they
would

would be both alike void of all merit. A man at the bottom of St. Paul's *will not jump up*: A man at the top *will not jump down*. Both events may be *certain*. But a man at the bottom *cannot* jump up: A man at the top *can* jump down. And if in common speech we should say in the latter case, that a man at the top *cannot* jump down, we should speak figuratively and improperly; meaning only that he certainly *will not*. Who can deny, even with respect to the Supreme Deity, that, however certain it may be that he will not make his creation miserable, he has the power to do it? It is, indeed, on this power that all our notions of moral excellence in the actions of beings depend. Were the beneficence of a being no more *his* action, or *self-determination*, than the falling of rain is the action, or self-determination, of rain, it would not be the object of moral approbation; or the ground of esteem and gratitude. (See *Review of Morals*, p. 410 to p. 415. *second edit.*) This leads me to observe, lastly,

6. That

6. That the *casualty* implied in the views and dispositions of beings is entirely consistent with moral obligation, and responsibility: But that all effects brought about by mechanical laws are inconsistent with them. This appears sufficiently from the preceding observations.

Upon the whole. The question concerning Liberty is not, “Whether the “views or ideas of beings *influence* their “actions,” but “what the *nature* of that “*influence* is.” That it is not any kind of *mechanical* or *physical* efficiency, appears to me palpably evident. But if I am mistaken in this opinion; and if indeed, as Dr. Priestley maintains, man has no other liberty in following motives than water has in running down hill, or than the arms of a scale prest by weights, have in rising and falling: If, I say, this is the truth, man never *acts*. It is folly to applaud or reproach ourselves for our conduct; and there is an end of all moral obligation and accountableness—Dr. Priestley does not acknowledge these consequences. I think them clear to such a degree

degree as not to admit of proper proof. The best that can be done in this case is to state the question distinctly and intelligibly, and leave the decision to common sense.

In reviewing these papers I have found, that my desire to explain myself fully has led me to a redundancy of expression and many repetitions. Dr. Priestley will, I hope, excuse this. I refer myself to his candour, and chuse now to withdraw from this controversy——His first volume concludes with some observations in defence of the *Socinian* scheme of christianity. I will not enter into any debate with him on this subject. My opinion is, that the *Socinian* scheme degrades christianity, and is by no means reconcileable to the Scriptures. But I know that some of the best men and wisest christians have adopted it. Among these I reckon Dr. *Priestley*, Mr. *Lindsey*, and Dr. *Jebb*; and should it, contrary to my apprehensions, be the true christian doctrine, I wish them all possible success in propagating it.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

On the subject of *Necessity* I have nothing material to add to what is contained in the second volume of my work, and I cannot help thinking, that if what I have there advanced be attended to, it will be sufficient to obviate the objections here urged by Dr. Price. But as he has been so obliging as to give his ideas with great frankness, and distinctness, on the subject, and I conceive this to be the only difference of real consequence between us, I shall so far repeat the substance of what I have said before, as may be necessary to reply with equal explicitness to what he has here observed.

If *self-motion*, or *self-determination*, properly so called, be essential to liberty, I must deny that man is possessed of it; and if this, and nothing else, must be called *agency*, I must deny that, *in this sense*, man is an agent; because every human volition is invariably directed by the circumstances in which a man is, and what we

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call

call *motives*. It appears to me that we have no more reason, *from fact and observation*, to conclude that a man can *move himself*, that is, that he can *will without motives*, than that a stone can move itself. And if the will is as invariably influenced by motives as the stone is influenced by gravity, it may just as well be said that the stone moves itself, though always according to the laws of gravity, as that the will, or the mind, moves itself, though always according to the motives; and whether these motives be called the *moral* or the *physical* causes of our volitions, is of no sort of signification; because they are the *only* and the *necessary* causes, just as much as gravity is the only and necessary cause of the motion of the stone. Let the mind act contrary to motives, or the stone move contrary to the laws of gravity, and I shall then, but not before, believe that they are *not* the only and necessary causes.

“ The perception of reasons or motives
 “ Dr. Price calls the eye of the mind,
 “ which informs and directs;” but if the
 determination

determination of the mind, which follows upon it, be invariably *according to* that perception, I must conclude that the nature of the mind is such, as that it *could not* act otherwise, and therefore that it has no self-determination properly so called. A power manifested by no effects, must be considered as merely imaginary, it being from *effects* alone that we arrive at the knowledge of *causes*.

Judging from facts, I must conclude that a proper *self-motion* can no more belong to man than *self-existence*. Indeed, we have no more idea of the nature of self-motion than we have of self-existence. Motion and existence cannot be eternally derived, and *actual existence* and *actual motion*, necessarily lead us to some *self-existing*, and consequently *self-moving being*. Though the idea be ever so incomprehensible, and confounding to our faculties, we must acquiesce in it; for to stop *short* of this, or go *beyond* it, is equally impossible.

The difference that Dr. Price and others make between *moral* and *physical* causes and

effects, appears to me to be that which subsists between *voluntary* and *involuntary* causes and effects; and this is indeed a most important difference. Where involuntary motions are concerned, as in the case of a man dragged by force, it is absurd to use any reasoning or expostulation, or to apply rewards or punishments, because they can have *no effect*; but where voluntary motions are concerned, as in the case of a man who is at liberty to go where he pleases, and chuse what company he pleases, &c. reasoning and expostulation, rewards and punishments, have the greatest *propriety*, because the greatest *effect*; for they are applied to, and influence or move the will, as much as external force moves the body.

It is on this circumstance, viz. *the influence of motives on the will*, that the whole of *moral discipline* depends; so that if the will of man were so formed, as that motives should have no influence upon it, he could not be the subject of moral government; because the hope of reward, and the fear of punishment, operate in no other manner than

than as *motives applied to the will*. And since the whole of moral government depends upon the distribution of rewards and punishments, what has been called *liberty*, or a power of acting independently of motives, is so far from being the only foundation of moral government, that it is absolutely inconsistent with it, as I have shewn at large in my second volume.

The ideas belonging to the terms *accountableness, praise and blame, merit and demerit*, all relate to the business of moral discipline, and therefore necessarily imply that men are influenced by motives, and act from *fixed principles, and character*; though, on account of our not comprehending the doctrine of *causes*, and stopping where we ought not, we are generally under some mistake and misconception with respect to them. Therefore, to guard against all mistake, it may be more advisable that, in treating the subject philosophically, those words be disused. Every thing that really corresponds to them may be clearly expressed in different language,

and all the *rules of discipline*, every thing in *practice*, on the part both of the *governor* and the *governed*, will stand just as before. To make my meaning intelligible, and show that I do not advance this at random, I shall here endeavour to express in a strict and philosophical manner the full import of all the terms abovementioned.

In common speech we say that we are *accountable creatures*, and *justly liable to rewards and punishments* for our conduct. The philosopher says, that *justice* ought to be called *propriety* or *usefulness*, or a rule of conduct adapted to answer a good purpose, which in this case is the good of those who are the subjects of government or discipline; and therefore, instead of saying, We are *justly liable to rewards or punishments*, he says, We are beings of such a constitution, that to make us happy upon our observance of certain laws, and to make us suffer in consequence of our transgressing those laws, will have a good effect with respect both to our own future conduct and that of others; *i. e.* tending to our own melioration,

melioration, and operating to the melioration of others.

In common language we say a man is *praise-worthy*, and has *merit*. The philosopher says, that the man has acted from, or been influenced by good principles, or such principles as will make a man happy in himself, and useful to others; that he is therefore a proper object of complacency, and fit to be made happy; that is, the *general happiness* will be promoted by making him happy.

So also when, in common language, a man is said to be *blame-worthy* and to have *demerit*, the philosopher says, that he has acted from, or been influenced by bad principles, or such as will make a man unhappy in himself, and hurtful to others; that he is therefore a proper subject of aversion, and is fit to be made unhappy; that is, the making him unhappy will tend to promote the general happiness.

Upon the whole, therefore, though the vulgar and philosophers use different lan-

guage, they would see reason to *act* in the same manner. The governors will rule voluntary agents by means of rewards and punishments, and the governed, being voluntary agents, will be influenced by the apprehension of them. It is consequently a matter of indifference in whatever language we describe actions and characters. If the common language be in some respects inconsistent with the doctrine of necessity, it is still more inconsistent with the doctrine of liberty, or the notion of our being capable of determining without regard to motives.

For the *effect* of the more exalted views of the philosophical necessarian, (as unspeakably superior to the more imperfect views of the vulgar) I refer to what I have said upon that subject in my second volume. We are not, however, to expect that necessarians should universally, and to the eye of the world, be better than other men. Even christianity does not universally appear to this advantage in the lives of its professors. But of this I am persuaded,
that

that if any man had strength of mind fully to comprehend the doctrine of necessity, and to keep his mind at all times under the influence of it, he would be much superior to the *mere christian*, though not perhaps as much so as the christian may be to the *mere virtuous heathen*.

Before I conclude this subject, I cannot help noticing what appears to me to be an inconsistency in Dr. Price's account of his view of it. He says, p. 137, "The power of self-determination can never be exerted without some view, or design," *i. e.* the will cannot be determined without motives, and "The power of determining ourselves, by the very nature of it, wants an end, and rule, to guide it." From this I should infer, that the end and rule by which the will was guided being given, the determination would be certain and invariable; whereas, in another place, p. 139. he says, that "moral causes only *may* produce a certainty; and even that the certainty of an event arising from moral causes, that is,

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“ from the views and perceptions of things,
 “ admits of an infinite variety of degrees,
 “ and sometimes passes into probability
 “ and contingency,” p. 140. Also that “ in
 “ the operation of moral causes there is a
 “ possibility of producing any other ef-
 “ fect than that which is produced.”

Now that the will should, by the very nature of it, want an end and rule to guide it, and yet be capable of determining not only *without*, but *contrary* to that rule, is, I think, inconsistent; and yet upon this it is that the whole controversy hinges. If the will be always determined according to motives (whether it be alleged to be *by itself*, or *by the motives*) the determination is certain and invariable, which is all that I mean by *necessary*; whereas if it may determine *contrary to motives*, it is *contingent*, and uncertain; which I maintain to be a thing as impossible as that, in any case whatever, an effect should arise without a cause; and also to be a thing that is, in its nature, incapable of being the object of *fore-knowledge*.

ledge. And yet, if there be any truth in the scriptures, the Divine Being certainly foresees every determination of the mind of man.



THE THIRD COMMUNICATION.

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY,

DR. PRICE,

ON the subject of necessity I will only say farther, that notwithstanding what Dr. Priestley has said in his last reply, p. 145, &c. I remain of opinion that “ *Self-determination* and certainty of determination “ are perfectly consistent.”—“ That a self-determining power which is under no “ influence from motives, or which destroys the use of discipline and the superintendency of providence, has never “ been contended for, or meant by any “ advocates for liberty.”—And, that I am by no means sensible of any inconsistency between
between

between asserting that every being who acts at all must act for some end, and with some view; and asserting, that a being may have the power of determining his choice to any one of different ends, and that when a regard to different ends is equal, *contingency* of event takes place.—The controversy, however, does not according to my views of it, hinge on the consideration last mentioned; but merely on this, whether man is a proper agent, or has a self-determining power, or not. Beings may have a self-determining power, as, according to Dr. Priestley's concession, the deity has; and yet they may be always guided, as the deity certainly is, by a rule or end.—I know Dr. Priestley will not allow me to argue thus from the deity to inferior beings. But this method of arguing appears to me fair; and, in the present case, it seems decisive. It is only the *manner* in which God possesses his attributes that is incommunicable. We may justly say, God possesses power. Therefore, he may *give* power. But we cannot, without a contradiction, say, God is self-existent: Therefore, he may

may give self-existence ; for this would be to say, that he can make a *derived* being, *underived*.——Nor can we say, God possesses infinite power ; therefore, he can communicate *infinite* power ; for this would be to say, that he can make a being, who, as a creature, must be finite and dependent, infinite and independent.——It might be shewn, that creation out of nothing implies infinite power, and therefore cannot be communicated.

Dr. Priestley will, I hope, allow me to add the following queries.

Is it not more honourable to the deity to conceive of him, as the parent, guide, governor, and judge of free beings formed after his own image, with powers of reason and self-determination, than to conceive of him, as the former and conductor of a system of conscious machinery, or the mover and controuler of an universe of puppets ?

Can Dr. Priestley believe easily, that in all those crimes which men charge
themselves

themselves with, and reproach *themselves* for, God is the agent; and that (speaking philosophically) *they*, in such instances, are no more *agents*, than a *sword* is an agent when employed to commit murder?

Is it surprising that few possess strength of mind enough to avoid starting at such conclusions?—I am, however, ready to own the weight of some of the observations Dr. Priestley has made to explain and soften them. And though I think, that were they commonly received, they would be dreadfully abused; yet I doubt not, but Dr. Priestley may be, as he says he is, a better man for believing them.

But I must not go on. Were I to write all that offers itself, I should fall into numberless tautologies; and there would be no end of this controversy.

A N S W E R.

I know very well that Dr. Price, and other advocates for what is called philosophical free-will, do not *think* that a self-determining

determining power destroys the use of discipline, and but I contend that it necessarily does so, I also deny that, strictly speaking, there can be any such thing as *contingency*, it always implying that there is *an effect without a cause*; and therefore that a determination of the mind in circumstances in which a regard to different objects is equal, is an impossibility. This must be universal, and consequently respect the supreme mind as well as others. Those who speak with the greatest reverence of the Divine Being, always suppose that he never acts but for some *end*, and that the best, *i. e.* he acts according to some invariable *rule*. But we soon lose ourselves in speculation concerning the *first cause*.

In answer to the *Queries*, I reply, in general, that I cannot conceive any thing honourable to the deity, because the thing is *not possible in itself*, and if possible, not at all *beneficial to man*, in the supposition of his having endued us with what is called *self-determination*. And though the doctrine of necessity may, like every thing
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the most true and sublime, be exhibited in a ridiculous light, it is the only system that is even *possible*; and in my opinion it is in the highest degree *honourable*, both to the universal parent, and his offspring; the just contemplation of it being eminently improving to the mind, and leading to the practice of every thing great and excellent, as I think I have shewn in my second volume.

It certainly sounds harsh to vulgar ears, to say that “in all those crimes that men charge themselves with, and reproach themselves for, God is the agent; and that, in such cases, they are in reality no more *agents*, than a sword is an agent when employed to commit a murder.” It does require *strength of mind* not to startle at such a conclusion; but then it requires nothing but strength of mind; *i. e.* such a view of things as shall carry us beyond *first* and *fallacious appearances*. And it requires, I think, but a small degree of sagacity to perceive that, whatever there is shocking in these conclusions, it is actually

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found, and under a very slight cover, in Dr. Price's own principles; since, I believe, he admits that God foresees all the crimes that men would commit, and yet made man; that he still has it in his power, in various ways, to prevent the commission of crimes, and yet does not chuse to do it. If Dr. Price will answer a question that is frequently put by children, viz. "Papa, Why does not God "kill the Devil?" I will undertake to tell him why God *made* the Devil. Let him tell me why God *permits* vice, and I will tell him why he *appoints* it.

However, the very language that Dr. Price uses to make the doctrine of necessity appear horrid and frightful, is the very language of the scriptures, in which wicked men are expressly called *God's sword*, and are said, in a great variety of phrases, to do *all his pleasure*; though, in a different sense, the very contrary expressions occur. The reply that Paul makes to what might be objected to his saying, *God has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will*

will be hardeneth, Rom. 9, &c. viz. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault, for who has resisted his will, favours more of the ideas of a necessarian, than I suspect; the abettors of the contrary doctrine can well bear; Nay but? O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?

I do not say it is impossible to explain this passage of scripture in a manner consistent with Dr. Price's opinions; but I will say that, with less latitude of interpretation, I will undertake to explain every text that can be produced in favour of the Arian hypothesis, in a manner consistent with Socinianism.

Since, upon all schemes, it is a fact, that vice, as well other evils, *does* and *must* exist, at least for a time; is it not more honourable to the universal creator, and supreme

ruler, to suppose that he *intended* it, as an instrument of virtue and happiness, rather than that, though he by no means chose it (as a thing that necessarily thwarted his views) it was not in his power to foresee or prevent it; but that he is content to make the best he can of it when it does happen, interposing from time to time to *palliate* matters, as *unforeseen emergencies* require. This, if it be possible in itself, is what we must acquiesce in, if we reject the doctrine of necessity. There is no other alternative.

I think it hardly possible that a person who believes in *contingencies* can have a steady faith in the doctrine of *divine prescience*; and to divest the Divine Being of this attribute, which in the scriptures he claims as his distinguishing prerogative, is such a *lessening* and a *degradation* of God, respecting him too in his most important capacity, or that in which we are most concerned, viz. as *governor of the universe*, that every thing that Dr. Price can represent

sent as the consequence of the doctrine of necessity appears to me as nothing in comparison with it.

But, as Dr. Price is fully sensible, we see things in very different lights; and it is happy for us that, in general, every light in which we view *our own principles* is more or less favourable to virtue. The Papist, I doubt not, thinks his mind powerfully and advantageously impressed with the idea of the sacramental elements being *the real body and blood of Christ*; the Trinitarian with the notion of *the supreme God being incarnate*, and the Arian with his opinion, that it was the *maker and governor of the world that died upon the cross*; and numbers will say that christianity is of no value, and with Mr. Venn, that they would *burn their bibles*, if these strange doctrines be not contained in them.

Dr. Price, however, does not *feel* that christianity is degraded *in his apprehension*, by considering these opinions as absurd, or ill founded, though he

does think it degraded by the Socinian hypothesis. Neither do I think christianity degraded, but, on the contrary, I think its effect upon the mind is much improved, and the wisdom and power of God more conspicuous, on the scheme which supposes that our Saviour was a *mere man, in all things like unto his brethren*; and that as by a *mere man* came death, so by a *mere man*, also, comes the resurrection of the dead. I cheerfully conclude with Dr. Price in saying, in his *letter* subjoined to the *Introduction*, “that our agreement in
 “expecting this awful period, makes it
 “of little consequence in what we differ.”

QUERIES *addressed to* DR. PRICE.

Of the penetrability of matter.

1. Is it not a fact, that *resistance* is often occasioned not by the contact of solid matter, but by a *power of repulsion* acting at a distance from the supposed substance, as in electricity, magnetism, optics, &c.?

2. What

2. What is the effect of supposed *contact*, but another resistance?

3. Is it not even certain, that this supposed contact cannot be *real contact*, since the particles that compose the most compact bodies, being capable of being brought nearer together by cold, appear not actually to touch one another?

4. Since, therefore, there cannot be any evidence of impenetrability, but what results from the consideration of *contact*, and there is no *evidence* of any real contact, does not the doctrine of impenetrability stand altogether unsupported by any *fact*; and therefore must it not be unphilosophical to admit that it is any property of matter?

Of the S O U L.

1. If matter be not impenetrable, Dr. Price seems (if I may judge from what he says in page 56,) not unwilling to admit that it may be endued with the properties of perception and thought. Since, therefore, *the uniform composition of the*

whole man will be gained by the preceding hypothesis, is it not a consideration in favour of it? It can only be a supposed *necessity* that could lead any person to adopt the hypothesis of *two substances* in the composition of *one being*, especially two substances so exceedingly heterogeneous as *matter* and *spirit* are defined to be.

2. Admitting matter to have the property of impenetrability, is there any reason to believe that the powers of perception and thought may not be superadded to it, but that we cannot *conceive* any connection between the different properties of impenetrability and thought, or any relation they can bear to each other?

3. Have we, in reality, any idea of a connection between the property of perception, and extended substance, that is *not impenetrable*?

4. If not, is it not more philosophical to suppose that the property of perception *may* be imparted to such a substance as the body; it being certainly unphilosophical to
suppose

suppose that man consists of *two kinds of substance*, when all the known properties and powers of man *may* belong to *one substance*.

5. If the soul of man be an extended substance, it is certainly in idea, and why may it not *in fact*, be as discernible as matter. If so, are all the parts into which it may be divided, thinking and conscious beings? If not, why may not a material being, possessed of thought, consist of material substances, not possessed of thought, as well as a spiritual one?

6. Whether is it more probable that God can endue organized matter with a capacity of thinking, or that an immaterial substance, possessed of that property, can be so dependent upon the body, as not to be capable of having a perception without it, so that even its peculiar power of *self-motion* cannot be exerted but in conjunction with the body?

7. If there can be any such thing as a proper connection between material and
imma-

immaterial substances, must not the former necessarily, according to the common hypothesis, impede the motions of the latter?

8. Is there, therefore, any proper medium between the hypothesis which makes man *wholly material*, and that which makes the body a clog upon the soul, and consequently the death of the body the freedom of the soul?

9. They who maintain the Arian hypothesis, believe that an immaterial spirit, similar to the human soul, is capable of the greatest exertions in a state independent of any connection with body, at least such bodies as ours. They also suppose that between the death and the resurrection of our Lord, he possessed, and exerted, his original powers. Is it not then inconsonant to this system, to suppose that the human soul, which to all appearance is influenced by bodily affections exactly like the embodied soul of Christ, should be incapable of all sensation or action during the sleep or death of the body?

10. Con-

10. Consequently, does not every argument that proves the dependence of the soul on the body favour the Socinian hypothesis, by making it probable, that the soul of Christ was equally dependent upon his body, and therefore was incapable of exertion *before* as well as *after* its union to it? In other words, that Christ had no proper existence before his birth?

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

1. If any mental determination, or volition, be preceded by nothing, either within the mind itself, or external to it, but what might have existed without being followed by that determination, in what does that determination differ from *an effect without a cause*?

2. Admitting the possibility of such a determination, or a determination without any previous motive, with what propriety can it be the subject of praise or blame, there being no *principle*, or *design* (which would come under the denomination of *motive*) from which the determination proceeded?

ceeded? How then can such a power of self determination make us *accountable creatures*, or the proper objects of rewards and punishments?

3. If certain definite determinations of mind be always preceded by certain definite motives, or situations of mind, and the same definite motives be always followed by the same determinations, may not the determinations be properly called *necessary*; necessity signifying nothing more than the *cause of constancy*?

4. If certain determinations always follow certain states of mind, will it not follow, whether these determinations be called necessary, or not, that no determination could have been *intended*, or *expected*, by the author of all things, to have been otherwise than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*? Since, in this case, they could not have been otherwise without a miracle,

5. If any event be properly *contingent*, *i. e.* if the determination does not depend upon the previous state of mind, is it possible that the most perfect knowledge of
that

that mind, and of all the states of it, can enable a person to tell what the determination will be? In other words, is a contingent event the object of fore-knowledge, even to the deity himself?

DR. PRICE.

In answer to Dr. Priestley's 4th query, (page 172,) and also to what he says in page 161, 162, &c. I readily admit that all events are such as the power of God (acting under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness) either *causes* them to be, or *permits* them to be. I rejoice in this as the most agreeable and important of all truths: But I by no means think with Dr. Priestley, that there is no difference between it, and God's *producing* all events. I scarcely think he would conclude thus in other cases. Are there not many instances in which Dr. Priestley would think it hard to be charged with *doing* what he only foresees, and for the best reasons, thinks fit not to *hinder*?

Active and self-directing powers are the foundation of all morality; all dignity of
nature

nature and character; and the greatest possible happiness. It was, therefore, necessary such powers should be communicated; and being communicated, it was equally necessary that scope, within certain limits, should be allowed for the exercise of them. Is God's *permitting* beings, in the use of such powers, to act wickedly, the same with being himself the agent in their wickedness? Or can it be reasonable to say, that he *appoints* what cannot be done without breaking his laws, contradicting his will, and *abusing* the powers he has given?

Were I to be asked such a question as that which Dr. Priestley (in page 162,) puts into the mouth of a child—"Why God made the Devil?" or, "Why God does not confine or kill the Devil?" I should probably answer, that God made the Devil good, but that he made himself a Devil; and that a period is near when the Devil and all wicked beings will be destroyed; but that, in the mean time, the mischief they do is not prevented by confining them, or taking away their power, for
the

the same reason that a wise government does not prevent crimes by shutting men up in their houses, or that a parent does not prevent his children from doing wrong by tying up their hands and feet.— I would, in short, lead the child to understand if possible, that to prevent wickedness by denying a sphere of agency to beings, would be to prevent one evil by producing a greater.

The answer I would give to most of Dr. Priestley's other queries, may be easily collected from my former replies.

With respect to the last of them in particular, I cannot help observing, that it implies what I can by no means admit, that free agency is inconsistent with a dependence of our determinations on the state of our minds, and with a certainty of event. I think I have proved that our determinations may be *self*-determinations, and yet this be true of them.

The fore-knowledge of a *contingent* event carrying the appearance of a contradiction,
is

is indeed a difficulty; and I do not pretend to be capable of removing it.

ANSWER.

I still cannot see any difference, with respect to *criminality*, between *doing*, and *permitting* what may be prevented, even with respect to men, and much less with respect to the deity; and I should *not* think it hard to be charged with what I thought proper not to hinder. If I had, as Dr. Price says, *the best reasons for it*, they would sufficiently justify me, and in both cases alike.

But men have only an imperfect control upon each other, and the exertion of it is often difficult, or at least inconvenient. We, therefore, make an allowance with respect to men, for which there is no reason with respect to God. He distinctly foresees every action of a man's life, and all the *actual consequences* of it. If, therefore, he did not think any particular man, and his conduct, proper for his plan of creation and providence, he certainly would
not

not have introduced him into being at all.

All that Dr. Price observes with respect to what he calls *active* and *self directing powers*, I entirely approve; but I think the same conclusions will follow on the supposition of man and superior beings, having what we call mere *voluntary powers*, liable to be influenced by the motives to which they will be exposed, in the circumstances in which the Divine Being thinks proper to place them. It is this that I call *the foundation of morality*; and not to have given this power, or, by miraculous interposition, to controul it, would either be, as Dr. Price says, *to prevent smaller evils by producing greater*, or not to produce the greatest possible good. His reply to the child is the same that I make, but the question has a meaning to which the capacity of a child does not extend.

If Dr. Price admits, as, in this, place, he seems to do, that our determinations *certainly* depend upon the state of our minds,

M

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I shall have no objection to his calling us *free agents*. I believe we are so, in the popular sense of the words, and I think it perfectly consistent with all the *necessity* that I ascribe to man. When men say that they are *free*, they have no idea of any thing farther than a freedom from the control of others, or what may be called *external force*, or causes of action not arising within themselves. *Internal causes* are never so much as thought of, and much less expressly excluded, when they speak of this most perfect liberty.

LETTERS

L E T T E R S

TO

DR. KENRICK,

MR. JOHN WHITEHEAD,

AND

DR. HORSELEY.

WILLIAM H. HARRISON

to the people of the United States

and to the people of the State of Ohio

in answer to a resolution of the

House of Representatives of the

United States, passed March 10,

1840, and to the

Senate of the United States

passed March 10, 1840,

and to the

House of Representatives of the

State of Ohio, passed

March 10, 1840,

and to the

Senate of the State of Ohio

passed March 10, 1840,

and to the

House of Representatives of the

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March 10, 1840,

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Senate of the State of Ohio

passed March 10, 1840,

To Dr. KENRICK.

S I R,

YOU and I differ so very little with respect to any thing of importance in my *Disquisitions*, &c. that notwithstanding the obligation I have laid myself under, I should hardly have thought it necessary to address you on the subject; and I freely acknowledge, that it is rather your importunity, than any thing else, that has induced me to do it.

We equally maintain that matter is not that impenetrable stuff that it has been imagined to be, that man is an homogeneous being, the sentient principle not residing in a substance distinct from the body, but being the result of organization; and, as far as I can perceive, you likewise

agree with me in holding the doctrine of philosophical necessity.

Of what then is it that you complain; It seems to be, principally, that I do not acknowledge to have learned my doctrine in your school, and that the manner in which I explain it is not perfectly consistent, or just. You say, *Review* for 1778, p. 48, “ I cannot easily absolve you from the censure of unpardonable neglect, in being ignorant of what has so recently, and repeatedly been advanced on the fundamental subject of your *Disquisitions*. Twenty years are now nearly elapsed since I first took up the subject, on occasion of the late Cadwallader Colden’s treatise of the *principle of action in matter*, a subject on which I have frequently descanted, in various publications, as occasion offered.” In the same page you say, “ that this neglect of mine is not so much *real* as *affected*.”

Now, Sir, whatever be the degree of *blame* that I have justly brought upon myself, I do assure you that my ignorance of
your

your having maintained what I contend for is not affected, but *real*; and indeed my not having learned *more* of you, and my not holding your doctrine with perfect consistency, may be allowed to weigh something in answer to a charge of *plagiarism*. Besides, whatever injury I have done you, I reap no advantage from it; because I do not advance the doctrine as my own discovery, but profess to have learned the system from F. Boscovich, and Mr. Michell.

I am but an occasional reader of *Reviews*, and I have not the least recollection either of Mr. Colden's treatise, or of any thing that was ever said about it; and yet I am far from thinking disrespectfully either of *anonymous*, or of *periodical* publications, of which, without the least reason, you frequently charge me: but certainly there is less chance of an anonymous publication being generally known, and especially of its being ascribed to its right author.

You say, p. 402, that you find I do not think you much my *friend*, because I said so of the author of the *Essay* in your

Review for September 1775; but I had not the most distant suspicion of your being the writer of that Essay. It is there called *a Letter to the Reviewers*, and was announced by yourself, as a piece supposed to be written either by *myself*, or *some of my able friends*; and, in consequence, probably, of that manner of announcing it, it has, with many persons, passed for mine. You must not blame me for not knowing it to be yours, when yourself announced it as mine.

As you seem not to have any recollection of this circumstance, which has led myself and others into a mistake, I shall take the liberty to recite the whole paragraph, which is in a note of your Review for August 1775, p. 175, “ For the reasons alledged in our account of Dr. Priestley’s Essays, we beg leave to be excused for the present from entering into this interesting dispute, and that still the more earnestly, as we have had sent us a long and laboured defence of the passage that appeared so exception-
“ able

“ able to Mr. Seton, intended to have been
“ printed in a pamphlet by itself, had not
“ the author (either the Dr. himself, or
“ some able friend) justly conceived so
“ good an opinion of our candour, as to
“ think we should afford a place for it
“ in our Review, which we purpose to do
“ in our next number.” Accordingly in
the very next number (September 1775,) appeared this Essay, which you now call your own.

There are several other things in your letters to me that are almost as unaccountable as this. I am very far from having a mean opinion of your understanding, and men of sense are generally candid; at least they are able to perceive the real meaning of a writer who wishes to be understood, and they are above little cavils. And yet, p. 64, you ascribe to me what I am professedly refuting, and only suppose for the sake of that refutation, viz. the solidity of the atoms, or the ultimate constituent parts of bodies. You write variously, and perhaps not very consistently

sistently with respect to me; but, in general, you seem to think that I write with tolerable *perspicuity*, as well as readiness; you should therefore have reconsidered the passages which you except against. I see little, if any thing, that I can amend in them; and yet you say that, “with the
“best disposition in the world to compre-
“hend me, you cannot possibly conceive
“what I am about.

Your cavil, p. 65, appears to me to be equally ill founded: for by the *smallest parts* of bodies, I evidently mean those that are *supposed to be* the smallest, or the solid indiscerptible atoms of other philosophers; which I maintain to be resolvable into still smaller parts. I do not wonder to find this wretched cavil in such a writer as Mr. Whitehead, but it is altogether unworthy of a person who has any degree of reputation, as a writer, or a man of sense, and candour.

You ridicule what you call my *pompous list* of authors prefixed to the *Disquisitions*,
when

when I barely mention those of which there are *different editions*, that, as I quote the *pages*, those who had different editions of the same book might be apprized of it. What could the most modest writer, yourself for instance, who wished to be understood, do less? Had I meant to swell the list, I should have inserted in it *all* that I have quoted; which, however, is a very common practice, and not at all exceptionable. On many occasions you charge me with *vanity* and *conceit*; and once, in imitation, I suppose, of the style of Dr. Johnson, you term it *an exuberance of self-exaltation*: but this charge is founded upon nothing but the most forced and uncandid construction of my expressions. This I consider as an unworthy artifice. Had I affected an unusual degree of *modesty*, inconsistent with writing so much as I do, (as it certainly implies that I think myself capable of instructing, at least, some part of mankind) there would have been more reason for your conduct.

As to the work which you promise the public, I shall expect it with some impatience,

tience, and shall certainly read it with the greatest attention; and as you say that “the *theory of physics*, or the systematical “principles of natural philosophy, the science which Lord Bacon represents as the “basis and foundation of all human knowledge is the department of your peculiar profession,” I do hope that you will throw some light upon it, and I have every reason to wish you success. If you can prove, as you say, page 277, that *all matter is possessed of some degree of perception*, you will effectually remove the only difficulty under which my scheme labours; which is *how* a sentient principle is the result of organization. The *fact* I think indisputable, and must be admitted on the received rules of philosophizing; but that it *must be so*, from the nature of things, I own I do not yet see, any more than I am yet satisfied that “the form and magnitude “of bodies are to be considered as generated by motion,” p. 161, or that “every natural phenomenon, or distinct “object of sense, is a compound of active “and passive physical powers,” notwithstanding

standing the very ingenious observations that you have advanced with respect to them.

You frequently hint that, the reason why I have generally appeared to advantage in controversy, is that I have always pitched upon *weak antagonists*. I can only say, that, if this has been the case, it has been because I have not had the good fortune to meet with any better; and in general they have not been weak either in their own eyes, or in those of the public. This character, however, can by no means apply to Dr. Brown, Dr. Balguy, Dr. Blackstone, Dr. Reid, or Dr. Beattie, whatever you may say of Dr. Oswald, on whose work you will find the highest encomiums in the Reviews of the day; and it was in fact, held in very great and general admiration.

You will also find the same to be, in a great measure, true of the *Letters on Materialism*. Besides the stating of *objections actually made*, and answering them, has a much better effect than proposing them in
other

other words ; as it may be suspected, that, by this means, the answerer gives himself an unfair advantage ; and when I replied to him, no other answer had appeared. For as to your *Mr. Seton*, who, it seems, notwithstanding the incredulity of some, did really *live*, and is now actually *dead*, I could not, though I endeavoured to do it, persuade myself to take any notice of him ; he appeared to know so very little of the very rudiments of theological knowledge. Many other opponents I have neglected to notice because I thought them insignificant, though they are not without their admirers, and boast, as you do, that I make no reply, because I am not able to do it. As to yourself, pretend what you will, I cannot consider you in the light of an adversary.

You ask me repeatedly, why, since I deny all solidity or impenetrability, I should chuse to make use of so obnoxious a term as *matter*, when the less exceptionable one of *spirit* would answer my purpose full as well. I answer, that the cause of truth is
best

best answered by calling every thing by its *usual name*, and I think it a mean subterfuge to impose upon mankind by the use of words.

Man, I believe, was wholly made of *the dust of the ground*, or of the same substance with the earth itself. Now by what term has the earth, and all the substances that belong to it, been distinguished, but that of *matter*? I suppose the sentient principle in man to be the brain itself, and not any *invisible substance* residing in the brain, and capable of subsisting when the brain is destroyed. Now of what has the brain been always said to consist, but *matter*, another species indeed from that of the dust of the ground, but still comprised under the same common appellation of matter? In what other manner than that which I have chosen, is it possible to rectify the mistakes of men? To call matter by the name of *spirit* might tend to give them an idea that my opinions were, in fact, the same with theirs, though expressed in different words; and by this means, I might screen myself from their
censure,

censure; but I should only *deceive*, and should not *instruct* them at all.

In this manner too many christian preachers, and writers, adopting the phraseology of the Athanasian system, pass for orthodox, without, as they think, any violation of truth. But what accrues from this conduct? No advantage to the *cause of truth*; nothing but the mere *safety of the preacher, or writer*:

This, Sir, is not my object. I have hitherto pursued a different plan, and have seen no reason to repent of it. Upon this general principle, I have chosen to say that *man is wholly material*, rather than *wholly spiritual*, though both the terms were in my option.

You must give me leave to close this letter with some notice of a passage of yours to me, which is in the same strain with many others, and of which we have but too many examples in such writers as Voltaire and Mr. Hume. You say, p. 489, "As to your concern for the con-
" version

“ version of infidels, I look upon it as
 “ the cant of a philosophical crusader, and
 “ am sorry I cannot coincide with you in
 “ your projected conciliation of the *ra-*
 “ *tional truths* of philosophy, with the
 “ *mysterious truths* of christianity. I am
 “ apprehensive that it is impossible, with-
 “ out endangering the cause of both, to
 “ bring them into too close a contact.”
 In a note, (*ib.*) you add, “ It is a moot
 “ point with me, whether the really think-
 “ ing and intelligent philosophers, whom
 “ Dr. Priestley wishes to convert, are great-
 “ er infidels, in their present state of un-
 “ belief, than they would be, if con-
 “ verted by him into rational christians.”

Now I must take it for granted, that a
 man of much less discernment than you,
 cannot but be sensible, that no proposition
 can be *true* and *false* at the same time, or
 true with respect to philosophy, and false
 with respect to theology, or *vice versa*; so
 that if what is called a *mystery in christianity*,
 be really a *falsehood in philosophy*, *i. e.* re-
 ducible to a contradiction, the belief of it

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must

must be abandoned altogether, at any hazard; and the scheme of religion that necessarily supposes it to be true must be confessed to be ill founded, and an imposition on mankind.

If, for example, *bread and wine*, philosophically, *i. e.* strictly and justly considered, cannot be *flesh and blood*, the popish doctrine of *transubstantiation* cannot be true. So also if *one* cannot be *three*, or *three*, *one*, mathematically considered, neither can the Athanasian doctrine of the *Trinity* be true. It certainly, therefore, behoves every rational christian to prove the consistency of the articles of his faith with true philosophy and the nature of things. This is the only method of effectually silencing such unbelievers as, with the low view of imposing on the weakest christians, pretend to believe christianity, at the same time that they maintain it is *not founded on argument*; thinking to lose no character with men of sense, like themselves, who will easily perceive the design with which such absurd professions are made, and will be ready to
join

join in the laugh at the credulity of those who are taken with them. If I were really an unbeliever, I think I should not scruple to avow it, rather than debase my mind by such paltry evasions. But it must be owned, that an unbeliever has not the same cause for *a strict attachment to truth*, that a christian has.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, June 1778.

Dr. E. H. R. L. C. K.

join in the laugh at the credulity of those
who are taken with them. I think I should not attempt
an undelivered, I think I should not attempt
to show it, rather than doubt my mind by
such guilty evasions. But I must be content
that an unbeliever has not the same cause
for a final attachment to you, that a child-
ren has.

I am, Sir,
Your very humble servant,
J. PRIESTLEY

Given, this 25th day of June, 1791,
at Birmingham, in the County of Warwick,
England, the said J. Priestley, of the County of Warwick,
in the Parish of St. Martin, in the City of Birmingham,
do hereby certify that the within is a true and correct
copy of the original of the said J. Priestley, of the County of Warwick,
in the Parish of St. Martin, in the City of Birmingham,
do hereby certify that the within is a true and correct
copy of the original of the said J. Priestley, of the County of Warwick,
in the Parish of St. Martin, in the City of Birmingham,
do hereby certify that the within is a true and correct
copy of the original of the said J. Priestley, of the County of Warwick,
in the Parish of St. Martin, in the City of Birmingham,

To Mr. WHITEHEAD.

S I R,

AN attack from a person of your religious persuasion is a thing that is new to me; and as I have frequently mentioned your people with respect, and have always had very agreeable connections with individuals of your body, it would have been a real satisfaction to me to have found that, even in their *opposition* to me, they were respectable; and therefore to have had it in my power to speak as handsomely of you *all*, as I have hitherto done. However, though an individual has shewn that want of civility and candour, which I had thought inseparable from all Quakers, and, also too little acquaintance with his subject, I shall by no means impute these faults to the whole body to which you belong; many of whom I know to be equally distinguished for their candour and knowledge.

You know, Sir, I presume, that I profess to believe in a *God*, a *providence*, and a *future state*, in the *divine mission of Christ*, and the *authority of the scriptures*. I have written not a little in the direct defence of these principles, and I hope my general character and conduct does not give the lie to my profession. Why then should you suppose me not to be *sincere*, and to be *secretly undermining* these great principles of religion? Might not I, if I were so disposed, retort the same surmises and calumnies respecting you? You are certainly at liberty to urge me with what you apprehend to be the real consequences of my doctrine, but this you might do without intimating, as you frequently do, that I was *apprized* of the immoral and dangerous consequences of my principles, and wished to propagate them *on that account*.

“Materialism,” you say, p. 163, “must
“terminate in Atheism;” and p. 90,
“The doctrine of materialism must be at-
“tended with the most destructive and
“fatal

“ fatal consequences. It supposes that this
“ life is our only place of existence, and
“ by this means takes away all confidence
“ in God, all hope of future rewards, and
“ fear of punishment. It tears up all
“ religion by the very roots, and renders
“ all our moral powers and faculties wholly
“ useless, or supposes them to be mere
“ creatures of education and human policy.
“ In short, its language is, *let us eat and*
“ *drink, for to-morrow we die.*” You are
pleased to add, “ I do not say that Dr.
“ Priestley will *directly* defend these prin-
“ ciples, or that he *altogether* believes
“ them to be the consequences of his doc-
“ trine.” This however, is an insinuation,
that, though not *altogether*, I do *in part* be-
lieve them to be the consequences of my
doctrine; and other passages in your work
sufficiently shew, that you think me capa-
ble of advancing and supporting these prin-
ciples, even though I should be altogether
persuaded of their horrid consequences.

“ It must be owned,” you say, p. 108,
“ that our author shews no great delicacy

“ respecting the character of the sacred
“ penmen. He very freely, though in-
“ directly, bespatters them with dirt ; from
“ whence one might naturally suspect, that
“ he owes them no very good will. Pro-
“ fessions of this kind,” you say, p. 110,
“ from one who professes to believe the
“ gospel, looks so much like a *feigned*
“ *friendship*, in order to deliver it more se-
“ curely into the hands of the deists, that
“ it will not fail to recall to memory the
“ treatment of our Lord by one of his
“ professed disciples, to which, with re-
“ spect to the gospel revelation, it bears a
“ striking resemblance. There,” you say,
p. 112, “ is an end of all scripture au-
“ thority at once, which perhaps would
“ not be very disagreeable to this writer.”
Lastly you scruple not to say, page 106,
“ I should not wonder to hear this learned
“ gentleman, armed cap-a-pee, with logic
“ and philosophy, represent his Lord and
“ Saviour as a greater deceiver than Ma-
“ homet. To such miserable and profane
“ shifts, may rash reasoning bring an un-
“ guarded man.”

For

For the honour of the christian name, and of the particular profession to which you belong, I hope that, on reflection, yourself, or at least your friends, will blush for these things. In the preceding quotation, I hope, Sir, you will be thought to have given a very unfair account of my *moral principles* and *views*; let us now see whether you be any better acquainted with the *professed design* of my work, and the *nature of the argument*.

“The great object in view,” you say, p. 171, “it seems, in contriving and modelling these enquiries into matter and spirit, was to lay a foundation for the better support of *Arianism*.” Now, Sir, so much are you mistaken, that the great object in view was the very reverse of what you suppose, viz. the radical overturning of the system of Arianism, by proving the absurdity, and explaining the origin, of the doctrines of a *soul*, and of *pre-existence*, which are necessarily supposed in the Arian system; and a very great part of my work is, not indirectly, but *openly*, and both *really*,
and

and *by name*, an attack upon Arianism, and both what is called the *high* and the *low Arian hypothesis*, which I consider separately.

Let us now see the light in which my account of *the opinions of the christian Fathers* has happened to strike you; and in this you are no less unfortunate. "The thing
 " he proposes to prove," you say, p. 140,
 " is that the christian Fathers believed that
 " the soul can have no existence separate
 " from the body, that thought and con-
 " sciousness may be the result of an orga-
 " nized system of matter. Consequently,"
 you say, p. 149, "our author's grand boast,
 " that the apostles and primitive fathers
 " thought with him, that the soul is ma-
 " terial and mortal, vanishes into air;
 " where, perhaps, this experimental phi-
 " losopher may be able to make more of
 " it than we can do in these lower re-
 " gions."

Again, p. 148, after reciting the opinion of Cl. Mamertus, who says of the soul, that it is neither *extended*, nor *in place*,
 you

you say, "These seem to me most extraordinary assertions, to prove that the soul is material, and dies with the body. It requires more skill in Logic than I am master of to find this conclusion in either of the premises."

A very extraordinary conclusion indeed, but, if that had been my idea, it would not have been more extraordinary than your mistake of the whole drift of my argument in this business. I had asserted that the idea of *refined spirituality*, maintained, I find, by yourself, was unknown to all antiquity; and therefore I have shown, that though, according to the notion of the heathen philosophers, the soul was considered as a substance distinct from the body, being a detached part of the great soul of the universe, it had the property of *extension*, and was, in reality, what we should now call *a more refined kind of matter*; and that true *spiritualism* was introduced gradually; but, if any more distinct æra can be fixed on, it was that of this very Mamertus.

I farther prove, that, according to the true system of revelation, though the sentient and thinking principle may be spoken of as distinct from the other functions of the man, it was always supposed to reside in some part of his body, and to be inseparable from it. For the sacred writers never speak of the soul as in one place, and the body in another; and it was not till the introduction of the heathen philosophy into christianity, that it was imagined that the soul retained its perceptivity and activity while the body was in the grave. Of this, I presume, I have given sufficient proof.

You are pleased, indeed, to alledge, page 144, as a proof that the early christians thought differently, a passage in the epistle of Polycarp, who says that “ Paul, and “ the rest of the apostles, are in the place “ appointed for them, *παρεστω κυριω*, with the “ Lord.” But if you had attended to the Greek, you would have perceived that this is not the *necessary* sense of the passage, and Archbishop Wake renders it “ the place “ that was due to them, from the Lord.”

Indeed,

Indeed, had you been sufficiently conversant with *ecclesiastical history*, you would have known, that it was not till many centuries after the time of Polycarp, that any christian thought that the separate soul, whether sentient or not, was in any other place than that which is distinguished by the term *hades*. It was universally thought that good men were not *with God and Christ* till after the resurrection, which is clearly the scripture doctrine.

In John xvi. 3. our Lord says, *I will come again, and receive you unto myself, that where I am, ye may be also*. Here is a plain limitation of the time when the disciples of our Lord, and even the apostles themselves, were to be admitted to his presence, and live with him, viz. at his return to raise the dead, and not before.

What you say on the subject of the state of the soul between death and the resurrection, is too trifling to deserve a particular notice. As you seem not to have given sufficient attention to this subject, I would take the liberty to recommend to
your

your careful perusal, what the excellent Bishop of Carlisle has written on it, Archdeacon Blackburne's *Historical View of this Controversy*; the Dissertation prefixed to *Alexander's Commentary on 1 Cor. xv.* and a summary of the principal arguments in the third volume of my *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*.

It is upon this subject that you note, with great triumph, that I have quoted as one, two similar passages in the book of *Revelation*. Another person would have supposed this to have happened through *inadvertency*, and not, as you will have it, *with design*. It must have been infatuation to have done this in a work so inviting of criticism as mine is. A new edition of the work will shew you that my argument loses nothing by the rectification of that mistake.

I shall mention one more mistake of my meaning, though in a thing of no great consequence. "It is a great mistake," you say, p. 10, "to suppose with Dr. Priestley, and some other philosophers, that

“ that there is some unknown substance
“ in material nature, distinct from the pro-
“ perties of solidity and extension.” Now
what I have said, and repeated many times,
is, that when all the properties of sub-
stance are taken away, the substance itself
is gone; and that the terms *substance*, *es-*
sence, &c. &c. are merely a convenience in
speech.

You triumph exceedingly in my speak-
ing of the *smallest particles of matter* being
resolved into others still *smaller*. For an
explanation of this, I refer you to my let-
ter to Dr. Kenrick.

Your strictures on the subject of *personal*
identity I freely leave to have their full effect
on the minds of our readers, without any
apprehension of the consequence.

Before I close this letter, I shall briefly
mention a few particulars, which show
that you are not sufficiently acquainted
with the *state of opinions* for a controversial
writer on such subjects as those of the
Disquisitions.

“ Nor

“ Nor do I presume,” you say, p. 25,
“ that any philosopher will contend for an
“ earlier and earlier existence of this world,
“ and the creatures in it, *ad infinitum*.”

Now, Sir, many philosophers and divines maintain the very doctrine that you think not to exist. It was the opinion of the Platonists, it is asserted by Dr. Hartley, it is what I have given in my Institutes, and I believe it is that of Dr. Price, who is far from thinking with me on the subject of the *Disquisitions*.

“ Our learned author,” you say, p. 81,
“ indeed, affects to disbelieve the continual
“ flux of the particles of the human body;
“ but this I presume no one will seriously
“ deny, who has a competent knowledge
“ of its structure and œconomy.”

Now many persons, Sir, and even Dr. Watts, whom you quote with so much respect, seriously believed that there are parts of the body, some *stamina*, that never change.

There

There is another thing that you take for granted, in which I believe you are quite singular, and it is, indeed, sufficiently curious. You say, p. 167, that "where body is, space is necessarily excluded," and from this extraordinary supposition you draw many curious inferences, in your reasoning about the nature of spirit, and of the deity. Now I have heard of space being *occupied*, but never of its being *excluded* before.

I must not quite conclude without acknowledging myself obliged to you for furnishing me with a proof, which you will find, by Dr. Price's remarks, was in some measure wanting, of its being the *real opinion* of any person, that *spirit bears no relation to space*. You do it in the amplest manner, and build upon it your argument against the materiality of the human soul. According to you Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and others, who maintain the *locality*, and consequently the *extension* of spirit, are as much materialists as myself. I leave them and you to dispute that point;
O and

and you may imagine I shall not feel unpleasantly in the situation of a *spectator*. It will give me some respite, and I shall expect to derive some advantage from the issue of the contest, in whose favour soever it may be.

“ No corporeal substance,” you say, p. 63, “ whatever can possibly be the seat of sensation; for all of them have extension, and must be of some figure or form. On the same principles,” p. 128, “ we may explain the omnipresence of God not by extension through all bodies, as this writer seems to believe, which is an idea so gross that it deserves a name which, for the sake of the author, I shall not bestow upon it.”

Now, as you have not scrupled to make use of the terms *materialist*, and *atheist* in this controversy, I have really a good deal of curiosity to know what dread name it is, that, *out of regard to me*, you suppress the mention of. If it be too dreadful for the *public ear*, could you not favour me with the intimation of it in a private letter? I shall

shall communicate it to my friend Dr. Price, whom it concerns as much as it does myself. Dr. Clarke, you will also find, and in the opinion of Dr. Price, all the most distinguished immaterialists, will fall under this dread censure. But, being so many of us, materialists and immaterialists, we shall bear it the better; for bodies, and large companies of men, we know, are not easily affected either by *shame* or *fear*.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, June 1778.

Mr. W. H. T. E. A. D.

shall communicate it to my friend Dr. Price, whose acquaintance with Aristotle is such that you will also find in the opinion of Dr. Price, and the most distinguished naturalists, with all under this dread curse. But being so many of us, materialists and immaterialists, we shall be in the better, for bodies, and large companies of men, we know, are not easily affected either by heat or cold.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

J. PRIESTLEY

Case, June 1791

LETTER
TO
DR. HORSELEY.

DEAR SIR,

I THINK myself particularly happy that a person of your abilities, and mathematical and philosophical knowledge, has vouchsafed to allude to my work, though only in a *sermon*, as it gives me an opportunity of explaining myself more fully with respect to the state of the question concerning *liberty* and *necessity*, and likewise of showing that the *sect* of necessarians, though almost *every where spoken against*, is more numerous and respectable than is generally imagined; for that you, Sir, belong to it as much as I do; with this only difference, that you chuse to make use of one set of phrases, and I of another.

It is impossible for me to express in stronger terms than you do, the absolute certainty of every determination of the will of man, as depending upon the circumstances he is in, and the motives presented to him. "A moral motive and a mechanical force," you say, p. 10, "are equally certain causes, each of its proper effect. A moral motive," you say, "is what is more significantly called the final cause, and can have no influence but with a being that proposes to itself an end, chooses means, and thus puts itself in action. It is true that while this is my end, and while I conceive these to be the means, a definite action will as certainly follow that definite choice and judgement of my mind, provided I be free from all external restraint and impediment, as a determinate motion will be excited in a body by a force applied in a given direction. There is, in both cases, an equal certainty of the effect."

Having granted this, it is not possible that you and I can have any difference that

is

is not merely *verbal*. Our *ideas* are precisely the same; nor have I indeed any objection to your *language*, in any sense in which it can be consistent with the above assertions.

You are too good a mathematician to require being told, that, if every determination of the mind of man certainly depends upon preceding causes, whether the causes be moral, or physical, it is not possible that any determination, or consequently that any event, in which men are concerned, could have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*; or that the Divine Being, who, as you justly say, “knows
“ things by their causes, as being himself
“ the first cause, the source of power and
“ activity to all other causes,” should not have *intended* every thing to be just as it is. On this ground only can you affirm, as you do, that “to him every thing that shall
“ ever be is at all times infinitely more
“ certain, than any thing, either past or
“ present, can be to any man,” &c. This, I say, you need not be told. It is an im-

mediate and necessary inference from your own principle. Indeed, it is little more than repeating the same thing in other words.

You even apply these principles to a case of the greatest virtue that was ever exerted by man, viz. the voluntary sufferings and death of Christ, and likewise to a case of the greatest wickedness, viz. that of his enemies in voluntarily inflicting those sufferings upon him. No person can express this with more perspicuity or energy than you have done.

“ Now therefore,” you say, p. 3, “ he begins to shew them” (his disciples) “ that
 “ he *must* go to Jerusaleem, and, after much
 “ malicious persecution from the leaders
 “ of the Jewish people, he *must* be killed.
 “ The form of expression here is very remarkable in the original, and it is well
 “ preserved in our English translation. He
 “ *must* go, he *must* suffer, he *must* be killed, he *must* be raised again on the third
 “ day. All these things were fixed and
 “ determined—must inevitably be—no
 “ thing

“ thing could prevent them—and yet the
“ greater part of them were of a kind that
“ might *seem* to depend intirely upon man’s
“ free-agency. To go, or not to go to
“ Jerufalem, was in his own power, and
“ the perfecution he met with there,
“ arifing from the folly and the malice of
“ ignorant and wicked men, furely de-
“ pended upon the human will; yet, by the
“ form of the fentence, thefe things are
“ included under the fame *Necelfity of Event*
“ as that which was evidently an immedi-
“ ate effect of divine power, without the
“ concurrence of any other caufe, the re-
“ furrection of Jefus from the dead. The
“ words which in the original exprefs the
“ going, the *suffering*, the *being killed*, the
“ *being raifed again*, are equally fubject to
“ the verb which answers to the word
“ *must* of our language, and in its proper
“ meaning predicates *necelfity*. As he *must*
“ be raifed on the third day, fo he *must*
“ go, he *must* fuffer, he *must* be killed.
“ Every one of thefe events, his going to
“ Jerufalem, his fuffering, and his death
“ there, and that thefe fufferings, and that
“ death

“ death should be brought about by the
“ malice of the elders and chief priests
“ and scribes; every one of these things
“ is plainly announced, as no less unal-
“ terably fixed, than the resurrection of
“ our saviour, or the time of his resur-
“ rection, that it was to happen on the
“ third day.”

If then the virtuous determinations of Christ, and the wicked determinations of his enemies, were equally necessary (for I have no other idea to the word *must be*, and indeed you yourself use them as synonymous) every other act of virtue, or act of vice, is equally necessary, or *must be*, and nothing but a miracle, or an arbitrary infringement of the laws of nature, can prevent its taking place. Though you do not chuse to call this a *physical*, but a *moral* necessity, you allow it to be a *real* necessity, arising from the operation of the established laws of nature, implying an impossibility of the thing being otherwise than it is, which is all that I wish you to grant.

For

For any man to have acted differently from what he did, in any given case, he must have been differently disposed at the time, or must have had different views of things present to his mind; neither of which, properly speaking, depends upon himself. For though it does so *immediately*, it does not do so *ultimately*: for since every particular determination depends upon his immediately preceding circumstances, it necessarily follows that the whole chain of his determinations and actions depends upon his *original make*, and *original circumstances*. And who is our maker but God? or who is it that disposes of us but the same God?

You could not, dear Sir, have written what you have done, if you had not felt, and enjoyed this most important truth. Let us do it freely and without reserve, let us not scruple to express it in its proper language, and let us openly acknowledge, and chearfully embrace, all the fair consequences of it. I need not with you, Sir, make any encomium on our common
prin-

principles. The doctrine of necessity, (moral necessity, if you chuse to call it so) contains, or implies, all that the heart of man can wish. It leads us to consider ourselves, and every thing else as at the uncontrolled disposal of the greatest and best of beings; that, strictly speaking, nothing does, or can, go wrong; that all *retrograde motions*, in the moral as well as in the natural world, are only *apparent*, not *real*. Being under this infallible guidance, our final destination is certain and glorious. In the language of Pope,

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
 All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
 All discord, harmony not understood;
 All partial evil, universal good:
 And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
 One truth is clear, *whatever is, is right*.

Let us now consider why it is that you object to the term *physical*, as applied to the causes of human actions. For I am ready to disuse it, if it imply any thing more than we both agree in maintaining. The word itself is derived from *φύσις*, *nature*, and therefore, literally rendered, signifies *agree-*
able

able to nature, or the laws of nature. A physical cause, therefore, is simply that which, according to the established laws of nature, will produce a given effect; and of course respects the laws to which the mind is subject, as well as those by which the external world is governed, both being equally within the compass of nature. I therefore apply it to both cases indiscriminately.

If you say the *operations*, and therefore the *laws*, are of a very different nature, I readily acknowledge it. For, with respect to this, it is impossible that we can really differ. The compass of nature is great, and comprizes very various things. *Chemistry*, for instance, and common *mechanics* are very different things; and accordingly we have different *kinds of laws*, or *rules*, by which to express, and explain, their operations; but still they are equally branches of *Physics*. So also though the *phenomena*, and consequently the *laws of the mind*, are different from those of the *body*, that is no sufficient reason why we should

should not comprize them under the same general term of *physics*. However, if you dislike the word, in the extensive application in which I use it, I am very well content to use it in your more restrained sense, and will call the things that influence the mind *moral*, and not physical causes. Only allow that there *are* laws, and causes, by which the mind is truly and properly *influenced*, producing certain definite effects in definite circumstances, and I shall not quarrel with you for the sake of a term.

You say, p. 10, that I confound moral and physical necessity, or, to use your own words, that “when I represent the influence of moral motives, as arising from a physical necessity, the very same with that which excites and governs the motions of the inanimate creation, I confound nature’s distinctions, and contradict the very principles I would seem to have established; and that the source of the mistake is, that I imagine a similitude between things which admit of no comparison.”

Now,

Now, Sir, I will allow as much difference as you *can* suppose between moral and physical causes. Inanimate matter, as the pen that I write with, is not capable of being influenced by *motives*, nor is the *hand* that holds the pen, but the *mind* that directs both. I think I distinguish these things better by the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary*; but these are mere *words*, and I make no comparison between them, or between moral and physical causes, but in that very respect in which you yourself acknowledge that they agree, *i. e.* the *certainty* with which they produce their respective effects. And this is the proper foundation of all the *necessity* that I ascribe to human actions. My conclusion, that men could not, in any given case, act otherwise than they do, is not at all affected by the *terms* by which we distinguish the laws and causes that respect the mind from those which respect the external world. That there are *any laws*, and that there are *any causes*, to which the mind is subject, is all that my argument requires.

Give

Give me the thing, and I will readily give you the name.

Again, you distinguish between *efficient* and *final* causes, and say that, by means of the latter, a person *puts himself in motion*. But still, if it be true, as you allow, that, notwithstanding this, a definite act will certainly follow a definite choice and judgment of the mind, there is, in no case, any more than *one way* in which the mind can put itself in motion, or only one direction that it can take, which is all the necessity that I contend for. I chuse to say that *motives determine the mind*, whereas you say that the *mind determines itself according to the motives*; but, in both cases, the determination itself is the very same, and we both agree that it *could not have been different*. Our difference, therefore is merely verbal, and cannot possibly be any thing more.

Turn over this subject, Sir, in your own mind as you please, you will find that one who controverts the doctrine of necessity,
has

has the choice of no more than *two things*. He must either say that, in a given situation of mind, with respect to disposition and motives, the determination is *definite*, *i. e.* agreeable to some general rule, or that it is *indefinite*, *i. e.* subject to no rule at all. If the former be admitted, which is what you allow, you are, to all intents and purposes, a necessarian. You may (unknown to yourself) conceal your principles under the cover of some specious and ambiguous phraseology, but you certainly maintain the *thing*. If, on the other hand, you say, that the determination is *indefinite*, you are very sensible that you suppose *an effect without a cause*, which is impossible. This side of the dilemma, therefore, you carefully avoid. In short, Sir, there is no choice in the case, but of the doctrine of necessity (disguised, perhaps, under some other name) or absolute nonsense. There is no possibility of finding any medium.

Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare Charybdim.

P

You

You are pleased, Sir, to call philosophical necessity the doctrine of the *subtle moderns*, and that of predestination that of their *more simple ancestors*, saying, that we *subtle moderns*, are *deeply versed in physics*, and maintain the regular operation of *second causes*; and you candidly acknowledge that we are both actuated by the *same humble spirit of resigned devotion*. This, Sir, is frank and generous, and I hope true. I only object to your characterizing us necessarians as *subtle*, when, in reality, Sir, our doctrine is the plainest thing in the world, and it requires no small degree of subtlety to believe any thing else.

What are your distinctions between things *moral* and *physical*, *efficient* and *final*, *certain* and *necessary*, these relating to *self-determination*, or *self-motion*, &c. &c. &c. but *subtleties*, to which we have no recourse. We are content to call all things by their common names. With us laws are laws, and causes causes. If the laws are inviolable, and the causes certain in their operation (and without this they are, in reality

ality, *no laws*, and *no causes* at all) we say that all that follows is *necessary*, or what *could not but be*. What is there, Sir, of *subtlety* in all this?

As you are a man of undoubted sense, and candour, and particularly well versed in mathematical and philosophical knowledge, I doubt not you will carefully attend to these few plain considerations; and I am confident that, with the honest mind that I believe you to be possessed of, you will henceforth avow yourself to be what, without hitherto knowing it, you really are, a believer in “the great and glorious, though “unpopular doctrine of *philosophical necessity*.”

I am,

With the greatest respect,

Dear Sir,

Yours, very sincerely,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, June 1778.

P 2

P. S.

P. S. I shall take it as a particular favour, if you will oblige me and the public with your *second thoughts* on this subject. I have had, and expect, so many weak and hasty answers, that, I own, I am eager to lay hold of a man who is equal to the discussion of the subject, and especially one who is, at the same time, truly liberal and candid. The Doctrine of Necessity is very far from being well understood by the generality of scholars, and it is certainly of great consequence to have their attention drawn to it. I shall be happy, likewise, to walk with you over *all* the ground marked out in the *Disquisitions*, with respect to which I perceive that you hold a system very different from mine.

ILLUSTRATIONS

ILLUSTRATIONS

OF SOME PARTICULARS IN THE DISQUISITIONS ON MATTER AND SPIRIT.

THAT I might not obtrude upon the public a crude and hasty performance on subjects of so much importance as those which I have ventured to discuss in these *Disquisitions*, I put copies of the work, after it was completely printed off, into the hands of several of my friends, both well and ill affected to my general system, that I might have the benefit of their remarks, and take advantage of them, in an additional sheet of *Illustrations*, if that should appear to be necessary.

Accordingly I have received, and considered, with as much attention as I can,

various remarks that have been communicated to me, and have thought it might be of use to add some explanations in consequence of them. I hope they will be the means of obviating some cavils, and serve to make my meaning better understood, whether they make the doctrine itself more or less acceptable to my readers in general.

I. *Of Bodies acting where they are not.*

It is objected to the doctrine of these papers, which supposes that the repulsion, ascribed to bodies, takes place at some distance from their real surfaces; that bodies must then *act where they are not*, which is deemed to be an absurdity. I acknowledge that there is a considerable difficulty in this case; but it does not in the least affect the hypothesis that I have adopted concerning matter, any more than that which is commonly received. According to Sir Isaac Newton's Observations, rays of light begin to be reflected from all bodies at a certain distance from their surfaces;

faces; and yet he considers those rays as reflected by those bodies, that is, by powers inhering in and properly belonging to those bodies. So also the gravitation of the earth and of the other planets to the sun, he considers as produced by a power of attraction properly belonging to the sun, which is at an immense distance from them,

If Sir Isaac Newton would say that the impulse, by which light is reflected from any body, and by which planets are driven towards the sun, is really occasioned by other *invisible matter* in actual contact with those bodies which are put in motion, I also am equally at liberty to relieve my hypothesis by the same means. But the existence of this invisible substance, to the agency of which that great philosopher ascribes so very much, and which he calls *ether*, has not yet been proved, and is therefore generally supposed not to exist. And, indeed, if it did exist, I do not see how it could produce the effects that are ascribed to it. For the particles of this

very ether could not impel any substance, if they were not themselves impelled in the same direction ; and must we provide a still more subtle ether for the purpose of impelling the particles of the grosser ether ? If so, we must do the same for this other ether, and so on, *ad infinitum*, which is absurd.

Also, if the parts of solid bodies, as, for instance, of gold (which by its expansion when hot, and contraction when cold, appear not actually to touch one another) be kept asunder by a subtle matter, viz. the same ether above-mentioned, the parts of this ether must be kept asunder by a still more subtle ether as before, and so on, till the whole space, occupied by the dimensions of the piece of gold, be absolutely solid, and have no pores or vacuum whatever, which would be contrary to appearances, and make it impossible to contract by cold, or by any other means. I do not say that there is no difficulty in this case, but it is not a difficulty that affects my system more than the common one ;
and

and therefore it is no particular business of mine to discuss it.

If it be supposed that no kind of matter is concerned in producing the above-mentioned effects at a distance from the surfaces of bodies, but that the Deity himself causes these motions, exerting his influence according to certain laws, am not I at liberty to avail myself of the same assistance? And surely I must have less objection to this resource than those who believe that God is not the only proper agent in the universe. As a necessarian, I, in fact, ascribe every thing to God, and, whether mediately or immediately, makes very little difference. But I believe that it is possible, though we cannot clearly answer every objection to it, that God may endue substances with powers, which, when communicated, produce effects in a manner different from his own immediate agency.

II. *Whether Matter be any thing, on this Hypothesis.*

It is said that, according to my definition of matter, it must be absolutely *nothing*; because,

because, besides extension, it consists of nothing but the powers of attraction and repulsion, and because I have sometimes said that it consists of physical points only, possessed of those powers. In this I may have expressed myself rather incautiously; but the *idea* that I meant to convey was evidently this, that, whatever other powers matter may be possessed of, it has not the property that has been called *impenetrability*, or *solidity*.

From the manner of expressing our ideas we cannot speak of powers or properties, but as powers and properties of some *thing* or *substance*, though we know nothing at all of that thing or substance besides the powers that we ascribe to it; and, therefore, when the powers are supposed to be withdrawn, all idea of substance necessarily vanishes with them. I have, therefore, the same right to say that matter is a substance possessed of the properties of attraction and repulsion only, as another has to say, that it is a substance possessed of the property of impenetrability together with them, unless
it

it can be proved that the property of attraction or repulsion necessarily implies, and cannot exist without, that of impenetrability. Whether it be possessed of *any* of these properties must be determined by experiment only. If, upon my idea of matter, every thing vanishes upon taking away the powers of attraction and repulsion, in like manner every idea vanishes from the mind; if, upon the common hypothesis, solidity or impenetrability be taken away. I own that I can see no difference in this case; *impenetrability* being as much a property as *penetrability*, and its actual existence equally to be ascertained by experiment, which, in my opinion, is decisive in favour of penetrability.

They who suppose spirit to have proper *extension*, and the Divine Being to have a proper *ubiquity*, must believe the mutual penetrability of real substance; and by whatever names they may choose to call the substances, is of no consequence. If they say that, on my hypothesis, there is no such thing as matter, and that every thing is spirit, I have no objection, provided they
make

make as great a difference in *spirits*, as they have hitherto made in *substances*. The world has been too long amused with mere names.

III. *Of the laws of Motion.*

It is said, that if there is not what has been termed a *vis inertiae* in matter, the foundation of the Newtonian Philosophy is overturned: for that the *three laws of motion*, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, in the beginning of his *Principia*, have no meaning on any other supposition.

I answer, that these laws of motion are founded on certain *facts*, which result just as easily from my hypothesis concerning matter, as from the common one. It is an undoubted fact that every body perseveres in a state of rest or motion, till it be compelled to change that state by some external force, which is the first of the three laws, and the foundation of the other two. But this will follow just as well upon the supposition of that mutual action between two bodies taking place at any given distance

tance from their surfaces. Newton himself shews, that rays of light are reflected by a power belonging to other bodies, without actually impinging upon them, and, consequently, by a power which takes place at a certain distance from their surfaces, without supposing that any of his laws of motion were violated.

IV. *Of the Divine Essence.*

It is suspected that, notwithstanding I decline the term, it will be thought that I virtually make the Deity to be a material being. I answer that, since, according to my ideas, the divine essence, and other essences have quite different properties or powers, they ought, in strictness, to be denoted by quite different names; and, therefore, I can have no other objection to the term *immaterial*, as applied to the Divine Being, but as it is apt to imply that the divine essence is incapable of any property whatever in common with other essences, such as even relation to space.

I will farther observe, that, notwithstanding I *may* have expressed myself in an unguarded manner on this subject (though I am not at present aware of it) it will be found, by the candid and attentive, that I have not, in reality, any idea of the divine essence that is at all different from that of those philosophers and divines, who maintain the *proper omnipresence*, or *ubiquity* of the Divine Being, which necessarily implies a real extension; and that he has a power of acting upon matter.

I will take this opportunity of saying, farther, that, upon no system whatever, is the great Author of Nature more distinct from his productions, or his presence with them, and agency upon them, more necessary. In fact, the system now held forth to the public, taken in its full extent, makes the Divine Being to be of as much importance in the system, as the apostle makes him, when he says, *In him we live, and move, and have our being*. The contemplation of it impresses the mind with sentiments of the deepest reverence and humility,

mility, and it inculcates a degree of devotedness to God, both active and passive, that no other philosophical system can inspire. Consequently the obligation to all those virtues that are more immediately derived from that great vital spring and principle of all virtue, *devotion*, those which give a superiority to the world, a fearless integrity, and a noble independence of mind in the practice of our duty, is more strongly felt, and therefore may be supposed to take a deeper root in the mind, than upon any other system whatever. In short, it is that philosophy which alone suits the doctrine of the *scriptures*, though the writers of them were not philosophers, but had an instruction infinitely superior to that of any philosophical school. Every other system of philosophy is discordant with the scriptures, and, as far as it lays any hold upon the mind, tends to counteract their influence.

In the last place, I think it may not be unuseful to observe, that a distinction ought to be made with respect to the *relative importance*

portance and *mutual subordination* of the different positions contended for in this treatise. The principal object is, to prove the uniform composition of man, or that what we call *mind*, or the principle of perception and thought, is not a substance distinct from the body, but the result of corporeal organization; and what I have advanced preliminary to this, concerning the *nature of matter*, though subservient to this argument, is by no means essential to it; for whatever matter be, I think I have sufficiently proved that the human mind is nothing more than a modification of it.

Again, that man is wholly material is eminently subservient to the doctrine of the *proper*, or *mere humanity* of Christ. For, if no man has a soul distinct from his body, Christ, who, in all other respects, appeared as a man, could not have had a soul which had existed before his body; and the whole doctrine of the *pre-existence of souls* (of which the opinion of the pre-existence of Christ was a branch) will be effectually overturned. But I apprehend
that,

that, should I have failed in the proof of the materiality of man, arguments enow remain, independent of this, to prove the non pre-existence of Christ, and of this doctrine having been introduced into christianity from the system of Oriental philosophy.

Lastly, the doctrine of *necessity*, maintained in the Appendix, is the immediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism. But whether man be wholly material or not, I apprehend that proof enough is advanced that every human volition is subject to certain fixed laws, and that the pretended *self-determining power* is altogether imaginary and impossible.

In short, it is my firm persuasion, that the three doctrines of *materialism*, of that which is commonly called *Socinianism*, and of philosophical *necessity*, are equally parts of *one system*, being equally founded on just observations of nature, and fair deductions from the scriptures; and that whoever shall

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duly consider their *connection*, and *dependence on one another*, will find no sufficient consistency in any general scheme of principles, that does not comprehend them all. At the same time each of these doctrines stands on its own independent foundation, and is capable of such separate demonstration, as subjects of a moral nature require, or admit.

I have advanced what has occurred to me in support of all the three parts of this system; confident that, in due time, the truth will bear down before it every opposing prejudice, how inveterate soever, and gain a firm establishment in the minds of all men.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS.

I. *Of the Nature of Matter.*

SEVERAL of my friends have proposed to me queries concerning the *physical indivisible points*, of which I have sometimes supposed matter to consist. But I beg it may be considered, that the only mention I have made of such *points* is in the extract from my *History of Vision*, &c. in which I gave an account of the hypothesis of Father Boscovich and Mr. Michell, adding only a single observation of my own; and that, in what properly belongs to the *Disquisitions*, I have not, as far as I can recollect, encumbered my doctrine with any of the difficulties attending the consideration of the *internal structure of matter*; concerning which we know, indeed, very little; having few *data* to argue from.

In this *metaphysical work*, I have confined myself to the exclusion of the property of *impenetrability*, which is generally considered as essential to all matter, and to the claim of the property of *attraction* or *repulsion*, as appearing to me not to be properly what is *imparted* to matter, but what really *makes is to be what it is*, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all; which is giving it the same rank and importance that has usually been assigned to the property of *solidity* or *impenetrability*. By this means it is that I leave no room for the popular objection to the materiality of man founded on the idea of matter, as *solid* and *inert*, being incapable of the powers of sensation and thought.

This, I say, is all that my purpose in the *Disquisitions* requires; and so far I see no difficulty, that appears to me to be of much moment, and the argument lies in a very small compass. I deny that matter is impenetrable to other matter, because I know no one *fact*, to the explanation of which that supposition is necessary; all those facts
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which led philosophers to this supposition, later, and more accurate observations, having shewn to be owing to, *something else* than solidity or impenetrability, viz. a *power of repulsion*, which, for that reason, I would substitute in its place. As other philosophers have said "Take away solidity, and matter vanishes:" so, I say, "Take away attraction and repulsion, and matter vanishes." Also, if any person asks *what it is* that attracts and repels, or what is left when the powers of attraction and repulsion are taken away, I, in my turn, ask, What is it that is solid, or what is left when the property of solidity is taken away. The immaterialist; whether his immaterial substance be extended, or not, cannot, with the least reason, ask such a question as this. If he do, he must be effectually silenced by being asked, what will be left of *spirit*, when the powers of sensation and thought are taken from it. If the immaterial substance he contends for be extended, it must, in that case, be reduced to *mere space*, and if it be not extended, it must be reduced to *nothing at all*.

It is, moreover, not a little remarkable, that, according to the common hypothesis, spirit, though destitute of solidity, has the power of acting upon matter, or in other words, has the same property of attraction and repulsion with respect to matter, that I ascribe to unsolid matter; so that it is with a very ill grace indeed that the abettors of that hypothesis can object to mine, that nothing will remain when the powers of attraction and repulsion are withdrawn.

Farther than this, which I think very clear ground, it does not appear to me that I have any proper call, or business, to proceed. In what *manner* matter, penetrable or impenetrable, is formed, with what interstices, &c. and how far the powers which we ascribe to it may be said to *inhere in*, or *belong to* it, or how far they are the effect of a *foreign power*, viz. that of the deity, concerns not my system in particular. And whatever difficulties may be started as resulting from these considerations, the very same, I think, or greater, may fairly be charged upon the opposite system.

system. If I have advanced beyond these narrow bounds, it has been inadvertently, and for the sake of answering objections. The metaphysician has no business to speculate any farther, and the natural philosopher will find, I imagine, but few *data* for farther speculation.

In fact, what I have advanced above is all that I have ascribed to that excellent and truly cautious philosopher Mr. Michell. See *Disquisitions*, p. 21. I will venture, however, in order to give all the satisfaction I am able to the inquisitive natural philosopher, to go one step farther in this speculation, on the idea suggested at the conclusion of my account of that hypothesis, p. 33. I am well aware that the generality of my readers will revolt at the ideas I am about to present to them; but I beg their patient attention, and I may perhaps convince them, that the common hypothesis, when considered in connection with *facts*, is no less revolting.

Suppose then that the Divine Being, when he created *matter*, only fixed certain

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centers

centers of various attractions and repulsions extending indefinitely in all directions, the whole effect of them to be upon each other; these centers approaching to, or receding from each other, and consequently carrying their peculiar spheres of attraction and repulsion along with them, according to certain definite circumstances. It cannot be denied that these spheres may be diversified infinitely, so as to correspond to all the kinds of bodies that we are acquainted with, or that are possible. For all effects in which bodies are concerned, and of which we can be sensible by our eyes, touch, &c. may be resolved into attraction or repulsion.

A compages of these centers, placed within the sphere of each others attraction, will constitute a body that we term *compact*; and two of these bodies will, on their approach, meet with a repulsion or resistance, sufficient to prevent one of them from occupying the place of the other, without a much greater force than we are capable of employing, so that to us they will appear perfectly hard.

As in the constitution of all actual bodies that we are acquainted with, these centers are placed so near to each other, that, in every division that we can make, we still leave parts which contain many of these centers, we, reasoning by analogy, suppose that every particle of matter is infinitely divisible; and the *space* it occupies is certainly so. But, strictly speaking, as these centers which constitute any body are not absolutely infinite, it must be naturally possible to come, by division, to one single center, which could not be said to be divisible, or even to occupy any portion of space, though its sphere of action should extend ever so far; and had only *one* such center of attraction, &c. existed, its existence could not have been known, because there would have been nothing on which its action could have been exerted; and there being no *effect*, there could not have been any ground for supposing a *cause*.

Father Boscovich supposes that no two of these centers can ever coincide, the resistance at the point itself being infinite. But
admitting

admitting their coincidence, they would only form *another center*, with different powers, those belonging to one center modifying those belonging to the other. Had their powers been *the very same* before such coincidence, at the same distances, they would have been just doubled at those distances. Also, though united by one cause, they might possibly be separated by another.

To philosophical people, and I am not now writing for the use of any other, I do not need to explain myself any farther. They will easily see, or F. Boscovich, in his elaborate work will shew them, that this hypothesis will account for all the phenomena of nature.

The principal objection to this hypothesis is, that matter is, by this means, resolved into nothing but the *divine agency*, exerted according to certain rules. But as, upon the common hypothesis, it has been again and again admitted, that, notwithstanding the existence of solid matter, every thing is really *done* by the divine power, what material

terial objection can there be to every thing *being* the divine power. There is, at least, this advantage in the scheme, that it supposes *nothing to be made in vain*.

Admitting that bodies consist of solid atoms, there is no sort of connection between the idea of them, and that of *attraction*; so that it is impossible to conceive that any one atom should approach another without a *foreign power*, viz. that of the deity; and therefore bodies consisting of such atoms could not hold together, so as to constitute *compact substances*, without this constant agency.

There is, again, as little connection between the idea of these solid atoms, and that of *repulsion at the least distance from the point of contact*. So that, since the constituent particles of no substance actually touch one another, as is evident from the effects of cold (which brings them nearer together) their coherence cannot be accounted for without the constant agency of the same external power. And though mere *resistance* (not repulsion) *at the place of contact* might be explained on the principle

eiple of solidity, it is remarkable, that in no *known case* of resistance can it be proved, that real contact is concerned, and in most cases of resistance it is demonstrable that there is no real contact; and therefore there can be no *reason from fact* to believe that there is any such thing as real contact in nature; so that if there be such a thing as solid matter, it is altogether *superfluous*, being no way concerned in producing any effect whatever.

If I have bewildered myself, and my reader, with this speculation, I can only say that I have been drawn into it, when I would willingly acquiesce in what I have observed concerning the simple *penetrability of matter*; confessing myself unable to proceed any farther on tolerably sure ground, and my readiness to abandon all this hypothesis, whenever a better, that is, one more nearly corresponding to facts, shall be suggested to me: and I own that I should much prefer an hypothesis which should make provision for the use of created matter without the necessity of such a *particular*

ticular agency as the preceding hypothesis requires; though, of the two, I shall certainly prefer one which admits of nothing being made in vain.

Being, however, engaged thus far, I must be permitted to advance one step farther, for the sake of observing, that there is nothing more approaching to *impiety* in my scheme than in the common one. On this hypothesis every thing is the *divine power*; but still, strictly speaking, every thing is not *the Deity himself*. The centers of attraction, &c. are fixed by him, and all action is his action; but still these centers are no part of *himself*, any more than the solid matter supposed to be created by him. Nor, indeed, is making the deity to *be*, as well as to *do* every thing, *in this sense*, any thing like the opinion of Spinoza; because I suppose a source of infinite power, and superior intelligence, from which all inferior beings are derived, that every inferior intelligent being has a consciousness distinct from that of the supreme intelligence, that they will for ever continue distinct,

ting, and that their happiness or misery to endless ages will depend upon their conduct in this state of probation and discipline.

On the other hand, the common hypothesis is much less favourable to piety, in that it supposes something to be *independent of the divine power*. Exclude the idea of deity on my hypothesis, and every thing except *space*, necessarily vanishes with it; so that the Divine Being, and his energy, are absolutely necessary to that of every other being. His power is the very *life and soul* of every thing that exists; and, strictly speaking, *without him, we ARE, as well as, can do nothing*. But exclude the idea of Deity on the common hypothesis, and the idea of *solid matter* is no more excluded, than that of *space*. It remains a problem, therefore, whether matter be at all dependent upon God, whether it be *in his power* either to *annihilate*, or to *create it*; a difficulty that has staggered many, and on which the doctrine of *two original independent principles* was built. My hypothesis, whatever other defects it may have,
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leaves no foundation for this *system of impiety*; and in this respect it has, I think, a great and desirable advantage.

I own that, for my part, I feel an inexpressible satisfaction in the idea of that most intimate connection which, on my hypothesis, myself, and every thing in which I am concerned, have with the deity. On his will I am entirely dependent for my *being*, and all my *faculties*. My sphere, and degree of influence on other beings and other things, is *his* influence. I am but an instrument in his hands for effecting a certain part of the greatest and most glorious of purposes. I am happy in *seeing* a little of this purpose, happier in the *belief* that the operations in which I am concerned, are of infinitely greater moment than I am capable of comprehending, and in the persuasion that, in the continuance of my existence, I shall see more and more of this great purpose, and of the relation that myself and my sphere of influence bear to it. Let the abettors of the common hypothesis say more than this
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if they can, or any thing different from this, that shall give them more satisfaction.

II. *Of the connection between sensation and organization.*

I have been asked, whether I consider the powers of sensation and thought as *necessarily resulting* from the organization of the brain, or as something independent of organization, but *superadded* and *communicated* to the system afterwards; having expressed myself doubtfully, and perhaps variously on the subject. *

I answer, that my idea *now* is, that sensation and thought do necessarily result from the organization of the brain, when the powers of mere *life* are given to the system. For I can easily conceive a perfect man to be formed without life, that is, without respiration,

* In the *Essay* prefixed to my edition of Hartley, I expressed myself with absolute uncertainty in this respect, "I rather think that the whole man is of some uniform composition, and that the property of perception, as well as the other powers that are termed mental, is the result (whether necessary, or not) of such an organical structure as that of the brain."

respiration, or the circulation of the blood, or whatever else it be in which life more properly consists, and consequently without every thing necessarily depending upon life; but I cannot imagine that a human body, completely organized, and having life, would want sensation and thought. This I suppose to follow *of course*, as much as the circulation of the blood follows respiration; and if there be any expressions in my work that intimate the contrary, I shall take care to alter them.

As to the *manner* in which the power of perception results from organization and life, I own I have no idea at all; but the *fact* of this connection does not appear to me to be, on that account, the less certain. Sensation and thought do always accompany such an organization; and having never known them to be separated, we have no reason to suppose that they *can* be separated. When, therefore, God had made man of the *dust of the earth*; nothing was wanting to make him all that he is, viz. a *living soul*, but simply the *breath of life*.

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In all other cases we deem it sufficient to say that certain circumstances are the causes, and the *necessary causes*, of certain appearances, if the appearances always accompany the circumstances. We are not, for example, in the least able to conceive how it is that a magnet attracts iron; but having observed that it never fails to do it, we conclude that, though we do not see the *proximate cause*, or *how* the attraction is effected, the magnet nevertheless *has* that power, and must cease to be a magnet before it can lose it; so that our reasoning with respect to the result of sensation from organization is exactly similar to our reasoning concerning the attraction of iron by magnetism.

Also, for the very same reason that it is said that it is not the organized body that feels and thinks, but an *immaterial substance* residing in the body, and that will remain when the body is destroyed, we might say that it is not the material magnet that attracts, but a peculiar immaterial substance within

within it, that produces the effect, and that will remain when the material magnet is destroyed. And, for the same reason, we may imagine *distinct immaterial substances* for every operation in nature, the proximate cause of which we are not able to perceive.

The manner in which the association of ideas is formed, or in which motives influence the mind, was equally unknown; but association of ideas was nevertheless known to be a *fact*, and the influence of motives was not, on that account, denied. But now that Dr. Hartley has shewn us what ideas probably are; we see much farther into the *mechanism of the mind*. We see *how* one idea is connected with another, and *the manner* in which motives (which are only trains of ideas) produce their effect. Now we are not more (or not much more) ignorant how sensation results from organization, than we were how the motion of the hand results from a volition, or how a volition is produced by a motive, which

are now no longer such very difficult problems. It is not impossible but that in time we may see *how* it is that sensation results from organization.

III. *A general view of the origin and progress of opinions relating to the ESSENCE OF THE SOUL, with some considerations on the notion of its being an EXTENDED, though an IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE.*

After the deduction that I have given of the history of opinions concerning the soul in the *Disquisitions*, it may be useful to give a summary view of the whole, that the several steps in the progress, and their natural connection, may more easily appear.

Man is a being possessed of various faculties, or powers. He can *see, hear, smell, feel, walk, think, and speak*. He is also a very complex being, consisting of various distinct parts, some of which are evidently appropriated to some of these powers, and others to others of them. Thus it is the eye only that sees, the ear that hears, the
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nose that smells, the feet that walk, and the tongue is of principal use in modulating the voice. What it is in man that *thinks* is not so obvious, and the opinions concerning it have been various. I apprehend, however, that it was always supposed to be something *within* a man, and not any part that was conspicuous.

The writers of the Old Testament seem to have conceived of it variously, sometimes referring it to the *heart*, perhaps as the most central part of man, as when the Psalmist says, *My heart is inditing a good matter*, &c. but at other times to the *reins*, as *My reins instruct me in the night season*. The *passions* are generally seated by them in the heart, but the sentiments of pity and commiseration are more frequently assigned to the *bowels*, which are said to yearn over an object of distress. It is remarkable that the *head*, or *brain*, never seems to have been considered by them as having any thing to do in the business of thinking, or in any mental affection whatever. But the reason of it may be that strong mental af-

fections were sooner observed to affect the heart, reins and bowels, than the head.

In antient times the simple power of *life* was generally thought to be in the *breath*, or animal *beat*, because breathing and warmth are the universal concomitants of life. I do not, however, recollect that the latter idea ever occurs in the scriptures, but there life is sometimes said to be in the *blood*.

When men reflected a little farther, and began to conceive that possibly both the property of *life*, and also all the powers that we term *mental*, might belong to the same thing, the breath (the supposed principle of life) was imagined to be competent to the whole; and then the idea of a *soul* was completely formed. Consequently, it was first conceived to be an aerial, or an igneous substance, which animates the body during life, and makes its escape at death; after which it was supposed to be either detained near the place where the body was deposited, being held by a kind of
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of attraction, or an affection to its former companion, or to rise in the atmosphere to a region in which it was counterpoised by the surrounding elements.

We may smile at the ignorance of mankind in early ages, in supposing that the breath of life could be any thing more than part of the common air, which was first inspired, and then expired. But though this be a thing well known in the present age, I can easily conceive that, when the nature of air and respiration were little understood, men might not immediately conceive that the breath, though it mixed with the air, and was invifible, was therefore the very same thing with it. They might well enough imagine that it was something distinct from it, which was in part drawn in and out during the continuance of life, and wholly discharged and set loose at death. There are other instances of the ignorance of the antients in matters of philosophy, and even in tolerably enlightened ages, almost, if not altogether, as gross as this.

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When, at length, it was discovered that the breath was nothing more than the air, still the idea of an *invisible principle of life and thought* being once fixed, would not be immediately exploded, but would be supposed to be a substance more attenuated, and refined; as being, for instance, of an *ethereal* or *fiery* nature, &c. still invisible, and more active.

Whatever was the invisible substance of which the human soul consisted, the *universal soul* of the heathen philosophers, or the *divine essence*, was supposed to be the very same; and all other souls were supposed to have been parts of it, to have been detached from it, and to be finally resumed into it again. In this state of opinions, therefore, the soul was supposed to be what we should now call *an attenuated kind of matter*, capable of division, as all other matter is.

This was the notion adopted by the christian Fathers from the Oriental and Platonic system of philosophy, and therefore many of these Fathers did not scruple
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to assert that the soul, though conceived to be a thing distinct from the body, was properly *corporeal*, and even *naturally mortal*. The opinion, however, of its being naturally immortal gained ground; and, *matter*, according to the philosophical system, being considered as a thing that was necessarily *perishable*, as well as *impure*, the doctrine of the immateriality as well as of the immortality of the soul was pretty firmly established; an immaterial substance being, however, still considered as only something more refined than gross matter.

The idea of the soul being immaterial soon led to the idea of its not having any property in common with gross matter, and in time with matter strictly considered; and being confounded with, and illustrated by, the idea of the *principle of life*, it was asserted to have no length, breadth, or thickness, which are properties peculiar to matter; to be *indivisible* also, and finally *not to exist in space*. This was the idea that generally prevailed after the time of Marmertus, though various other refinements occur

occur in the writings of the schoolmen upon the subject.

But the doctrine of *pure spiritualism* was not firmly established before Descartes, who, considering extension as the essence of matter, made the want of extension the distinguishing property of mind or spirit. Upon this idea was built the immaterial system in its state of greatest refinement, when the soul was defined to be *immaterial, indivisible, indiscerptible, unextended*, and to have nothing to do with *locality* or *motion*, but to be a substance possessed of the simple powers of thought, and to have nothing more than an arbitrary connection with an organized system of matter.

This was the idea of mind or spirit that was prevalent about the time of Mr. Locke, who contributed greatly to lower it, by contending that whatever exists must exist *somewhere*, or in *some place*, and by shewing that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the power of thought may be superadded by the Divine Being to an organized system of mere matter, though at the
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same time declaring himself in favour of the notion of a separate soul. From this time, the doctrine of the nature of the soul has been fluctuating and various; some still maintaining that it has no property whatever in common with matter, and bears no relation to space, whereas others say that it exists in space, and occupies a portion of it, so as to be properly extended, but not to have solidity, which they make to be the property that distinguishes it from matter.

The object of my late work is to prove that the doctrine of a soul is altogether unphilosophical, and unscriptural; for that, judging from the phenomena, all the powers of *the same being*, viz. *man*, ought to be referred to *one substance*, which, therefore, must necessarily be *the body*, and that the refined and proper spiritualism above described is peculiarly chimerical and absurd. Absurd, however, as is the notion of a substance which has *no property in common with matter*, which bears *no relation to space*, and yet both acts upon body, and is acted upon by it, it is the doctrine that, in the course
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of gradual refinement, philosophers and divines were necessarily brought to, and is the only consistent immaterialism. For every other opinion concerning spirit makes it to be, in fact, the same thing with matter; at least every other opinion is liable to objections similar to those which lie against the notion of a soul properly material. Because, however, I have not been thought to have given sufficient attention to this idea of *extended spirit*, I shall here make a few animadversions upon it.

1. The chief reason why the principle of thought has been supposed to be incompatible with matter, is that there is no *conceivable connection* between *thought* and *solidity*, that the two ideas are altogether different, and *dissimilar*. But is there any more conceivable connection between thought and mere *extension*? Are ideas, according to the opinion of the persons who hold this doctrine, extended things? Is the *judgment* extended, is the will *extended*, or have the *passions* extension? How, then, do they require an extended substance in which to inhere?

inhere? If there be some unknown reason why they *do* require an extended *substratum*, may not this substance have *solidity* added to its extension, the idea of solidity not being more foreign to the idea of thought, than that of extension, nor more dissimilar to it.

2. The essence of the soul, it is said, cannot be matter, because it would then be *divisible*; but is not every thing that is extended divisible? It is not the solidity of bodies that makes them capable of division so properly as their extension. It is this property that makes division possible; and then all that is necessary to actual division is *discerptibility*, or the possible separation of one part of its substance from another. For wherever there is extension, there must be conceivable parts, viz. a half, a third, a fourth, &c. But till the substance of which the soul (exclusive of its power of thinking) consists be more known to us, so that we can subject it to a rigorous examination, it is impossible to say whether it be more or less *discerptible* than any species of

of matter; for all that we know of it is that it is *extended*, and that it *thinks*. The firmness of its texture, is a thing of which we have no knowledge at all; and if it be any thing more than *mere space*, it must have that which may be called *texture*, or *consistence*, solid or fluid, elastic or non-elastic, &c. &c. Consequently, it may, for any thing we know, be as corruptible, and perishable, as the body. The boasted *unity of consciousness*, and *simplicity of perception and thought*, can be no security against division and dissolution, unless they inhere in a substance naturally incapable of division, and consequently of dissolution.

3. As divisibility may always be predicated of any substance that is extended, and not infinite, I wish the advocates of this doctrine of extended spirit would consider a little what would be the probable consequence of an actual division of it. Supposing the substance of a human soul to be divided into two equal parts (which to divine power must, at least, be possible) would the power of thinking be necessarily destroyed,

destroyed, or would the result be *two spirits*, of inferior powers, as of smaller size? If so, would each of them retain the consciousness of the whole undivided soul, or would the stock of ideas be equally divided between them?

4. As every created being must *exist* before it can *act*, I wish the advocates of this doctrine would consider what idea they can form of the extended substance of a spirit before it has acquired any ideas at all, and consequently before it has begun to think. In what will it differ from mere space? Whatever this state be, in what does it differ from the state of the soul whenever it ceases to think, as in a deep sleep, a swoon, or the state between death and the resurrection!

5. I would also submit it to the consideration of the partisans of *extended spiritualism*, what *size* or *shape* they would give to the human soul (for if it be extended, size and shape it must have) and whether some inconvenience may not arise to their system
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in the discussion of the question. If nothing can act but where it is, I should think that the soul must have the size and form of the brain, if not of the whole nervous system. For there is no region within the brain of less extent than the medullary part of it, that can be imagined to be the *sensorium*, or the immediate seat of sensation; and as the nerves consist of the same substance with the medullary part of the brain, and are properly a production, or part of it, I do not see why the soul should be confined to the size of the brain only, exclusive of the nerves; and then as the nerves are in every part of the body, the soul would, in fact, be of the same form and size with the body to which it belongs, though with more interstices.

6. It is also a matter of some curiosity to the speculatist to consider whether the size and form of these extended souls be invariable, or whether, as we suppose the body to undergo some change at the resurrection, in order to adapt it to its new mode of existence, the soul may not undergo

a proportionable change, and be transformed together with it.

7. We are apt to impose upon ourselves, and to confound our understandings, by the use of *general terms*. To gain clear perceptions of things we must inspect them more closely, in order to discover what particular and more *definite ideas* are necessarily comprized in the more general ones. Thus while we content ourselves with saying that man is a compound being, consisting of two substances, the one *corporeal* and the other *spiritual*, the one both extended and solid, and the other extended indeed, but destitute of solidity; and that an intimate union subsists between them, so that they always *accompany* and *affect* one another (an impression upon the body causing a sensation in the mind, and a volition of the mind causing a motion of the body) we are satisfied. The hypothesis seems to correspond to the *first view* of the phenomena; and though we cannot help being staggered when we consider this intimate union of two such *heterogeneous substances*,

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we still acquiesce in it, as an union effected by almighty power; and we are likewise repelled from a rigorous examination of it by the idea, however ill-founded, that our prospects of a future life are materially affected by it.

But a future life being secured to us by the promises of the gospel, upon *other and better principles*, we need not be afraid to consider what this supposed union of body and soul really implies, and it appears to me to imply that the soul, having *locality*, and *extension*, must have *solidity* also.

That the mind should move the body, and at the same time *move itself* along with the body, we may think a tolerable easy supposition; but what shall we say to the case of the body being moved during sleep, or a swoon, to which removal the mind does not at all contribute. It will hardly be said that, in this case, the soul is first of all left behind, in the place from which the body was taken, and that it afterwards *voluntarily* joins its former companion.

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And, if not, the motion of the mind must, in all cases, *necessarily* accompany the motion of the living body, or, in other words, the mind must be *involuntarily dragged* along with it. But can this motion be communicated from *body* to *mind* without real *impulse*, implying a *vis inertiae*, and *solidity*, without which, it should seem, that the one cannot lay hold of the other?

8. It will also, I think, be difficult to account for the separation of the soul from the body after death, unless the spiritual substance be supposed to be a proper constituent part of the *solid mass*, which, like fixed air in bodies, is set loose when the rest of the mass is dissolved by putrefaction, or otherwise. If putrefaction, or total dissolution, be the physical cause of this separation, is there not a good foundation for the practice of the Egyptians, who preserved the bodies of their friends as long as they possibly could, probably with a view of retaining their souls in them, or near them?

If the soul be really inseparable from the body, which is probably the opinion of those who maintain that, during the death of the body, the soul is in a state of insensibility until the resurrection, what part of the body does it accompany? If it be indiscernible, it must be wholly in some one place; and as all the constituent parts of every member of the body are completely dissolved and dispersed, it must, in fact, accompany some one of the *ultimate particles*, and which of them can that be?

If the extended spirit does *not* accompany any particle of the dissolved body, and all souls be preserved, during their dormant state, in some *general repository* (whether in the sun, the earth, or some part of the intermediate space) in what manner will the re-union of the souls and their respective bodies be effected at the resurrection? Will it be by any thing like what is called *elective attraction* between them, or will it be effected by a new and express *fiat* of the deity?

These objections do not much, if at all, affect the doctrine of *spirit bearing no relation*
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to space, or any speculation concerning the divine essence, which fills all space.

9. Many other queries will necessarily obtrude themselves on any person who shall begin to speculate on the nature of extended spiritual substances, which it will be impossible to dismiss without some degree of attention; and it appears to me that, let the advocates for this doctrine answer them in whatever manner they please, they must occasion some degree of embarrassment, so as to leave a suspicion of the doctrine from which they arise, as wanting a sufficient foundation in probability and truth; such as, What is the origin, or commencement, of the extended spirit? Is every soul a separate creation, or, are souls propagated from each other like bodies? Does it grow in size with the growth of the body and brain? Are these extended spirits mutually penetrable to each other? There can be no doubt but that they must occupy a portion of the same universal space that is already occupied by the divine essence. Is the essence of these extended spirits similar

to that of the deity, and will no impediment arise from this necessary mutual penetration?

Many more observations might be made on this notion of extended spirit, which appears to me not to have been sufficiently considered by those who hold it. They have concluded, or rather, have taken it for granted, that there is in man a soul distinct from his body, but they revolt at the idea of this soul having no extension, or relation to space, and therefore admit that it has these properties; but, being driven by mere necessity to admit thus much, they are unwilling to consider the subject any farther, and shut their eyes on all the concomitants and consequences of their concessions; though, if they would attend to them, they would find them such as would probably make them revolt at the whole system. Their arguments for a separate soul from the topics of thought being dissimilar to matter, from the unity of consciousness, indiscerptibility, &c. properly belong to the advocates for refined spiritualism, and
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are impertinently and ineffectually alledged by those, who, admitting a real extension, and consequently real size and form in the soul, in vain imagine that they are advocates for the doctrine of proper immateriality. In fact, they are themselves *semi-materialists*.

How easy is it to get rid of all the embarrassment attending the doctrine of a soul, in every view of it, by admitting, agreeably to all the phenomena, that the power of thinking belongs to the *brain* of a man, as that of walking to his feet, or that of speaking to his tongue; that, therefore, man, who is *one being*, is composed of *one kind of substance*, made of *the dust of the earth*; that when he dies, he, of course, ceases to think; but when his *sleeping dust* shall be reanimated at the resurrection, his power of thinking, and his consciousness, will be restored to him?

This system gives a real value to the doctrine of *a resurrection from the dead*, which is peculiar to revelation, on which

alone the sacred writers build all our hope of a future life, and it explains the uniform language of the scriptures, which speak of one day of judgment for all mankind, and represent all the rewards of virtue, and all the punishments of vice, as taking place at that awful day, and not before. This doctrine of a resurrection was laughed at by the conceited Athenians, and will always be the subject of ridicule to persons of a similar turn of mind; but it is abundantly confirmed to us by the well attested resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the promises of the gospel, established on all the miraculous events by which the promulgation of christianity was attended,

IV. *Of Consciousness.*

Since, in all metaphysical subjects, there is a perpetual appeal made to *consciousness*, or *internal feeling*, that is, to what we certainly and intuitively know by reflecting on what passes within our own minds, and I have hitherto contented myself with noticing the particular instances in which I apprehended

apprehended some mistake has been made with respect to it, as they occurred in the course of my argument; I shall here give a more general view of the subject, in order to acquaint my reader what things they are that, I apprehend, we *can* be conscious of, and especially to caution him against confounding them with those things of which we are not properly conscious, but which we only *infer* from them.

When we shut our eyes on the external world, and contemplate what we find within ourselves, we first perceive the images, or the ideas of the objects by which our senses have been impressed. Of these we are properly conscious. They are what we immediately *observe*, and are not *deductions* from any prior observations.

In the next place, we know by intuition, or are conscious, that these ideas appear, and re-appear, and that they are variously connected with each other, which is the foundation of *memory* or *recollection*. We also see that our ideas are variously *combined* and

and *divided*, and can perceive the other relations that they bear to each other, which is the foundation of *judgment*, and consequently of *reasoning*. And lastly, we perceive that various bodily motions depend upon ideas and trains of ideas, from which arises what is called a *voluntary power* over our actions.

These particulars, I apprehend, comprize all that we are properly conscious of; and with respect to these it is hardly possible we can be mistaken. But every thing that we pretend to know that is really more than these, must be by way of *inference* from them; and in drawing these inferences or conclusions, we are liable to mistakes, as well as in other inferences. In fact, there is perhaps no subject whatever with respect to which we have more need of caution, from the danger we are in of imagining that our knowledge of things relating to ourselves is *in the first instance*, when, in reality, it is in the *second*, or perhaps the *third* or *fourth*.

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If then, as I have observed, all that we are really conscious of be our *ideas*, and the various *affections of our ideas*, which, when reduced to general heads, we call the *powers of thought*, as *memory, judgment, and will*, all our knowledge of the *subject of thought* within us, or what we call *ourselves*, must be by way of *inference*. What we *feel*, and what we *do* we may be said to know by intuition; but what we *are* we know only by deduction, or inference from intuitive observations. If, therefore, it be asserted, that the subject of thought is something that is *simple, indivisible, immaterial, or naturally immortal*, it can only be by way of conclusion from given premises. Consequently, it is a decision for which no man's word is to be taken. We may *fancy* that it is something that we feel, or are conscious of, but, from the nature of the thing, it can only be that a man *reasons* himself into that belief, and therefore he may, without having been aware of it, have imposed upon himself by some fallacy in the argument.

Feeling

Feeling and *thinking* are allowed to be *properties*; and though all that we can know of any thing are its properties, we agree to say that all properties inhere in, or belong to, some *subject* or *substance*; but what this substance *is*, farther than its being possessed of those very properties by which it is known to us, it is impossible for us to say, except we can prove that those known properties necessarily imply others. If, therefore, any person say he is conscious that his mind (by which we mean the subject of thought) is *simple*, or *indivisible*, and if he speak properly, he can only mean, that he is *one thinking person*, or *being*, and not *several*, which will be universally acknowledged. But if he means any thing more than this, as that the substance to which the property of thinking belongs is incapable of division, either having no extension, or parts, or that those parts cannot be removed from each other, I do not admit his assertion without hearing what *reasons* he has to advance for it; being sensible that in this he goes beyond a proper consciousness. I may think it more probable,
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that every thing that exists must have extension, and that (except space, and the divine essence, which fills all space) whatever is extended may be divided, though that division might be attended with the loss of properties peculiar to the undivided substance.

Much farther must a man go beyond the bounds of proper *consciousness*, into those of *reasoning*, to say that the subject of his thinking powers is *immaterial*, or something different from the matter of which his body, and especially his brain, consists. For admitting all that he can know by *experience*, or *intuition*, I may think it more probable, that all the powers or properties of man inhere in *one kind* of substance; and since we are agreed that man consists, in part at least, of matter, I may conclude that he is wholly material, and may refuse to give up this opinion, till I be shown that the properties necessarily belonging to matter, and those of feeling and thinking, are incompatible. And before this can be determined, the *reasons for*, and *against* it must

must be attended to. It is a question that cannot be decided by *simple feeling*.

Less still can it be determined by consciousness that the subject of thought is *naturally immortal*, so that a man will continue to think and act after he has ceased to breathe and move. We are certainly conscious of the same things with respect to ourselves, but what one man may think to be very clear on this subject, another may think to be very doubtful, or exceedingly improbable; drawing different *conclusions* from the same premises.

Again, that man is an *agent*, meaning by it that he has a power of *beginning motion*, independently of any mechanical laws to which the author of his nature has subjected him, is a thing that is so far from being evident from consciousness, that, if we attend properly to what we really do feel, we shall, as I conceive, be satisfied that we have no such power. What we really do feel, or may be sensible of, if we attend to our feelings, is that we never
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come to any resolution, form any deliberate purpose, or determine upon any thing whatever, without some *motive*, arising from the state of our minds, and the ideas present to them; and therefore we ought to conclude, that we have no power of resolving, or determining upon any thing, without some motive. Consequently, in the proper philosophical language, motives ought to be denominated the *causes* of all our *determinations*, and therefore of all our *actions*.

All that men generally mean by a *consciousness of freedom*, is a consciousness of their having a power to do what they previously will, or please. This is allowed, and that it is a thing of which we are properly conscious. But to will without a motive, or contrary to the influence of all motives presented to the mind, is a thing of which no man *can* be conscious. Nay every just observation concerning ourselves, or others, appears to me very clearly to lead to the opposite conclusion, viz. that our *wills*, as well as our *judgments*, are determined by the *appearances of things* presented

presented to us; and therefore that the determinations of both are equally guided by certain invariable *laws*; and consequently that every determination of the will or judgment is just what the being who made us subject to those laws, and who always had, and still has, the absolute disposal of us, must have intended that they should be. If, however, this conclusion be denied, it must be controverted by *argument*, and the question must not be decided by *consciousness*, or any pretended *feeling* of the contrary.

V. *An addition to section II. on the argument for the Doctrine of Necessity from the consideration of CAUSE AND EFFECT.*

I do not think it at all necessary to add any thing to what I have advanced in my former treatise in illustration of the argument from the nature of *cause and effect*. But because this is the great and most conclusive argument for the doctrine that I contend for, proving the contrary doctrine of *philosophical liberty*, to be absolutely *impossible*;

possible; and I find that several persons, of excellent judgment in other respects, seem not to feel the force of it, I shall attempt a farther illustration of it, in order to remove, as far as I am able, the only remaining objection that I can imagine may be made to it; though I must ask pardon of my other readers for writing what will appear to them so very obvious, and superfluous.

It is universally acknowledged, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause. This is even the foundation on which the only proper argument for the being of a God rests. And the necessarian asserts that if, in any given state of mind, with respect both to *disposition* and *motives*, two different determinations, or volitions, be possible, it can be so on no other principle, than that one of them shall come under the description of *an effect without a cause*; just as if the beam of a balance might incline either way, though loaded with equal weights.

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It is acknowledged that the mechanism of the balance is of one kind, and that of the mind of another, and therefore it may be convenient to denominate them by different words; as, for instance, that of the balance may be termed a *physical*, and that of the mind a *moral* mechanism. But still, if there be a *real mechanism* in both cases, so that there can be only one result from the same previous circumstances, there will a *real necessity*, enforcing an absolute certainty in the event. For it must be understood that all that is ever meant by *necessity in a cause*, is that which produces *certainty in the effect*.

If, however the term *necessity* give offence, I, for my part, have no objection to the disuse of it, provided we can express, in any other manner, that property in causes, or the previous circumstances of things, that leads to absolute certainty in the effects that result from them; so that, without a miracle, or an over-ruling of the stated laws of nature, *i. e.* without the intervention of a higher cause, no determination

termination of the will could have been otherwise than it has been.

To evade the force of this argument from the nature of cause and effect, it is said that, though, in a given state of mind, two different determinations may take place, neither of them can be said to be without a sufficient cause; for that, in this case, the cause is *the mind itself*, which makes the determination in a manner independent of all influence of motives.

But to this I answer, that the mind itself, independent of the influence of every thing that comes under the description of *motive*, bearing an equal relation to both the determinations, cannot possibly be considered as a cause with respect to either of them, in preference to the other. Because, exclusive of what may properly be called motive, there is no imaginable difference in the circumstances immediately preceding the determinations. Every thing tending to produce the least degree of inclination to one of the determinations more

than to the other must make a difference in the *state of mind* with respect to them, which, by the stating of the case, is expressly excluded. And I will venture to say, that no person, let his bias in favour of a system be ever so great, will chuse to say in support of it, that the mind can possibly take one of two determinations, without having for it something that may, at least, be called an *inclination* for it, in preference to the other; and that inclination, or whatever else it be called, must have had a cause producing it, in some previous affection of the mind.

In short, let ever so much ingenuity be shown in stating this case, it is impossible not to come at length to this conclusion, that, in no case whatever, can the mind be determined to action, *i. e.* to a volition, without something that may as well be called a *motive* as be expressed in any other manner. For the reason, or proper cause, of every determination must necessarily be something either in the state of the mind itself, or in the ideas present to it, immediately

diately before the determination; and these ideas, as they impress the mind, may, strictly speaking, be comprehended in what we mean by the *state of mind*, including whatever there is in it that can lead to any determination whatever. Or, on the other hand, the state of mind may be included in the meaning of the term *motive*, comprehending in the signification of it whatever it be that can *move*, or *incline* the mind to any particular determination,

It appears to me that it may just as well be said that, in the case of the balance above-mentioned, the beam may be the cause why, though equal weights be suspended at the different ends of it, it may nevertheless incline one way or the other. For, exclusive of what necessarily comes under the description either of *motive*, or *state of mind*, the mind itself can no more be the cause of its own determination, than the beam of a balance can be the cause of its own inclination.

In the case of the beam it is immediately perceived that, bearing an equal relation to

both the weights, it cannot possibly favour one of them more than the other; and it is simply on account of its bearing an equal relation to them both that it cannot do this. Now, let the structure of the mind be ever so different from that of the balance, it necessarily agrees with it in this, that, exclusive of motives, in the sense explained above (viz. including both the state of mind and the particular ideas present to it) it bears as equal a relation to any determination, as the beam of a balance bears to any particular inclination; so that as, on account of this circumstance, the balance cannot of itself incline one way or the other, so neither, on account of the same circumstance, can the mind of itself incline, or determine, one way or the other.

In fact, an advocate for the doctrine of philosophical liberty has the choice of no more than *two suppositions*, and neither of them can, in the least degree, answer his purpose. For he must either assert that, in a given state of mind, the determination will certainly be *a* and not *b*; or it may be
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either *a* or *b*. If he adopts the former,^o he may just as well say at once, that the determination will *necessarily* be *a*, and that without a miracle it cannot be *b*. For any other language that he can possibly use can do no more than serve to hide what might otherwise be obnoxious in the sentiment, and will leave it still true, that, without a miracle, or the intervention of some foreign cause, no volition, or action of any man could have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*, which is all that a necessarian contends for. And if, on the contrary, he chuses to assert that, in the same state of mind, the determinations *a* and *b* are equally possible, one of them must be *an effect without a cause*, a supposition which overturns all reasoning concerning appearances in nature, and especially the foundation of the only proper argument for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever, even a thought in the mind of man, could arise without an adequate cause, any thing else, the mind itself, or the whole universe, might likewise exist without a cause.

• I own it is irksome to me to enter into so minute a discussion of an objection that appears to me to be so little deserving of an answer; and it is only with a view to obviate every thing that *has been*, or that I can foresee *may be* urged, with the least plausibility, that I have considered it at all. If this do not give satisfaction, I own I do not think it will be in my power to give satisfaction with respect to this argument, or any other. There does not appear to me to be, in the whole compass of reasoning, that I am acquainted with, a more conclusive argument, than that for the doctrine of necessity from the consideration of the nature of *cause and effect*.

VI. *Of the nature of REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE, and of PRAYING FOR THE PARDON OF SIN, on the Doctrine of Necessity.*

Several persons firmly persuaded of the truth of the doctrine of necessity, yet say, that it is not possible to *act upon it*; and to put what they think a peculiarly difficult case,

case, they ask how it is possible for a necessarian to pray for the pardon of sin.

I answer, in general, that Dr. Hartley appears to me to have advanced what is quite sufficient to obviate any difficulty that can arise from this view of the subject, when he admonishes us carefully to distinguish between the *popular* and *philosophical language*, as corresponding to two very different views of human actions; according to one of which the bulk of mankind refer their actions to themselves only, without having any distinct idea of the divine agency being, directly or indirectly, the cause of them; whereas, according to the other, we look beyond all second causes, and consider the agency of the first and proper cause, exclusive of every thing subordinate to it.

These very different views of things must be attended with very different *feelings*; and, when separated from each other, they will, in several respects, lead to a different *conduct*, as well as require a different *language*. Now, such are the influences
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to which all mankind, without distinction, are exposed, that they necessarily refer actions (I mean refer them ultimately) first of all to themselves and others; and it is a long time before they begin to consider themselves and others as *instruments* in the hand of a superior agent. Consequently, the associations which refer actions to themselves get so confirmed, that they are never intirely obliterated; and therefore the common language, and the common feelings of mankind, will be adapted to the first, the limited and imperfect, or rather erroneous view of things.

The Divine Being could not be unapprized of this circumstance, or unattentive to it; and he has wisely adapted the system of religion that he has prescribed to us, the modes of our religious worship, and every thing belonging to it, to this imperfect view of things. It is a system calculated for *the bulk of mankind*, and of philosophers as partaking of the feelings of the bulk of mankind; and therefore, would, we may suppose, have been different if the
bulk

bulk of mankind had been speculatively and practically philosophers; in some such manner as the modes of worship varied in the Jewish and christian churches.

But it is of prime consequence in this business, that, in whatever *sense*, or *degree*, any particular sentiment or feeling is felt as improper by a necessarian, in the same sense and degree his principles will make that sentiment or feeling to be of no use to him. Thus, to apply this to the case in hand: if the sentiments of self-applause on the one hand, and of self-reproach on the other be, in any sense or degree, impossible to be felt by a necessarian, in the same sense or degree (while he feels and acts like a necessarian) he will have no occasion for those sentiments; his mind being possessed by a sentiment of a much higher nature, that will intirely supersede them, and answer their end in a much more effectual manner. And whenever his strength of mind fails him, whenever he ceases to look to the first cause only, and rests in second causes, he will then necessarily feel
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the sentiments of self-applause and self-reproach, which were originally suggested by that imperfect view of things into which he is relapsed.

Every man's feelings will necessarily be uniform. To be a necessarian in *speculation*, and not in *practice*, is impossible, except in that sense in which it is possible for a man to be a christian in speculation and a libertine in practice. In one sense a speculative christian, or necessarian, may feel and act in a manner inconsistent with his principles; but if his faith be what Dr. Hartley calls a *practical* one, either in the doctrine of necessity, or the principles of christianity, that is, if he really *feels* the principles, and if his affections and conduct be really directed by them, so that they have their natural influence on his mind, it will be impossible for him to be a bad man. What I mean, therefore, is that a *truly practical necessarian* will stand in no need of the sentiments either of self-applause, or self-reproach. He will be under the influence of a much superior principle,
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loving God and his fellow creatures (which is the sum and object of all religion, and leading to every thing excellent in conduct) from motives altogether independent of any consideration relating to himself. On this I need not enlarge in this place, if what I have advanced on the *moral influence of the doctrine of necessity*, in my Appendix, be considered.

It is acknowledged that a necessarian, who, as such, believes that, strictly speaking, *nothing goes wrong*, but that every thing is under the best direction possible, himself, and his conduct, as part of an immense and *perfect whole*, included, cannot accuse himself of having done wrong, in the ultimate sense of the words. He has, therefore, in this strict sense, nothing to do with repentance, confession, or pardon, which are all adapted to a different, imperfect, and fallacious view of things. But then, if he be really capable of steadily viewing the great system, and his own conduct as a part of it, in this true light, his supreme regard to God, as the great, wise, and

and benevolent author of all things, his intimate communion with him, and devotedness to him, will necessarily be such, that he can have no will but God's. In the sublime, but accurate language of the apostle John, he will *dwell in love*, he will *dwell in God*, and *God in him*; so that, *not committing any sin*, he will have nothing to repent of. He will be *perfect*, as his *heavenly father is perfect*.

But as no man is capable of this degree of perfection in the present state, because the influences to which we are all exposed will prevent this constant referring of every thing to its primary cause, the speculative necessarian, will, in a general way, refer actions to himself and others; and consequently he will necessarily, let him use what efforts he will, feel the sentiments of shame, remorse, and repentance, which arise mechanically from his referring actions to himself. And, oppressed with a sense of *guilt*, he will have recourse to that *mercy* of which he will stand in need. These things must necessarily accompany one another,

another, and there is no reason to be solicitous about their separation.

It is, alas! only in occasional seasons of retirement from the world, in the happy hours of devout contemplation, that, I believe, the most perfect of our race can fully indulge the enlarged views, and lay himself open to the genuine feelings, of the necessarian principles; that is, that he can *see every thing in God, i. e.* in its relation to him. Habitually, and constantly, to realize these views, would be always to *live in the house of God*, and within the *gate of heaven*, seeing the plain finger of God in all events, and as if the angels of God were constantly descending to earth, and ascending to heaven before our eyes. Such enlarged and exalted sentiments are sometimes apparent in the sacred writers, and also in the histories of christian and protestant martyrs; but the best of men, in the general course of their lives, fall far short of this standard of perfection.

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We are too apt to lose sight of God, and of his universal uncontrolled agency; and then, falling from a situation in which we were equally strangers to *vice*, and *solicitude*, from a state truly *paradisaical*, in which we were incapable of *knowing* or *feeling* any evil, as such, conversing daily with God, enjoying his presence, and contemplating his works, as all infinitely good and perfect, we look no higher than ourselves, or beings on a level with ourselves; and of course find ourselves involved in a thousand perplexities, follies and vices; and we now want, and ought to fly to, the proper remedy in our case, viz. self abasement, contrition, and supplication.

Moreover, well knowing what we generally are, how imperfect our *views*, and consequently how imperfect our *conduct*, it is our wisdom, and our interest, freely to indulge these feelings, till they have produced their proper effect; till the sense of guilt has been discharged by the feelings of contrition, and a humble trust in the Divine mercy. Thus, *gradually* attaining
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to purer intentions, and a more upright conduct, we shall find less obstruction in enlarging our views to comprehend the true plan of providence; when, having less to reflect upon ourselves for, the sentiment of reproach shall easily and naturally vanish; and we shall then fully conceive, and rejoice in, the belief that in all things we *are, and have been, fellow workers together with God*; and that *he works all his works in us, by us, and for us.*

The improvement of our natures, and consequently the advancement of our happiness, by enlarging the comprehension of our minds, chiefly by means of a more distinct view of the hand of God in all things, and all events, is, in its own nature, a gradual thing, and our attempts to accelerate this natural progress may possibly be attended with some inconvenience; though, I own, I apprehend but little danger from this quarter.

What we have most to dread, is the almost irrecoverable debasement of our minds by *looking off from God, living without him,*
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without a due regard to his presence, and providence, and *idolizing ourselves and the world*; considering other things as *proper agents and causes*; whereas, strictly speaking, there is but *one cause*, but *one sole agent* in universal nature. Thus (but I feel myself in danger of going beyond the bounds of the question I am now discussing) all vice is reducible to *idolatry*; and we can only be completely virtuous and happy in the worship of the one only living and true God; the idea usually annexed to the word *worship* but faintly shadowing out what the intelligent reader will perceive I *now* mean by it.

In all this it must be remembered that I am addressing myself to *professed necessarians*; and I must inform them, that if they cannot accompany me in this speculation, or find much difficulty in doing it, they are no more than *nominal* necessarians, and have no more feeling of the real *energy of their principles* than the merely nominal christian has of those of christianity. It requires much reflection, meditation, and strength

strength of mind, to convert *speculative* principles into *practical* ones; and till any principle be properly *felt*, it is not easy to judge of its real *tendency* and *power*. It is common with unbelievers to declaim on the subject of the mischief that christianity has done in the world, as it is with the opponents of the doctrine of necessity to dwell upon the dangerous tendency of it; but the real necessarian, and true christian, know, and *feel*, that their principles tend to make them better men in all respects; and that it can only be something that is very improperly called either *christianity*, or *the doctrine of necessity*, that can tend to make them worse.

I think, however, that a mere speculatist may be satisfied, that the feeling of remorse, and the practice of supplication for pardon, have still less foundation on the doctrine of philosophical liberty, than on that of necessity, as I presume has been demonstrated in my treatise. Indeed, what can a man have to blame himself for, when he acted *without motive*, and from *no fixed*

principle, good or bad ; and what occasion has he for pardon who never meant to give offence ; and, as I have shewn at large, unless the mental determinations take place without regard to motive, there is no evidence whatever of the mind being free from its necessary influence. But it seems to be taken for granted, that whatever a necessarian cannot feel, or do, his opponent can ; whereas, in fact, the doctrine of repentance, as defined by the advocates of liberty themselves, has much less place on their principles than on ours.

The whole doctrine of *second causes* being *primary* ones, is certainly a mistake, though a mistake that all imperfect beings *must* be subject to. Whatever, therefore, is built upon that mistake can have no place in a truly philosophical system. But I will farther advance, that while men continue in this mistake, and, consequently, while their reflections on their own conduct, as well as on that of others, shall be modified by it, they will derive considerable advantage even from an imperfect view of the true philosophical

sophical doctrine, viz. that of necessity; whereas a man, in the same circumstances, must receive some injury from the opposite sentiment of philosophical liberty; so much may it be depended upon, that a knowledge of this truth can do no harm, but must do some good.

Remorse for past misconduct implies a deep sense of depravity of heart, or a wrong bias of mind, by which temptations to sin will have much more influence with us than they ought to have. This is the sentiment that will be fully felt by what I now call the *imperfect necessarian* (a character which, as I observed before, applies to all mankind). As a necessarian he considers his bad conduct as necessarily arising from his bad disposition. It is *bad fruit* growing from a *bad tree*. And, as he knows that, unless the tree be made good, it will be impossible to make the fruit good; so he is sensible that unless he can, by the use of proper discipline, bring his mind into a better state, he can never depend upon himself for acting more pro-

perly on future occasions. He, therefore, from that principle by which we universally seek our own happiness and improvement, labours to correct his vicious disposition; and, expecting no miraculous assistance, he applies to the proper remedies indicated by the consideration of his case.

At the same time, his regard to God, as the author of all good, and who has appointed *meditation* and *prayer* as a means of attaining it, will make him constantly look up to him for his favour and blessing. And if, as he becomes more philosophical, his devotions have in them less of *supplication*, and rather take the form of *praise*, *thanksgiving*, and a joyful firm *confidence* in the divine care and providence, respecting equally the things of time and eternity, it will not contribute the less to his moral improvement and happiness. But the best of men will not, in fact, get beyond that state of mind, in which direct and fervent *prayer*, properly so called, will be as *unavoidable* as it will be *useful* to them. What I now say will not be well understood

stood by all persons, but I speak to those who have some experience in matters of religion, and who are accustomed to reflection on their natural feelings.

Let us now consider what the doctrine of philosophical liberty can do for a man in the circumstances abovementioned. He, like the necessarian, finds himself involved in guilt, and he also begins to speculate concerning the causes of it; but, overlooking the secret mechanism of his mind, he ascribes the whole to the mere *obstinacy of his will*, which, *of itself*, and not necessarily influenced by any motives, has turned a deaf ear to every thing that better principles could suggest. But, in what manner can such mens *uncontrollable will* be rectified? As far as we have recourse to *motives*, and *principles*, we depend upon the doctrine of *mechanism*; and without that we have nothing to do but sit with folded hands, waiting the arbitrary decisions of this same *sovereign will*.

If he speculates farther, and considers how little his real temper and character are

concerned in such unaccountable motions of his self-determined will, I should think him in some danger of making himself very easy about his vices. And this would be the case, if men were not necessarily influenced by sounder principles than they always distinctly perceive. Now, it appears to me, that if a man's speculations take this turn, it would have been much better for him never to have speculated at all, and that they only tend to bewilder, and hurt him.

Again, supposing a man to have attained to some degree of a virtuous character and conduct, his farther progress will be accelerated by the belief of the doctrine of necessity, and retarded by that of philosophical liberty.

The conviction that God is the author of all *good* will always much more readily take firm hold of the mind than the idea of his being, likewise, the author of all *evil*, though all evil ultimately terminates in good; because it requires more strength of mind to see and believe this. A long time, therefore,

therefore, before we suspect that our evil dispositions come from God, as well as our good ones, and that all things that exist, ultimately considered, equally promote the divine purposes, we shall ascribe all evil to ourselves, and all good to God; and this persuasion will be so riveted, in a long course of time, that after we are convinced that God is really and truly the author of *all things*, without distinction, we shall ascribe evil to him only in an unsteady and confused manner, while the persuasion that he is the sole author of all good will have received a great accession of strength, from our new philosophical principles coinciding with, and confirming, our former general notions.

Now no sentiment whatever is so favourable to every thing amiable, good, and great, in the heart of man, as a spirit of *deep humility*, grounded on disclaiming all our excellencies, and referring them to their proper source, that feeling which Dr. Hartley very expressively calls *self-annihilation*, joined with that which naturally and necessarily accompanies it, *joy and confidence in*
God,

God, as working all our good works in us and for us. This is the disposition that inspires all the writers of the books of scripture, and is observable in all truly serious and devout persons to this day, whether their speculative opinions be favourable to it or not. Nay, it has given such a turn to the *established language of devotion* in all countries, and all ages, that the contrary sentiment, or that of claiming the merit of our good works to ourselves, would have the appearance of something absolutely impious, and blasphemous. Now it must be acknowledged that this disposition of mind, viz. that of ascribing every thing that is good in us to God, is greatly favoured and promoted by the belief of the doctrine of necessity. It may even operate this way, to the greatest advantage, at the same time that, through our imperfect comprehension of things, we continue to ascribe evil to ourselves, and are affected with the deepest sentiments of remorse and contrition.

On the contrary, as far as the doctrine of philosophical liberty operates, it tends to

to check humility, and rather flatters the pride of man, by leading him to consider himself as being, independently of his maker, the primary author of his own good dispositions and good works. This opinion, which, without being able to perceive *why*, every truly pious person dreads, and cannot bring himself expressly to avow, is apprehended to be just, * according to the doctrine of philosophical liberty, which represents man as endued with the faculty of free will, acting independently of any control from without himself, even that of the Divine Being; and that just so far as any superior being, directly or indirectly, influences

* I say *apprehended* to be just, which is all that my argument requires, though, strictly speaking, as I have shewn at large, the claim of *merit*, or *demerit*, is equally ill-founded on the doctrine of philosophical liberty. The sentiments of merit and demerit are certainly *natural*, and found in all mankind; but they have not, therefore, any connection with the doctrine of philosophical liberty. On the contrary, I maintain that the *common opinion* is the doctrine of necessity, though not come to its proper extent. No man, for instance, has any idea but that *the will is always determined by some motive*, which is the great hinge on which the doctrine of necessity turns; nor has any man in common life any idea of *virtue*, but as something belonging to *character* and *fixed principle*, constantly influencing the will.

influences his will, he can pretend to no such thing as real virtue, or goodness; though the virtue that answers to this description is certainly not that which animated the prophets of the Old Testament, or our Saviour and the apostles in the New, but is mere heathen *Stoicism*.

When this temper is much indulged, it is even possible, contradictory as it seems, to ascribe all moral good to a man's self, and all moral evil to the instigation of the Devil, or some other wicked spirit that has access to our minds: whereas, without the intervention of this doctrine of the *independency of the will*, and especially with a little aid from the doctrine of *mechanism*, we should rather, as was shewn before, though inconsistently still, ascribe all good to God, and all evil to ourselves.

Constantly to ascribe *all* to God is an attainment too great for humanity. To be able to do it *at intervals*, in the seasons of retirement and meditation, but so as considerably to influence our general feelings, and conduct in life, is a happy and glorious advantage,

advantage. Sweet, indeed, are the moments in which these great and just views of the system to which we belong can be fully indulged. But if we cannot habitually ascribe *all* to God, but a part only, let it be (and so indeed it naturally will be) that which is *good*, and if we must ascribe any thing to ourselves, let it be that which is *evil*.

Thus have I given a frank and ingenuous account of my own ideas and impressions on this subject. How far they will give satisfaction to others I cannot tell.

ADDITIONAL

THE DISCOURAGEMENT

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ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

BY

DR. P R I C E,

ON A

REVIEW of the whole CONTROVERSY,

AND OF

Dr. PRIESTLEY's LETTERS and ILLUSTRATIONS,

As printed in the preceding Parts of this Work.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS



By J. R. D.

ON A

REVIEW of the whole CONTROVERSY,

AND OF

Dr. PRISTLY'S LETTERS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

As printed in the preceding Parts of this Work.

L E T T E R
T O

DR. P R I E S T L E Y.

NEWINGTON-GREEN, Sept. 19, 1778.

DEAR SIR,

THE desire you have expressed that I would give you my sentiments of the Controversy between us, *on a view of the whole of it as now printed*, has induced me once more to apply my thoughts to it. I have done this with care and attention; but am not sure that any thing which you will judge of great importance has occurred to me. It might, therefore, have been right to resolve to say no more; and indeed, I am so much afraid of perplexing by a multiplicity of words, and of giving disgust by too many repetitions, that this would have been my resolution, had I not

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thought, that the *Additional Observations* which you will receive with this letter, contain some *new* matter; and place several of the arguments already insisted on, in a light that may render them to some persons more intelligible and striking. I have now said the best I can; and I leave our readers to judge between us, hoping that whether they decide in your favour or mine, they will be candid, and believe that we are both of us governed alike by a sincere love of truth and virtue. I feel deeply that I am in constant danger of being led into error by partial views, and of mistaking the suggestions of prejudice for the decisions of reason; and this, while it disposes me to be candid to others, makes me ardently wish that others would be candid to me.

I am, in a particular manner, sensible of my own blindness with respect to the nature of matter and spirit, and the faculties of the human mind. As far as I have gone in this dispute I am pretty well satisfied; but I cannot go much further. You have
asked

asked me some questions (and many more may be asked me) which I am incapable of answering.

I cannot help taking this opportunity of repeating to you, that I dislike more than I can easily express, the malevolence expressed by most of the writers against you. I have myself, as you well know, been long an object of abuse for a publication which I reckon one of the best actions of my life, and which events have fully justified. The consciousness of not deserving abuse has made me perfectly callous to it; and I doubt not but the same cause will render you so.

It is certain that, in the end, the interest of truth will be promoted by a free and open discussion of speculative points. Whatever will not bear this must be superstition and imposture. Instead, therefore, of being inclined to censure those who, with honest views, contribute to bring about such a discussion, we ought to thank and honour them, however mistaken we may think them, and however sacred the points of

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discussion may be reckoned. I wish I could see more of this disposition among the defenders of religion. I am particularly sorry to find that even Mr. Whitehead does not perfectly possess this temper. Had he avoided all uncandid insinuations, and treated you constantly with the same just respect that he does in general, his book in my opinion would have done him much honour.

Dr. Horsley is, I fancy, the only person who, in opposing your opinions, has discovered a just liberality. This is worthy of an able Philosopher; and you have, therefore, very properly distinguished him from your other antagonists, by addressing him, in your letter to him, with particular respect. His method of arguing agrees very much with mine. There is, likewise, an agreement between some of Mr. Whitehead's arguments and those I have used. But this agreement has been accidental; for our correspondence was begun and finished long before I knew any thing of

DR. P R I E S T L E Y. 325

of either Dr. Horsley's or Mr. Whitehead's
publications.


Wishing you every possible blessing,

I am,

With the most affectionate respect,

Yours,

RICHARD PRICE.



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ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

BY

DR. PRICE.

SECT. I. *Of the Human Soul.*

DR. PRIESTLEY acknowledges that the soul is a *single* being or substance. But at the same time he speaks of the *parts* of a soul; of its being a *system*; and, in p. 119, of the *materials* of which Christ consisted before his birth. Has he yet proved this to be consistent? (*) His

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doctrine

(*) Page 86, "I believe I am a *being* or *substance*;
" also, that I am a *single* being; and that my limbs and
" senses are not *myself*."—P. 279, "Man, who is *one* be-
" ing, is composed of *one kind* of substance, made of the
" dust of the earth."—To the same purpose Dr. Priestley
says in p. 284, "that the mind, the subject of thought, is

" one

doctrine is, that, as a number of corporeal substances put together in a particular manner, become, when put into motion, that *measurer of time* which we call a *clock* or a *watch*; so a number of corporeal substances put together in a particular manner in the brain become *of course*, when circulation begins, that thinking being we call a *man*. And his doctrine further is, that both are alike machines, the operations of the one in measuring time, and of the other in thinking, perceiving, willing, &c. being equally brought about by mechanical laws, and the necessary result of particular motions and vibrations. This, I imagine, is as concise and just an account as can be given of his system. See particularly, the second

“ *one* thinking person, or one being;” but afterwards (in the next page) he says, “ that the subject of thought, is the “ body, especially the brain; and that its powers inhere in “ *one kind* of substance.”—These passages compared lead me to suspect, that when he says, in the first of them, that he is *one* being or substance; his meaning is, that he is *many* substances of *one kind*. I can think of no other method of making these passages consistent. For I suppose he cannot possibly mean, that the mind, though one *being*, is many *substances*. This would imply, that a substance, numerically different from all others, is not a being

second sect. of his Additional Illustrations, P. 256, &c.

Not to say any thing at present of the latter part of this system, I would beg leave again to remind him that, according to his own concession, it is *one* substance that *thinks*; that, on the contrary, it is a number of substances that *measure time*; and that, consequently, these cases cannot be parallel.

I know not how to believe Dr. Priestley will adhere to the only observation he has made in answer to this objection; I mean, the observation (in p. 100) “that
“ a *number* of unthinking substances may
“ make *one* thinking substance.” Would he not wonder were I to maintain that a number of *unlearned* men may make one learned *society*? But what would he think were I to maintain, that a number of *unlearned* men may make one learned *man*?

But dismissing this difficulty. According to Dr. Priestley, certain particles in
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the brain are the *subject* of thought and consciousness; and their arrangement, order and motion are *actual* thought and intelligence. These particles, it should be observed, must be some *definite* number: For were they an *indefinite* number, the *man*, or the *subject of thought*, could not continue always the same. Any particles added would *increase* the man, in proportion to the number added. Any taken away would *lessen* him, in proportion to the number taken away. Or, in other words, the man would become so far *different*; and so many particles might be added or taken away, as would make him, in any given proportion, a *different* or *another* being.

All this is manifestly absurd and contradictory. The soul we know, amidst all changes and through every period of its existence, maintains a precise and unvaried sameness and individuality. If, therefore, the soul is the brain, it must be, not that gross and ever-varying mass of substances commonly so called, but some certain *staminal* parts of it which have existed from
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the first creation of matter, (*) but were put together at conception so as to form thought; and which continue without increase or diminution during the life of man; are only disarranged at death; will be put together again at the resurrection so as to form an improved consciousness; and will remain precisely the same, except in their order and vibrations, through all eternity.

Can Dr. Priestley satisfy himself with such a notion of the human soul? Is it possible this should be a right account of that simple and indivisible essence, which every

(*) When Dr. Priestley says (in p. 191) "*The sentient principle* in man, I suppose to be the brain itself," he means probably not the whole brain, but (agreeably to what is above observed) some *staminal* parts of it. He sometimes, indeed, calls the *sentient principle* "a result from the organization of the brain;" but his meaning must be, not that the soul itself is nothing but a result from the form and arrangement of the materials of the brain, for he has acknowledged it (p. 86) to be a *substance*; but that its consciousness and reason are such a result. See the reasoning from p. 113, to p. 116. It is not, he says (p. 76) *myself*, but my *power of thought*, that is the result of figure, motion, &c.

every man calls *himself*; and of those faculties by which we investigate truth, and are capable of growing for ever in knowledge and bliss? Does he, in particular, feel no difficulty in conceiving that a number of particles, disposed in *one* order and moved in *one* way, should be nothing but torpid matter; but, disposed in *another* order and moved in *another* way, should become perception, judgment and reason? (†)

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(†) Dr. Priestley (in p. 258) intimates, that the power of thinking may as well be the result of the organization of the brain, as the attraction of iron be the result of the structure of a magnet. But the attraction of iron by a magnet is the action, not of the magnet itself, but of *another* cause. It would be strange indeed if a mass of matter could be so put together as to become capable of moving a body at a distance without touching it. The truth, in this case, seems to be, that there are causes or powers in nature operating according to stated laws which unite themselves to substances formed as iron and a magnet are, and drive them towards one another. Perhaps, therefore, this fact might be mentioned as most similar to the union of a soul to the brain in consequence of its organization. Some assert that magnetism is caused by the emission of *effluvia*, or the intervention of a subtle fluid; and if this is true, it is only an instance of the communication of motion by impulse from matter to matter.

Dr. Priestley has observed, (see p. 124) that a compound may have properties which the component parts have

I must leave every one to make his own reflections on what Dr. Priestley says from page 268, to 270. I think it scarcely worthy of him. Why might I not say that spirit is not *extended*? He says so, if I understand him, of matter; and yet maintains (p. 248, 249,) that it exists in place, possesses a sphere of action, and is moveable,

have not. This is true only of such properties as denote merely an *order* or *relation* of parts. For instance. Though no *one* of the component parts of a circle is *circular*, the whole compound is so. What can be plainer?—A number of things may be ranged into the order of a circle, but one thing cannot. Does this warrant us to conclude, that, though no one of the particles in a mass of matter is conscious, yet all taken together may be so? As well might we conclude that though no one of the particles moves, yet the whole compound may move. Such, however, is the conclusion we are directed to draw by Dr. Priestley; and also by Mr. Collins in his dispute with Dr. Clarke.

I will beg leave to remark further in this place, that Dr. Priestley's account of the soul has no such tendency as he describes in the Introduction, from p. 16, to p. 19. If he is right, we shall, in the *future state*, have no separate souls. But this will give us no reason for *then* concluding, that we had not pre-existed in a conscious and active state. Just as little reason, in my opinion, does it give us *now* for drawing such a conclusion. But this observation may be carried much farther.—Our existence after death, according to Dr. Priestley, will be only the existence of the materials, separated and dispersed,

able. But I have repeatedly acknowledged my ignorance on this subject. I pretend to know no more than that, whatever my soul is in respect of *locality*, it is *indivisible*, the idea of a *part* of a self, or of a *self* divided into *two selves* being contradictory. Of this I think myself sure. See p. 62, 96, and 106.

SECT. II. *Of the Nature of Matter.*

Dr. Priestley denies that matter is impenetrable, because there is no experiment in which we are sure that we have found it to be so. I have given a reply to this in p. 51. What I would observe here

dispersed, of which we now consist. But this is an existence which belonged to us equally before we were born. Our *pre-existence*, therefore, is no less certain than our *post-existence*.—It is true, Dr. Priestley teaches, that some time after death our scattered parts are to be brought into union, and to be made again conscious. But will he say such an union might not have also taken place sometime or other before we were born?—Little then certainly is the support which *Socinianism* receives from *Materialism*.—See what is said to this purpose in p. 125. The remembrance of pre-existence cannot be necessary; or, if it is, Christ might have possessed it.

here is, that, according to Dr. Priestley's doctrine, there is also no experiment in which we have found that any one thing *causes* or *produces* another; the only proper cause in nature, as he asserts, being that power of the Deity which is not an object of our senses. When a body in motion gives motion to another, all that we observe (and all that is true, if Dr. Priestley is right) is a *conjunction*, not a *connection* of two events; or one motion *going before* another, not one motion *producing* another; the body moved having really received its motion not from the *apparent*, but from an *invisible* cause. This, if I understand Dr. Priestley, is the truth in every instance. Even the determinations of the will are the actions of the Deity; and motives are properly no more than certain perceptions that constantly *precede* them. Since then experiments do not furnish us with the ideas of *causation* and *productive power*, how came we by these ideas? And how does Dr. Priestley know they have any existence?

How

How, in particular, does he avoid the sceptical system which Mr. Hume has advanced in his Philosophical Essays, and which he founds entirely on this observation? I have shewn how I avoid it in my *Review* of the Difficulties in Morals. P. 29, 30, &c.

In p. 245, Dr. Priestley repeats a former observation; namely, that “it is no less
 “ proper to ask what remains of matter after
 “ solidity and extension are taken away,
 “ than to ask what remains of it after at-
 “ traction and repulsion are taken away.”
 I have answered, that solidity and extension are *inherent* properties; but that attraction and repulsion, signifying only *something that is done to matter*, convey no idea of it. Were he to ask me what *spirit* is, and I was to give him no other answer, than that it is *something* that is moved, he would probably be much dissatisfied.

In the first sect. of the *Additional Illustrations*, Dr. Priestley has given a new account of matter, according to which it is
 only

only a number of centers of attraction and repulsion; or, more properly, of centers (not divisible, p. 249) to which divine agency is directed. I would here ask, wherein do such centers differ from mathematical points? Is not a mathematical point merely the *end* or *termination* of a line, as a line is the termination of a surface, and a surface of a solid? Can any one of these be conceived to subsist separately from the rest? What conception can be formed of a point or center which has no figure, nor is the termination of a line, but is capable of moving and being moved? Is the whole universe nothing but a collection of such points acted upon by divine power? Are these points *substances*? If not, can they be *matter*? Or can they be the *souls* of men? Does not divine agency require an object different from itself to act upon? What then can Dr. Priestley mean when he intimates that there is nothing in nature but God's agency?

At the beginning of this controversy Dr. Priestley denied *solidity* to matter, but al-

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lowed it extension. He seems now inclined to deny it *both*, and to be for reducing it (and consequently all sentient beings) to nothing but points to which God's agency (in attracting and repelling I know not what) is directed.

In p. 250, &c. he observes, that since the constituent parts of matter do not touch one another, it can *do* nothing, (every thing being really done by divine power) and consequently is of no use, and, if created, must have been created in vain. (†) The obvious inference from hence is, that there is no such thing as matter. And, accordingly, influenced by this reason, he says, that "it is nothing but the divine agency." The whole creation, then, being matter

(†) Dr. Priestley intimates (p. 252) that he should prefer to his own hypothesis, an hypothesis, could he find it, which should make provision for the use of created matter without resolving it into the divine agency. I think I can inform him of such an hypothesis. *Solid* matter (that is, the matter hitherto believed in by all mankind) is capable of moving other matter by contact and impulse. It can, therefore, *do* somewhat, and be of use. Why then should he not admit it?

matter according to Dr. Priestley's doctrine, the whole creation is nothing but the divine agency; and consequently it must be nothing at all. For what idea can be formed of the *creation* of the divine agency; or of an agency that acts upon itself?

But, perhaps, it is not proper to urge these objections, because Dr. Priestley in the very passage (p. 253) which contains this account of matter, asserts that "though every thing is the divine power, and all action is his action," yet every thing is not the *Deity himself*; and because, likewise, he has very candidly (p. 252) expressed a doubt whether he has not lost himself on this subject. It will, however, be proper to put him in mind (and I wish I could press it on his attention) that he ought not to lay so much stress as he does on the doctrine of materialism, till he is better able to inform us what matter is.

SECT. III. *Of the Doctrine of Necessity.*

Dr. Priestley, in his letter to Dr. Horsley, endeavours to prove, that there is no difference between him and the Necessarians. His reason for this assertion is, that Dr. Horsley acknowledges a *certain*, and (in one sense) a *necessary* influence of motives on the will. Now, it should be recollected, that the whole controversy has been reduced to this short question. “Has man a power of *agency*, or *self-determination*? Dr. Priestley has denied this. He has maintained that such a power is an impossibility; (p. 129 and 241) that we are mistaken when we refer our actions to ourselves; that our volitions are *perfectly mechanical things*; that motives influence *exactly as weights operate on a scale*; (§) and that

(§) See Treatise on Necessity, Dedication p. 12; and Illustrations, p. 30, 36, &c. See likewise this Volume, p. 306.

that there is only *one agent* in nature. (||)
 It is only as far as he means to maintain
 such assertions that he opposes the doctrine
 of liberty as explained by Dr. Clarke and
 others.

The influence of motives has never been
 denied. The point in dispute is, the *na-
 ture* of that influence; and with respect to
 this, I have long ago observed, (see Review
 of *Morals*, p. 351, 2d edit.) that *no* influence
 of motives, which is short of making them
*physical efficient*s or *agents*, can clash with
 liberty. May I then ask him whether he
 still adheres to the assertions I have men-
 tioned? If not, our controversy is at an
 end. But if he does, then he and I (and
 Y 3 probably

(||) Dr. Priestley has sometimes called man an *agent*. In
 p. 86, he says, that "man is a *voluntary agent*, though
 "not possessed of a self-moving power." There seems to
 me an evident contradiction in these words. For an agent
 that does not put himself in motion, is an agent that is al-
 ways acted upon, or an agent that never acts. In p. 178, he
 even allows that man may be called a *free agent*; but his
 meaning plainly is, that man is moved only by *internal*
springs; and this no more makes him truly free than it makes
 a watch free.

probably also he and Dr. Horsley) still differ. He should not say here, as he does p. 221, &c. that, provided the influence of motives is allowed, it makes no difference whether they influence in one way or in another; or whether we reckon them *physical causes* or *moral reasons*. This has been already answered in p. 138, &c. That kind of influence which I allow to motives implies, that man is a *self-moving* being. The other implies, that he is nothing but a machine. The one implies, that motives are only certain reasons on the view of which, or certain rules and perceptions according to which, the mind *determines itself*. The other implies, that they are *substances* which operate mechanically on the mind, and leave it no dominion over its determination. In short, the one is consistent with *moral agency*. The other, destroying *all* agency, destroys of course all *moral* agency. Is it possible there should be any greater difference? See p. 143.

I have in the course of this controversy sometimes appealed to common sense. Dr.
 Priestley

Priestley will, I hope, allow me again to do this on the present occasion. Let us suppose a common man, who knows nothing of those refinements on plain points which have disgraced human learning, and turned so much of it into rank folly; let us, I say, suppose such a man asked whether, in all his actions, he does not determine himself? He would certainly answer, without hesitation, in the affirmative. Suppose him told, that he was mistaken; and that very wise men had discovered, that he no more determined himself in any of his actions than a stone determines itself when thrown from a hand. Would he not wonder greatly?

Suppose him farther asked, whether there is not a *certainty* that he would accept a good estate if it was offered to him fairly? He would answer in the affirmative. Suppose it objected to him, that there could be no such *certainty*, because, being a self-determiner, he would be free not to accept. Would there be a possibility of puzzling him by such an objection?

Dr. Priestley says, "that a determination of the mind in cases in which a regard to different motives is equal, is an impossibility." (*) The following case will prove the contrary, and may, I hope, help a little to illustrate this subject.

Suppose an *agreeable* proposal made to a person which shocks his moral feelings, but which he must immediately resolve, either to accept, or not. If he *accepts*, he gratifies his passions. If he does not accept, he follows his sense of duty. This brings him into circumstances in

(*) There are numberless cases in which there is a reason for acting *in general*, but no reason for any preference of one way of acting to another. It appears to me very wrong to say, that in these cases action becomes impossible. I may have a reason for going to a certain place, but it may be indifferent in which of two ways I go. Do I, in these circumstances, lose the power of going at all? Supposing the universe finite, it was indifferent where in infinite space it was placed. But was it, on this account, impossible to place it any where? Supposing it to consist of only two systems, there could have been no reason for placing one of them on *one* side of the other, rather than at an equal distance on the *opposite* side.

in which he must act upon a motive; and also upon *one* or *other* of two given motives. Nothing is more conceivable, than that these motives may be equal in their influence. In that case, would determination be (as Dr. Priestley says) impossible? To say this, would be to say, that a person, when tempted, may neither comply with the temptation, nor reject it. Without all doubt, his power in such a situation is to do *either*, not to do *neither*.

In general, I would observe here that, in circumstances of temptation, there are always two motives which influence the will;

side. But would it, on this account, have been impossible to create them?

In forming this earth, there could have been no reason against the transposition of any *similar* particles on its surface. Was it, therefore, impossible (as Mr. Leibnitz contended) that there should have been any such particles? See the beginning of Dr. Clarke's, 3d, 4th, and 5th Replies in the Collection of papers which passed between Dr. Clarke and Mr. Leibnitz.

When I say there are cases in which there can be no reason for any *preference* of one way of acting to another, I mean by *preference*,

will; and that the essence of moral merit and demerit consists in the free resolution of the will (or in its *self-determination*) to act on one of them rather than on the other. Dr. Priestley, therefore, should not have said, that the doctrine of liberty implies that a man in acting wickedly or virtuously, acts without a motive. I cannot conceive of a more groundless assertion.

But let us again consider the case I have put.

Passion and interest draw us one way. Conscience and duty order us another. In these circumstances, we may determine as
we

preference, the judgment of the mind concerning the best way of acting. I mention this, because there is a *preference* included in the idea of volition; and which signifies merely the determination to act in one way, and not in another. Preference in the former sense, is a perception of the understanding, and, therefore, *passive*. In the latter sense, it is the exertion of the self-moving faculty, and therefore *active*. These, though *commonly* united, are *often* separated; and it is chiefly inattention to the difference between them, or the not distinguishing (as Dr. Clarke observes) between the *perceptive* and *active* faculties, that has produced the disputes about liberty and necessity.

we *please*. Thus far Dr. Priestley and I would speak the same language, but we should mean differently. By determining *as we please*, he would mean our being subject, without the power of resistance, to the mechanical influence of that motive which happens to be strongest. But I should mean, our possessing a power to make *either* of the motives the strongest; that is, to make either of them the motive that *shall* prevail, and on which we *shall please* to determine. Unhappily for us, we are continually finding ourselves in these circumstances. Let every one examine himself, and consider which of these accounts is right. Has a man, urged by contrary inclinations, (by passion on one hand and a regard to virtue on the other) no controuling power over his inclinations to make one of them, preferably to the other, the inclination that he will follow. Or is he then exactly in the condition of a body impelled by contrary forces, which must be carried along by the strongest? If this is the truth, there is no *action* of the man, when a temptation overcomes him;

nor

nor consequently, if there is any meaning in words, can there be any guilt, or ill-desert. I intreat Dr. Priestley to remember, that this is the doctrine, and the *only* doctrine of necessity that I mean to oppose,

Dr. Priestley says, at the conclusion of his letter to Dr. Horsley, that there is no medium between acknowledging the will to be subject to the influence of motives, and asserting an effect without a cause; and that consequently, “there is no choice but “of the doctrine of necessity, or absolute “nonsense.” I am very sensible, that it is nonsense to deny the influence of motives, or to maintain that there are no fixt principles and ends by which the will is guided; but, at the same time, I must say, that this nonsense is scarcely equal to that of confounding *moral* with *physical* causes, making motives substances, asserting that we are not the causes of *our own* determinations, and denying that we are free merely because we have reasons for acting.

In

In Disquisitions, vol. II. p. 77, he says,
 “ that in all cases where the principle of
 “ freedom from the influence of motives
 “ takes place, it is *exactly an equal chance*
 “ whether rewards and punishments will
 “ determine or not, the self-determining
 “ power being not at all of the nature of
 “ any mechanical influence, that may be
 “ counteracted by influence equally me-
 “ chanical.” Does not this imply, that
 if the will is not subject to a *mechanical*
influence, it can be subject to *no in-*
fluence; and that, if there is not a *cer-*
tainty of its following a particular motive
 in any case, there cannot be even a *pro-*
bability?

Dr. Priestley lays great stress on the ob-
 servation “ that self-determination implies
 “ an effect without a cause.” I have taken
 some notice of this objection in p. 136.
 It evidently implies that it is impossible a
 “ self-moving power should be *itself* a
 “ cause,” and “ that there must be an
 “ endless progression of causes and effects
 “ without

“ without any first cause.” (†) I cannot, therefore, but wonder at this objection; and I am disposed the more to wonder at it, because Dr. Priestley, though he urges it so repeatedly, has at the same time been so candid as to acknowledge that the Deity is a self-determining being. But in answer to this he observes, that the Deity is also *self-existent*, and that it does not follow, because he is so, that his creatures may be so. See what is said to this in p. 102, and 157. Let the impartial reader judge here.

(†) Mr. Leibnitz maintained, that in all cases of such absolute indifference as those referred to in the note, p. 345, there could be *no* determination of the will; because it would be a determination for which no reason could be given. Undoubtedly says Dr. Clarke in answering him, (see 3d Reply, sect. 2d.) “ Nothing is without a sufficient reason why it is rather than *not*, and why it is *thus* rather than otherwise. “ But in things in their own nature indifferent, mere will, “ without any thing external to influence it, is alone a sufficient reason; as in the instance of God’s creating or “ placing a particle of matter in one place rather than in “ another, when all places are originally alike.”

“ A balance (5th Reply, 1st sect.) for want of having in “ itself a principle of action, cannot move at all when the “ weights are equal. But a free agent, when there appears “ two or more perfectly alike reasonable ways of acting, has “ still

here. Would not one think that if God is a self-moving being, self-motion cannot imply an effect without a cause? What analogy is there between saying "God is self-existent, (that is, *underived*;) therefore, his creatures may be so," and saying, "God is an *agent*; therefore, his creatures may be *agents*." Did God's self-existence mean, that he is the cause of his own existence, or that he produced himself, it would be no less absurd to apply

"still within itself, by virtue of its self-moving principle a power of acting, and it may have very strong reasons for not forbearing to act at all, when yet there may be no possible reason to determine any particular way of doing the thing to be better than another. To affirm, therefore, that supposing two different ways of placing certain particles of matter were equally good and reasonable, God could neither wisely nor possibly place them in either of those ways for want of a sufficient weight to determine him which way he should chuse, is making God not an active, but a passive being, which is not to be a God or governor at all." But the objection that liberty implies an effect without a cause, has been more particularly answered by Dr. Clarke, in his Remarks on Mr. Collins's *Philosophical Enquiry concerning Liberty*. It is indeed with some pain I reflect, that much of this discussion is little more than a repetition of Mr. Collins's objections on one side, and Dr. Clarke's Replies on the other.

ply this attribute to him than to any other being; but most certainly it has a very different meaning. It means, that being undervived, he exists (as Dr. Clarke speaks) "by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing;" or (as I should chuse to speak) that the *account* of his existence is the same with the account of the existence of space and duration, of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles, or of any abstract truth.

Dr. Priestley's arguments, in the 6th section of his *Additional Illustrations*, (p. 296) plainly lead to, and imply the following conclusions. That, since no action or event could possibly have been different from what it *has been, is, or will be*; and since there is but one cause, one will, one sole agent in nature; our proneness to look off from this one cause, and to refer our actions to ourselves, is an instance of vicious weakness in us, leading us to *idolize ourselves and others*; (p. 305, 306) and that had we *fortitude* enough to conquer

quer this weakness, and *wisdom* enough to lay aside all fallacious views, or were perfect philosophers and *necessarians*, we should ascribe to God our evil dispositions no less than our good ones, (p. 313) and consider ourselves as fellow-workers with him in our vices as well as our virtues; and, therefore, should never reproach ourselves for having done wrong, never think we have need of repentance, and never pray to God for pardon and mercy, or address him in any of the forms of confession and supplication.

If this is a just account, and Dr. *Priestley* really means to acknowledge these to be proper inferences from his doctrine; I must say that he cannot be sufficiently admired for his fairness in the pursuit of truth. He believes he has found it in the doctrine (the great and glorious doctrine, as he calls it) of necessity; and he follows it into all its consequences, however frightful, without attempting to evade or palliate them. For my own part, I feel here my own weakness. I shudder at these

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consequences, and cannot help flying from them. I think it impossible a doctrine should be true, from which such an apology for vice can be fairly deduced; and which opposes so strongly the constitution of nature and our necessary feelings, as not to be capable of being applied to practice, or even of being *believed* without particular fortitude. I am fully persuaded, however, that so sound is Dr. Priestley's constitution of mind, and so excellent his heart, that he can drink this deadly potion, and find it salutary. But such powers and such integrity are given to few.

I must farther confess to Dr. Priestley, that I am in some degree rendered averse to his doctrine, by my pride. I had been used to think of my soul as so real and substantial, as to be the very principle that gives reality to the sensible qualities of bodies, and consequently to the whole dress of the external world; as an essence of heavenly origin, incorporeal, un-

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compounded, self-determining, immortal and indestructible except by the power that created it; possessed of faculties which (however the exercise of them may be subject to interruptions) make it an image of the Deity, and render it capable of acting by the same rule with him, of participating of his happiness, and of *living* for ever, and *improving* for ever under his eye and care. But if Dr. Priestley is right, my soul is literally the offspring of the earth; a composition of dust; incapable of all agency; a piece of machinery moved by mechanical springs, and chained to the foot of fate; all whose powers of thought, imagination, reflection, volition, and reason, are no more than a *result* from the arrangement and play of a set of atoms, all unthinking and senseless.——What can be more humiliating than this account?——How low does it bring the dignity of man?——I cannot help feeling myself degraded by it unspeakably?——Were it to be received universally, it would, I am afraid, operate like a dead

weight on the creation, breaking every aspiring effort, and producing universal abjectness. The natural effect of believing (§) that nothing is left to depend on ourselves, and that we can *do* nothing, must be concluding that we have *nothing to do*; and resolving to leave every thing to that being who (as Dr. Priestley says, p. 303, 314) works *every thing in us, by us, and for us*.

That SELF-ANNIHILATION, therefore, which he mentions as one of the happy effects

(§) Dr. Priestley frequently speaks of the dependence of events on *ourselves*; but I cannot see the consistency of such language with his principles. Events, it is true, depend on our *determinations*; but our *determinations*, no more depending on *ourselves*, than the motion of a wheel depends on *itself* when pushed by another wheel, no events derived from such determinations, can be properly said to depend on *ourselves*. Dr. Priestley's system allows no one to be the maker of his own *volitions*. How then can it, as he says it does, (Disquisitions, vol. 2d. p. 99) allow every one to be the maker of his own *fortune*? In truth, the use which he finds unavoidable of such expressions as these and many others implying liberty, is a strong argument against him. For it proves, that so incompatible is his system with the whole frame of *language* as well as *nature*, that it is impossible even to *spea*k agreeably to it.

effects of his doctrine, is no great recommendation of it. On the contrary. That SELF-REVERENCE, which is taught by the opposite doctrine, inspiring high designs and a disdain of mean passions and vicious pursuits, is, in my opinion, a far more useful and noble principle.

Dr. Priestley takes notice of the serenity and joy which the doctrine of necessity inspires by causing us to view every thing in a favourable light, by shewing us the hand of God in all occurrences, and by teaching us that there is nothing wrong in nature. But these sources of joy are by no means confined to the doctrine of necessity. The contrary doctrine supplies them on better ground, and with more safety and purity. There are no ideas of free agency which do not allow of such a dependence of events on the circumstances of beings and the views presented to their minds as leaves room for *any* direction of events by superior wisdom. And though I believe that vice is an *absolute evil* productive of infinite losses to the individuals

who practice it; and that the permission of it is to be accounted for chiefly by the impossibility of producing the greatest good without giving *active powers*, (§) and allowing scope for exercising them. Though, I say, I believe this; yet I believe at the same time, that no event comes to pass which it would have been proper to exclude; and that, relatively to the divine plan and administration, *all is right*. Under this persuasion, I can view the course of events with satisfaction; and commit joyfully the disposal of my lot to that self-existent reason which governs all things; not doubting but that the order of nature is in every instance wise and good beyond the possibility of amendment; that infinitely more takes place in the creation than my

(§) See p. 174. The best that I can say on this subject, may be found in my Dissertation on Providence, sect. 4th.

Active powers, self-determining powers, and voluntary powers, are, according to my ideas, the same. But according to Dr. Priestley, a *voluntary power* (or the power of willing) is a *passive power*. That is, it signifies only (like *moveableness* in bodies) the capacity of being acted upon, or the necessity of yielding to an impressed force.

my warmest benevolence can wish for; and that, if I practice righteousness, I shall (according to the promise of God by Jesus Christ) rise again after sinking in death; and, together with all the upright of all nations and opinions, be at last happy for ever,

P O S T S C R I P T,

At the end of the second paragraph of the note beginning in p. 332, add the following words.—In short; consciousness, not being a mere order of parts, or an external denomination, but a quality *inhering* in its subject, it seems the plainest contradiction to say, that it can inhere in the *whole*, without inhering in the *parts*.

Also: After the words, *effect without a cause*, in p. 351, add—And that, if our acting with a view to ends and reasons proves we do not begin motion in ourselves, it must much more prove the same of the Deity; and, consequently, that there can be no *beginner* of motion, or *first cause*?

In the last line of p. 330, add a reference to Dr. Priestley's words in p. 83.—“ No particle of the man being lost, *as many as were essential to him*, will be collected and revived at the resurrection.”

To the reference in p. 341, add p. 85, 145, and 241.
For the words quoted in p. 344, see p. 160.

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R. F. P. L. I. B. S.

DR. P. R. I. C. H. S.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS.



DR. R. I. S. T. L. H. Y.

R E P L I E S

T O

DR. P R I C E's

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS,

SECT. I. *Of the Human Soul.*

P. 327, **I** CANNOT see any real in-
328. consistency between calling *the*
mind, or *the man*, *one being*, or even *one*
substance, and yet saying that this one sub-
stance, or being, consists of many parts,
each of which, separately considered, may
likewise be called a distinct being, or sub-
stance; * having again and again observed,
what

* That all the *unity* or *simplicity* of which we can be con-
scious with respect to ourselves, is that each person is *one*, and
not *two* conscious intelligent beings; but that consciousness
can give us no information whatever concerning the *substance*
to which these powers belong, as whether it be *simple* or *com-*
plex, *divisible* or *indivisible*, &c. has, I presume, been suf-
ficiently shown in the *Additional Illustrations* under the article
of *Consciousness*, especially p. 284; and yet this seems to be
the thing on which Dr. Price lays the greatest stress.

what I believe will be universally admitted, that by the words *being*, *substance*, or *thing*, we only mean the unknown, and perhaps imaginary *support of properties*, some of which may belong to the parts, though others may be peculiar to the whole.

Dr. Price, indeed, says, (p. 333) that “ this
 “ is only true of such properties as denote
 “ merely *an order or relation of parts*, as
 “ that no one of the component parts of
 “ a circle is circular, though the whole
 “ compound is so.” But I see no reason
 for this limitation. It is well known that
 chemical compounds have powers and properties which we could not have deduced from those of their component parts, or their new arrangement; as the power of *aqua regia* to dissolve gold, when neither the spirit of nitre, nor the spirit of salt, of which it is composed, will do it. It may be said, that a being of competent knowledge of the nature of gold, and that of the two acids, separately considered, might foretel that gold would be soluble in a mixture

ture of them. But I also may say that a being of sufficient knowledge might have foretold, that when God had made a human body, even of the *dust of the earth*, or *mere matter*, the result of the animation of this organized system would have been his *feeling* and *thinking*, as well as his *breathing* and *walking*; or, in the words of Moses, that when the mere *breath of life* was imparted, nothing more remained to be done to make a complete man. There was no *separate soul* to be communicated.

Even Dr. Price's own example, viz. that of a *clock*, or *watch*, will suit my purpose tolerably well. A watch, as he properly says, is a *time-measuring machine*, as man is a *thinking machine*. But what connection is there between the ideas of the brass, or steel, &c. of which the watch is made, or even of the separate parts of which it consists, as the wheels, pinions, spring, or chain, &c. and the idea of *measuring time*? Has not the whole, in this case, a property, or power, which does not, in the least degree, belong to any of the parts.

Nay

Nay the whole machine, when properly put together, has no more power of measuring time than any of its separate parts, or the rough materials of which they are made, till the spring is wound up; but then its power and office of measuring time takes place *of course*. Why then should it be thought not to be within the compass of almighty power to form an organized body of mere matter, so that by simply giving it *life* the faculty of *thinking* shall be the necessary result.

It is of no consequence, however, whether we be able to find any proper illustration of this case, or not, since, as I have shewn both in the *Disquisitions*, and in the course of this correspondence, that it is as evident from fact, that the brain thinks, as that the magnet attracts iron. See p. 92, &c.

Dr. Price says, p. 330, " The soul, we
 " know, amidst all changes, and through
 " every period of its existence, maintains
 " a precise and unvaried sameness and in-
 " divi-

“dividuality; and, p. 334, he calls it a “*simple and indivisible essence*.” Now I am satisfied that a man continues sufficiently the same being through the whole course of his life, and will be so after the resurrection; but I do not think that our imperfect knowledge of the nature of organized bodies will authorize the very strong language above quoted. I consider *man* as preserving his individuality, or identity, in the same manner as a *tree* does; and if we consider the loss of memory, the change of disposition and character, and the impairing of all the human faculties in old age, there will be no more argument from *fact* of his having continued the same from his birth to his death, than of an old, shattered, and dismembered tree being the same that it was when first planted, and during its vigour.

Dr. Price thinks, (see p. 333) that what I have said on the subject of *extended spirit* is *scarcely worthy of me*. Now I cannot help thinking that what I have advanced on that subject is both perfectly *just*, and
likewise

likewise *proper*. In my *Disquisitions* I had considered principally the most refined and proper kind of spiritualism, if I may use that expression, as appearing to me to be the only consistent system; according to which, spirit has neither extension nor relation to space. This Dr. Price acknowledges (p. 25) to be *an absurdity and contradiction that deserves no regard*. He says, "That matter is incapable of consciousness and thought, not because it is *extended*, but because it is *solid*," p. 57, "That Dr. Clarke," whose ideas he seems to adopt, "was not for excluding expansion from the idea of immaterial substances," p. 55, and together with myself, and Dr. Clarke, he always supposes the divine essence to have proper extension, filling all space.

It certainly then behoved me to examine this opinion of *extended human souls*, and I think I have shewn it to be no less absurd than the former. Dr. Price himself does not chuse to defend it, but rather seems willing to adopt a new and middle opinion,

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supposing the soul to have *locality*, without *extension*. But this idea I have noticed, and I think sufficiently, in my *Disquisitions*, referring to Dr. Watts, who confutes it more at large. I presume, therefore, that *in no form whatever* can the hypothesis of a soul separate from the body be maintained.

As to what I advanced in my random speculation concerning the *centers of attraction and repulsion*, of which I supposed that what we call *matter* might possibly consist, it was a mere voluntary excursion into the regions of hypothesis. I do not at present see any thing amiss in it, but I am confident that had I been more in earnest, and determined to abide by that hypothesis, there is nothing in it of which Dr. Price could materially avail himself in support of his doctrine of a separate soul.

The fact of the existence of *compound ideas* in the mind, still appears to me decisive against the opinion of such an absolute *simplicity* and *indivisibility* of its essence,

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as Dr. Price contends for. See *Disquisitions*, p. 37, and this Correspondence, p. 51, 95.

Since I wrote the *Additional Illustrations*, I have had the curiosity to make some inquiry into the actual state of opinions concerning the soul, and I see reason to think that, excepting Dr. Clarke, and perhaps a few others, the opinion that has most generally prevailed of late, is that which I have principally combated in my *Disquisitions*, viz. that it is a thing that has *no extension, or relation to space*. Dr. Watts asserts this opinion, and defends it very largely and ably against Mr. Locke, and it is the opinion that is advanced and proved, in all the forms of geometrical demonstration, by Dr. Doddridge in his *Lectures*. These Lectures are now read in all our dissenting academies, where perhaps one half of the metaphysicians in the nation are formed; for the clergy of the established church do not, in general, seem to have so much of this turn. Now I do not remember that any of my fellow students ever entertained a different idea,
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and many of us were very much intent upon metaphysical inquiries. We held very different opinions on other points, and were pretty eager disputants. I have also inquired of many other persons, and hitherto they have all told me, that their idea of spirit was that which I have considered. It will be observed, however, that all the arguments on which I lay the most stress respect the notion of a separate soul *in general*, without regard to any particular hypothesis about the nature of it.

Mr. Baxter, seems to deny extension to spirits, but not *locality*, so that probably neither Dr. Price nor myself have been exactly right in our idea of his opinion. It rather seems to have been that middle opinion to which Dr. Price now reverts. As to the doctrine of immaterial spirits having real *size*, and consequently *form*, or *shape*, though I ought perhaps to have respected it more, as the opinion of so great a man as Dr. Clarke, I really considered it as an hypothesis universally abandoned, till Dr. Price's seeming avowal of it made me

give it the degree of attention which I have done, and which produced what I have advanced on the subject in the *Additional Illustrations* to which he refers.

In his *Additional Observations*, (p. 332) Dr. Price suggests an idea of a soul, and of its union to the body, that I own I should not have expected from his general system; comparing it (as “that to which,” he says, “it is perhaps the most similar”) to “those causes and powers in nature, “operating according to stated laws, which “unite themselves to substances formed “as iron and a magnet are.”

Is then the soul nothing more than a *power* or *property*, necessarily resulting from the organization of the brain? This has been *my* idea, and not *his*. I therefore suppose him to mean that whenever a body is completely organized, there is a general law in nature, by which, without any particular interposition of the Deity, a soul immediately attaches itself to it. But this supposes what Dr. Price will excuse me for calling

calling *a magazine of souls* ready formed for that purpose, or the pre-existence of all human souls; which, indeed, was the original doctrine of a soul, and what I think is necessary to make the system complete, and consistent.

Dr. Price says, *note* p. 334, “It is certainly very little support that Socinianism receives from Materialism,” because the resurrection being nothing more than the re-arrangement of the same particles that composed a man before death, the same may have composed a man in a state prior to his birth.

I answer, that this is certainly *possible*, and had I the same *authority* for believing it, that I have to believe the resurrection, I should have admitted it; but having no *evidence* at all for it, it is a notion so far within the region of mere possibility, that it is in the highest degree incredible. For none of the natural arguments for the future existence of men, which are derived from the consideration of the moral government of God, can be alledged in favour of

a pre-existence of which we have no knowledge.

It is likewise possible that, in a former remote period, not only myself, but every thing with which I am connected, and the whole system of things, may have been just as it now is, that Dr. Price then wrote remarks on my *Disquisitions*, &c. and that I replied to him in a joint publication, the very same as the present; that there have been infinite revolutions of the same system, and that there is an infinity of them still to come, which was the opinion of some of the antient philosophers.

But it is not the mere *possibility* of such a scheme that can entitle it to any degree of credit. If, therefore, the failure in the support that the doctrine of Materialism gives to the doctrine of Socinianism be only in proportion to the probability of the pre-existence of man on the system of materialism (which excludes the notion of a separate soul) I think it may be put down as an *evanescent quantity*, or nothing at all. In
other

other words, the doctrine of materialism is a sufficient, and effectual support of the Socinian hypothesis.

So much confidence have I in the tendency that the doctrine of materialism has to favour Socinianism, that I doubt not but the moment it is believed that men in general have no souls separate from their bodies, it will be immediately and universally concluded, that Christ had none. And as to the mere possibility of his, and our *bodies*, having had a pre-existence in an organized and thinking state, I should entertain no sort of apprehension about it. Or, if this odd opinion should gain ground, it will have nothing in it contrary to the *proper principle* of Socinianism, which is, that Christ was a *mere man*, having no natural pre-eminence over other men; but that all his extraordinary powers were derived from divine communications after his birth, and chiefly, if not wholly, after his baptism, and the descent of the holy spirit upon him. This kind of pre-existence can also afford no support to any other of those cor-

ruptions of christianity which have been derived from the notion of a separate soul, such as the doctrine of *purgatory*, and the *worship of the dead*, &c. &c.

SECT. II. *Of the Nature of Matter.*

On what I advanced concerning the constitution of matter, as consisting of mere *centers of attraction and repulsion*, which I gave as a mere *random speculation*, and not at all necessary to my purpose, but according to which it may be said that every thing is the *divine agency*, Dr. Price asks, (p. 337) "Does not the divine agency require a different object from itself to act upon," and, (p. 338) "What idea can we form of the creation of the divine agency, or of an agency that acts upon itself." I answer, that the difficulty consists in *terms* only; for that on the random hypothesis to which this argument refers, the *exertion of the divine agency* may properly enough be called *creation*, and the *modification* of that exertion, the *action* of the Deity upon that creation.

Dr.

Dr. Price says, in the note p. 338, that *solid matter can do somewhat, and be of use*. But is it not rather unfortunate for this hypothesis, and those who maintain it, that they are not able to say *what it does*, there being no *effect*, or *appearance* in nature, to the explication of which it is necessary; all that is *actually done*, where matter is concerned, being probably effected by something to which solidity cannot be ascribed. There is certainly no conceivable connection between *solidity* and *attraction*. Solidity, indeed, might account for *resistance at the point of contact*, but I challenge any philosopher to stand forth, and produce but one clear instance of actual *unquestionable contact*, where matter is concerned. In most cases of repulsion it is undeniable that proper contact is not at all concerned, and therefore there can be no reason *from analogy* to lead us to conclude that it is, in *any case*, the proper cause of repulsion; but, on the contrary, that the true cause, as *certainly in most cases*, so *probably in all*, is something else. The case the most like

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to real contact is that of the component parts of solid bodies, as gold, &c. but even this cannot be any thing more than a certain *near approach*, because they are brought *nearer* together by cold; and it will hardly be pretended that any body merely impinging against a piece of gold comes nearer to its substance than the distance at which its own component parts are placed from each other.

On this subject Dr. Price refers to what he has advanced p. 31. But all that he says there is that, in some cases, the reason why bodies cannot be brought into contact *may be* their *solidity*, at the same time allowing that, in other cases, it is *certainly* a *repulsive power*. In the same section he refers to his *Treatise on Morals* for another origin of the idea of solidity. But this I have fully considered in the third of the *Essays* prefixed to my edition of *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*. See particularly p. 37.

However,

However, the whole of what I have advanced concerning *the penetrability of matter*, is a thing on which I lay no great stress. I do not see any reason to be dissatisfied with it; but admitting matter to have all the solidity that is usually ascribed to it, I have no doubt of its being compatible with the powers of thought; all the phenomena demonstrating to me that man is a being composed of *one kind of substance*, and not of *two*, and these so heterogeneous to each other as has been generally supposed.

It is within the limits of this section that Dr. Price puts the following question to me, (p. 335.) “ Since experiments do
 “ not furnish us with the idea of *causation*,
 “ and *productive power*, how came we by
 “ those ideas, and how does Dr. Priestley
 “ know they have any existence? How,
 “ in particular, does he avoid the sceptical system which Mr. Hume has advanced ? ”

I answer that my idea of *causation*, and of its *origin* in the mind, is, as far as I know;

know, the very same with that of other persons; but we all distinguish between *primary* and *secondary causes*, though speaking strictly and philosophically, we call secondary causes mere *effects*, and confine the term *cause* to the primary cause. Thus we say that the cause of moving iron is in the magnet, though the magnet is not the primary, but only the proximate, or secondary cause of that effect; deriving its power, and all that can be said to belong to it from a higher cause, and ultimately from God, the original cause of all things. So also I formerly considered man as the original cause of his volitions and actions, till, on farther reflection, I saw reason to conclude that like the magnet, he is no more than the proximate, immediate, or secondary cause of them; himself, his constitution, and circumstances, and consequently his actions, having a prior cause, viz. the same first cause from which the powers of the magnet, and all the powers in nature, are derived.

SECT.

SECT. III. *Of the Doctrine of Necessity.*

On this subject Dr. Price refers me, (p. 342) to the decisions of what he calls *common sense*, or the notions of the vulgar. These I have observed, as far as they go, are uniformly in favour of the doctrine of necessity. For if men were properly interrogated, they would admit all that I require in order to a proper demonstration of the doctrine; though, not being used to reflection, they do not *pursue* or even *apprehend* the consequences. See my *Treatise on Necessity*, p. 103, &c.

As to the consistency of the *popular language* with the doctrine of necessity, I have again and again made observations upon it, which I think it unnecessary to repeat, in answer to the conclusion of Dr. Price's note, p. 356.

Dr. Price says, (p. 345) that he “can-
 “ not conceive a more groundless assertion,
 “ than that the doctrine of liberty implies
 “ that a man can act wickedly or virtuously
 “ without a motive.” But after putting a
 case in which he supposes motives to be
 exactly

exactly equal, viz. the combination of *passion* and *interest* on one side, and of *conscience* and *duty* on the other, he makes liberty to consist in our possessing a power of making either of them the motive that shall prevail.

Now it appears to me to require very little power of analization to see that before the mind can decide to which of the motives it shall give this preference, it must form a previous real, and most serious *determination*, and that this previous determination requires a motive as much as the final determination itself, especially as Dr. Price expressly acknowledges, (p. 348) that “ it is nonsense to deny the influence of
“ motives, or that there are no fixed prin-
“ ciples or ends by which the will is
“ guided.” In the case above mentioned I have the choice of two things, viz. either to give the preponderance to the *motives of interest*, or to *those of duty*, which, being by supposition exactly equal, are themselves out of the question, and therefore cannot at all contribute to the decision. Now this being a real determination of the mind, it must,

must, by Dr. Price's own confession, require some motive or other.

This argument I own is quite new to me, and therefore I presume that it is, in part, the *new matter* which Dr. Price observes (p. 322,) is contained in these *Additional Observations*; but I know he will excuse my frankness if I tell him that it appears to me to be the last retreat of the doctrine of philosophical liberty, and not at all more tenable than any of those out of which it has been already driven. For when *all argument* fails, he will hardly take refuge in the *common sense* of my Scotch antagonists. I could say more on the subject of this new idea of *the mind choosing the motive on which it will decide*, but I think what I have now said may be sufficient.

I would take this opportunity of observing that if the motives, in the case abovementioned, be not of a *moral* nature, (and since both the motive of *interest* on one side, and that of *duty* on the other, are expressly excluded, every thing else of a moral nature seems to be excluded along with

with them) the determination cannot with propriety be denominated *moral*, or be said to be either *virtuous* or *vicious*.

Dr. Price, on this occasion, supposes that a strict equality of motives is a very common case. I answer that we are, indeed, sometimes sensible of it, but that then the determination always remains in suspense. For it appears to me that, if we give attention to the state of our minds, we shall see reason enough to conclude that we never come to an actual determination without a sufficient preponderance of motive. And if we consider that the force of a motive depends upon *the state of the mind* to which it is presented, as well as upon what it is in itself, that the state of mind is in perpetual fluctuation, and that the point of light in which we view the same thing is continually varying, we shall not be at all surprised that, in ordinary cases, when nothing of much consequence is depending, we determine with such readiness, and from motives so evanescent, that we are not able to trace the progress of our thoughts, so as distinctly

tinctly to recollect the real causes of our choice, after the shortest interval of time. If it were possible to make a balance which should support a thousand pounds weight, and yet turn with one thousandth part of a grain, would it be any wonder that a person should not be able easily to bring it to an equipoise? But what is even this to the exquisite structure of the mind?

Dr. Price acknowledges, as above, that “ it is nonsense to deny the influence of
 “ motives, or to maintain that there are
 “ no fixed principles by which the will is
 “ guided;” but at the same time he says (p. 348) that “ this nonsense is scarcely
 “ equal to that of confounding *moral* and
 “ *physical causes*.” Now if what I have said on this subject both in my *Treatise on Necessity*, and in my *Letter to Dr. Horsley* be not satisfactory, I shall despair of ever being able to give satisfaction with respect to any thing. I will even grant moral and physical causes to be as different, in their nature and operation, as Dr. Price himself can possibly suppose them to be;

but if they be really *causes*, producing *certain effects*, that is, if we be so constituted, as that one definite determination shall always follow a definite state of mind, it must be true that, without a miracle, no volition, or action, could have been otherwise than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*; and this is all that, as a necessarian, I contend for. If any person can please himself with calling this *liberty*, or the result of the *mind's determining itself*, I have no sort of objection, because these are mere *words* and *phrases*.

Dr. Price calls the doctrine of necessity, according to which all events, moral as well as natural, are ultimately ascribed to God, a *deadly potion* (p. 354) and yet he hesitates not to say (p. 358) that he believes "no event comes to pass which
"it would have been proper to exclude,
"and that, relatively to the divine plan
"and administration, all is right." Now, between this doctrine, and those naked views of the doctrine of necessity at which Dr. Price is so much alarmed, I see no
real

real difference. When a person can once bring himself to think that there is no wickedness of man which it would have been proper to exclude, and that the divine plan *requires* this wickedness, as well as every thing else that actually takes place (which is the purport of what Dr. Price advances, and very nearly his own words) I wonder much that he should hesitate to admit that the Divine Being might expressly *appoint* what it would have been improper to exclude, what his plan absolutely required, and that without which the scheme could not have been right, but must have been wrong.

May not this view of the subject, as given by Dr. Price, be represented as an *apology for vice*, and a *thing to be shuddered at*, and to be *fled from*, which is the language that he uses (p. 354) with respect to the doctrine of necessity? If to make vice *necessary* be deadly poison, can that doctrine be innocent which considers it as a thing that is *proper*, and, relatively to the divine plan and administration, *right*? The

two opinions, if not the same, are certainly very near *akin*, and must have the same kind of operation and effect.

If Dr. Price will attend to *facts*, he may be satisfied that it *cannot* require that great *strength* and *soundness of constitution* that he charitably ascribes to me, to convert the doctrine of necessity, poison as he thinks it to be, into wholesome nourishment, and that he must have seen it in some very unfair and injurious light. I am far from being singular in my belief of this doctrine. There are thousands, I doubt not, who believe it as firmly as I do. A great majority of the more intelligent, serious, and virtuous of my acquaintance among men of letters, are necessarians, (as, with respect to several of them, Dr. Price himself very well knows) and we all think ourselves the better for it. Can we *all* have this peculiar strength of constitution? It cannot be surely deadly poison which so many persons take, not only without injury, but with advantage, finding it to be, as Dr. Price acknowledges
with

with respect to myself (p. 352) even *salutary*.

We are all, no doubt, constituted much alike, how different soever may be the opinions that we entertain concerning the principles of our common nature. I, therefore, infer that Dr. Price himself, if it were possible for him to become a necessarian, would think it not only a very harmless, but a great and glorious scheme, worthy of a christian divine, and philosopher, and that he would smile, as I myself now do, at the notions which we first entertained of it.

Dr. Price also imagines (p. 355 and 356)
 “ that the belief of the doctrine of necessity
 “ must operate like a dead weight upon
 “ the creation, breaking every aspiring effort, and producing universal abjectness.
 “ The natural effect of believing that nothing is left to depend upon ourselves,
 “ and that we can *do* nothing, and *are*
 “ nothing, must be concluding that we
 “ have nothing to do.”

But I have observed in my *Treatise on Necessity* (p. 96, &c.) that, in the only sense in which the consideration of it can operate as a motive of action, *every thing depends upon ourselves*, much more so than upon any other scheme; and therefore that the necessarian must feel himself more strongly impelled to an exertion of his faculties than any other man.

By a man's *making his own fortune*, I mean that his *success* depends upon his *actions*, as these depend upon his *volitions*, and his volitions upon the *motives* presented to him. Supposing a man, therefore, to have *propensities* and *objects of pursuit*, as his own happiness, &c. &c. of which no system of faith can deprive him, he will necessarily be roused to exert himself in proportion to the strength of his propensity, and his belief of the necessary connection between his *end* and his *endeavours*; and nothing but such an opinion as that of philosophical liberty, which destroys that necessary connection, can possibly slacken his endeavours.

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With respect to this also, let Dr. Price consider whether his *theory* has any correspondence with *facts*. Let him consider those of his acquaintance who are necessarians. To say nothing of myself, who certainly, however, am not the most torpid and lifeless of all animals; where will he find greater ardour of mind, a stronger and more unremitted exertion, or a more strenuous and steady pursuit of the most important objects, than among those of whom he knows to be necessarians? I can say with truth (and meaning no disparagement to Dr. Price, and many others, who, I believe, unknown to themselves, derive much of the excellence of their characters from principles very near akin to those of the doctrine of necessity) that I generally find *christian necessarians* the most distinguished for active and sublime virtues, and more so in proportion to their steady belief of the doctrine, and the attention they habitually give to it. I appeal to every person who has read *Dr. Hartley's Observations on Man*, whether he can avoid having the same conviction with respect to him.

It is at *names* more than *things* that people in general are most frightened. Dr. Horfeley is clearly a necessarian, in every thing but the name. He avows his belief that every determination of the mind certainly follows from previous circumstances, so that without a miracle, no volition, or action, could have been otherwise than it *has been, is, or is to be*, and yet he disclaims the doctrine of necessity. Dr. Price does not properly maintain the doctrine, but he stands on the very brink of that tremendous precipice; believing that the mind cannot act without a motive, but thinking to secure his liberty on the supposition that the mind (I suppose, without any motive whatever) has the power of chusing what motive it will act from; and believing with the necessarian, that every thing is *as it should be*, and *as the divine plan required it to be*.

Upon the whole, both he and Dr. Horfeley appear to me to want nothing more than what is called *courage* fully to adopt, and boldly defend, the doctrine of necessity
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in *its proper terms*, and to *its full extent*. I well remember to have had the same fears and apprehensions about the doctrine of necessity that they now express; but being compelled, by mere *force of argument*, to believe it to be *true*, I was by degrees reconciled to it, and presently found that there was nothing to be dreaded in it, but, on the contrary, every thing that can give the greatest satisfaction to a well disposed mind, capable of any degree of comprehension, or extent of view. I think it much better, however, to admit the doctrine of necessity explicitly, and with all its consequences, than be compelled to admit the same consequences, in other words, and in conjunction with principles that are quite discordant with it.

To take off the dark cloud that Dr. Price has in these last observations thrown over the doctrine of necessity, I shall not here repeat what I have on former occasions advanced in its favour, but shall leave it to make whatever impression it may on our readers,

What

What Dr. Price says of *the soul* (p. 355) that, “ it is possessed of faculties which
 “ make it an image of the deity, and render it capable of acting by the same rule
 “ with him, of participating of his happiness, and of living for ever, and improving for ever under his eye and care,” I can say of *man*. But I do not think that, for this purpose, it is at all necessary that the mind should be *incorporeal*, *uncompounded* or *self-determining*, arrogating to ourselves the attributes of *little independent gods*. To whatever kind of substance, though it should be the humblest *dust of the earth*, that the truly noble prerogatives of man be imparted, it will appear to me equally respectable. For it is not the *substance*, but the *properties*, or *powers*, that make it so.

I also *reverence myself*, but not in the character of a being *self-determined*, or *self-existent*, but as the rational offspring of the first great and only proper cause of all things. By his power I am animated, by his wisdom I am conducted, and by his bounty

bounty I am made happy. It is only from the idea I have of my near relation to this great and glorious being, and of my intimate connection with him, that my exultation arises; far from founding it upon the idea that I have a will that is not ultimately his, or a single thought that he cannot controul. *Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things. To him, therefore, and not to ourselves, be glory.*

Dr. Price lays great stress on the consideration of God being a *self-determining*, and *self-moving* being, as a proof that man may be so too (p. 349 & 350) and considering *self-determining* as equivalent to *self-moving*, and this as equivalent to what we mean by a *self-existent*, or *first cause*, I have not objected to applying that appellation to the Divine Being; but I would observe that in this I mean nothing more than to express my total want of conception concerning the *cause*, or *reason*, of the *existence*, and if I may so say, of the *original action*, of the Deity. For, considering the Divine Being as *actually existing*, I have no more idea of
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the possibility of his acting without a motive (if there be any analogy between the divine mind and ours) than of any created being doing so; and to ascribe this self-determining power to the Divine Being, meaning by it that *he acts without a motive, or reason*, is certainly so far from exalting the Deity, that we cannot form any idea of him more degrading. It is to divest him at once of all his moral perfections. For to act invariably from good principles, or motives (in whatever it be that we make goodness, or virtue, to consist) is essential to moral excellence,

As to the *cause*, or *account*, as Dr. Price expresses it, of the divine existence, I profess to have no idea at all. That there must be a necessarily existing being, or a first cause, follows undeniably from the existence of other things; but the same disposition to inquire into the causes of things would lead us on *ad infinitum*, were it not that we see a manifest absurdity in it; so that, confounding as it is to the imagination, we are under an absolute necessity of acqui-

acquiescing in the idea of a *self-existent being*.

Every thing that I have yet seen advanced with respect to the proper *cause*, or *reason* of the divine existence appears to me either to suggest no ideas at all, or to give false ones. Dr. Clarke says, that *the Deity exists by an absolute necessity in the nature of things*, but this expression gives me no proper idea; for, exclusive of that necessity by which we are compelled to admit that such a being exists, which may be called necessity *a posteriori*, I am satisfied that no man, let his reasoning faculties be what they will, can have the least idea of any necessity. Of necessity *a priori* it is impossible we should know any thing. Let any person only exclude all idea of creation; which is not difficult, and consider whether, in those circumstances, he can discover a cause of any existence at all. To talk of *the nature of things*, in this case, is, to my understanding mere jargon, or a cloak for absolute ignorance.

Dr.

Dr. Price himself does not seem to be satisfied with this explanation of the cause of the divine existence, and therefore suggests a different idea; saying (p. 351) that "the account of the divine existence" is the same with the account of the existence of space, and duration, of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles, or of any abstract truth." Now, as Dr. Clarke's language gives me no idea at all, this account appears to me to suggest a false one.

The reason, or the account, of the existence of the *divine being* cannot be the same with that of the existence of *space*, or *duration*, for this plain reason. I can, in any case, form an idea of the non-existence both of all *effects*, and of all *causes*, and consequently both of the creation, and of the creator, and of the non-existence of the latter, just as easily as of that of the former; but still the ideas of *space* and *duration* remain in the mind, and cannot be excluded from it. To say that space is an *attribute of the deity*, or that it necessarily implies,

implies, and draws after it, the idea of his existence, appears to me to have no foundation whatever, and to have been assumed without the least face of probability. For this I appeal to what passes in any person's mind.

Again, the reason of the divine existence, and that of an abstract truth, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, appear to me to have no sort of analogy. They agree in nothing but that both of them are true, but with respect to the *reason*, or *cause of their being true*, no two things, in my opinion, can be more unlike.

An abstract truth is no *being*, *substance*, or *reality* whatever. It implies nothing more than the agreement of two ideas, whether the archetypes of those ideas have any existence or not, and of this agreement we have the most perfect comprehension. Nothing can be more intelligible. Now, if our persuasion of this abstract truth was of the same nature with our persuasion concerning the existence of God, we should
have

have the same perfect comprehension of the latter that we have of the former. But can any person seriously say this, when of the former we know *every thing*, and of the latter absolutely *nothing*? Let any person exclude from his mind all idea of the creation, and consider whether there be any thing left that will compel him to believe the existence of any *thing*, *being*, or *substance* whatever. A *creation* necessarily implies a *creator*, but if there be no creation, the only proof of the existence of a creator is cut off.

The cause of the existence of a *thing*, *substance*, or *being*, cannot, in the nature of things, be the same with that of a mere abstract hypothetical truth. The cause of a being, or substance, must be a being or substance also, and therefore, with respect to the divine being we are obliged to say that he has *no proper cause whatever*. The agreement of two ideas is a thing so very different in its nature from this, that the term *cause* is not even applicable to it; as, on the other hand, I see no meaning what-

whatever in the word *account* as applicable to the divine existence. In this case there must either be a *cause*, or *no cause*. *Account*, here, is to me a word without meaning.

If by the word *account*, we mean the same with *reason*, the cases are clearly the farthest in the world from being parallel. If I be asked the reason why the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I answer, that the quantity of the three, and that of the two, is the same, or that the ideas, when rightly understood, exactly *coincide*. But if I be asked why the divine being exists (I say *why he exists*, not why I *believe* him to exist) can I satisfy any body, or myself, by saying that the two ideas in the proposition *God exists* are the same, or coincide? Is the idea of *God*, and that of mere *existence* the same idea? The two cases, therefore, have nothing in them at all parallel. How then can the *reason*, *account*, or *cause* of an *abstract truth*, be of *the same nature* with that of the *reason*, *account*, or *cause* of the *divine existence*?

I shall now conclude the whole controversy with mentioning what appear to me to be the things on which the principal arguments in each part of it turn, and the misconceptions that Dr. Price seems to me to have laboured under.

On the subject of the *penetrability of matter*, he has never produced what I have repeatedly called for, viz. *one case of real unquestionable contact*, without which the doctrine of proper impenetrability cannot be supported. And till this be produced, I am obliged to conclude, from analogy, that *all* resistance is owing to such causes as we both agree that, in *many*, if not in *most cases*, it does certainly arise from, and this is *not solidity*, or impenetrability, but something very different from it.

With respect to the doctrine of *a soul*, Dr. Price appears to me to have been misled principally by his notion of the *absolute simplicity*, or *indivisibility* of the mind, or the thinking principle in man; as if it

was


was a thing of which we could be *conscious*; whereas I think I have shown sufficiently that we cannot be conscious of any thing relating to the *essence of the mind*; that we are properly conscious of nothing but what we *perceive*, and what we *do*. As to what we *are*, it is a thing that we must learn by way of *inference*, and *deduction* from observations, or consciousness; and I think the *arguments* are decisively against such a simplicity and indivisibility as Dr. Price supposes.

On the subject of the doctrine of *necessity*, Dr. Price agrees with Dr. Horsley in admitting that our volitions *certainly*, and invariably depend upon the preceding state of mind; so that, without a miracle, there was a real necessity of every thing being as it *has been, is, or is to be*; and imagines that the controversy depends on what I think to be the mere verbal distinction, of motives being the *moral*, and not the *physical causes* of our volitions and actions; or, as he sometimes expresses himself, that it is not the motives that determine the

mind, but that the mind determines itself according to the motives; which I maintain to be the doctrine of necessity, only disguised in other words. Indeed, how any man can boast of his liberty, merely because he has a power of determining himself, when, at the same time, he knows that he cannot do it in any other than *in one precise and definite manner*, strictly depending upon the circumstances in which he is placed, and when he believes that, in no one action of his life, he could have determined otherwise than he has done, is to me a little difficult of comprehension.

As to *real liberty*, or the power of acting independently of motives, he expressly confines it to those cases in which the motives for and against any particular choice are *exactly equal*. Such cases, I think, seldom, or never, occur; so that a man could have but few opportunities of shewing such a liberty as this. If they should occur, and any determination take place in those circumstances, it appears to me to be attended with the *absurdity* (as Dr. Price himself

himself calls it) of determining without a motive; and I should think that after supposing it possible that the mind might determine *without* a motive, it might also determine *contrary* to all motive. For the same constitution of mind that could enable it to do the one, would enable it to do the other.



A

L E T T E R

T O

DR. P R I C E.

DEAR SIR,

WITH this letter you will receive a few remarks on your *Additional Observations*, which I have read with that *attention* which every thing from you demands. That it has not been with *conviction*, your candour, I know, will not impute to any peculiar *obstinacy*, but to my unavoidably seeing the subjects of our discussion in a light different from that in which you see them. We have not the same idea of the nature of the human

mind, or of the laws to which it is subject, but we are both sufficiently aware of the force of *prejudice*, and that this may equally throw a bias on the side of *long established*, or of *novel* opinions. Also, equally respecting the christian maxim of *doing to others as we would that others should do to us*, we are each of us ready to give to others that liberty which we claim ourselves; while we equally reprobate those rash sentiments which proceed from a decision without a previous discussion of the reasons for and against a question in debate.

I am not a little proud of your commendation of me for my "fairness in the
 "pursuit of truth, and following it in all
 "its consequences, however frightful, without attempting to evade or palliate
 "them" (p. 352.) It is a conduct that I hope I shall always pursue, as the first of duties to that God who has given me whatever *faculties* I possess, and whatever *opportunity of inquiry* I have been favoured with; and I trust I shall continue to pursue this

con-

conduct at all risks. As he is properly no christian, who does not *confess Christ before men*, or who is *ashamed* of his religion in an unbelieving age, like the present; this maxim, which the author of our religion inculcates with respect to christianity in general, the reason of the thing requires that we extend to every thing that essentially affects christianity.

So long, therefore, as I conceive the doctrine of a *separate soul* to have been the true source of the grossest corruptions in the christian system, of that very *antichristian system* which sprung up in the times of the apostles, concerning which they entertained the strongest apprehensions, and delivered, and left upon record, the most solemn warnings, I must think myself a very lukewarm and disaffected christian if I do not bear my feeble testimony against it.

With respect to the private conduct of individuals, as affecting our happiness after death, I do not lay any stress upon this,

or

or upon *any opinion whatever*, and there is no person of whose christian temper and conduct I think more highly than I do of yours, though you hold opinions the very reverse of mine, and defend them with so much zeal; a zeal which, while you maintain the opinions at all, is certainly commendable. But with respect to the *general plan of christianity*, the importance of the doctrines I contend for can hardly, in my opinion, be rated too high. What I contend for leaves nothing for the manifold corruptions and abuses of popery to fasten on. Other doctrinal reformations are partial things, while this goes to the very root of almost all the mischief we complain of; and, for my part, I shall not date the proper and complete downfall of what is called *antichrist*, but from the general prevalence of the doctrine of materialism.

This I cannot help saying appears to me to be that fundamental principle in true philosophy which is alone perfectly consonant to the doctrine of the scriptures; and
being

being at the same time the only proper deduction from natural appearances, it must, in the progress of inquiry soon *appear to be so*; and then, should it be found that an unquestionably true philosophy teaches one thing, and revelation another, the latter could not stand its ground, but must inevitably be exploded, as contrary to *truth and fact*. I therefore deem it to be of particular consequence, that philosophical unbelievers should be apprized in time, that there are christians, who consider the *doctrine of a soul* as a tenet that is so far from being *essential* to the christian scheme, that it is a thing quite *foreign* to it, derived originally from heathenism, discordant with the genuine principles of revealed religion, and ultimately subversive of them.

As to the doctrine of *necessity*, I cannot, after all our discussion, help considering it as *demonstrably true*, and the only possible foundation for the doctrines of a *providence*, and the *moral government of God*.

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Continuing to see things in this light, after the closest attention that I have been able to give to them, before, or in the course of our friendly debate (and you will pardon me, if I add, seeing this in a stronger light than ever) you will not be displeased with the *zeal* that I have occasionally shewn; as I, on my part, intirely approve of yours, who consider yourself as defending important and long received truth, against fundamental and most dangerous innovations.

We are neither of us so far blinded by prejudice as not to see, and acknowledge, the wisdom of constituting us in such a manner, as that every thing *new* respecting a subject of so much consequence as *religion*, should excite a great alarm, and meet with great difficulty in establishing itself. This furnishes an occasion of a thorough examination, and discussion of all new doctrines, in consequence of which they are either totally exploded, or more firmly established. The slow and gradual
progress

progreſs of chriſtianity, and alſo that of the reformation, is a circumſtance that bids fairer for their perpetuity, than if they had met with a much readier reception in the world. You will allow me to indulge the hope of a ſimilar advantage from the oppoſition that I expect to this article of reformation in the chriſtian ſyſtem, and that the truth I contend for will be the more valued for being dearly bought, and ſlowly acquired.

As to the *odium* that I may bring upon myſelf by the malevolence of my oppoſers, of which, in your letter to me, you make ſuch obliging mention, I hope the ſame conſciouſneſs of not having deſerved it, will ſupport me as it has done you, when much worſe treated than I have yet been, on an occaſion on which you deſerved the warmeſt gratitude of your country, whoſe intereſts you ſtudied and watched over, whoſe calamities you foreſaw, and faithfully pointed out; and which might have derived, in various reſpects, the moſt ſolid
and

and durable advantages from your labours. But we are no christians, if we have not so far imbibed the principles and spirit of our religion, as even to *rejoice that we are counted worthy of suffering* in any good cause.

Here it is that, supposing me to be a defender of *christian truth*, my object gives me an advantage that your excellent *political writings* cannot give you. All your observations may be just, and your advice most excellent, and yet your country, the safety and happiness of which you have at heart, being in the hands of infatuated men, may go to ruin; whereas christian truth is a cause *founded upon a rock*, and though it may be overborne for a time, we are assured that the *gates of death shall not prevail against it*.

Having now, each of us, defended, in the best manner that we can, what we deem to be this important truth, we are, I doubt not, equally satisfied with ourselves, and shall cheerfully submit the result

sult of our discussion to the judgment of our friends, and of the public; and to the final and infallible determination of the *God of all truth.*

I am, notwithstanding this, and every other possible difference in *mere opinion*, with the most perfect esteem,

Dear Sir,

Yours most affectionately,

J. PRIESTLEY.

CALNE, Oct. 2, 1778.

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A NOTE

NOTE to DR. PRIESTLEY.

DR. PRICE desires DR. PRIESTLEY's acceptance of his gratitude for the expressions of his kindness and regard in the preceding letter; and assures him in return of his best wishes and ardent esteem. The controversy between them having grown much too tedious, he thinks there is a necessity of now dropping it. He cannot therefore persuade himself to enter farther into it; or to say any more than that his sentiments are undesignedly misrepresented, when in page 387, Dr. Priestley suggests, that he considers wickedness as *a thing that is proper*, and thinks the *plan of the Deity absolutely required it*. He has never meant to say more, than that the PERMISSION of wickedness is *proper*; and that (for the reasons mentioned in p. 173, 174, and 358) the divine plan required the communication of powers rendering beings capable of perversely *making themselves* wicked, by acting, not as the divine plan requires, (for this, he thinks, would be too good an excuse for wickedness) but, by acting in a manner that opposes the divine plan and will, and that would subvert the order of nature; and to which, on this account, punishment has been annexed.

ANSWER

ANSWER by DR. PRIESTLEY.

DR. PRIESTLEY will always think himself happy in having an opportunity of expressing the very high and affectionate regard he entertains for Dr. Price, notwithstanding their difference of opinion on subjects of so much moment as those discussed in the present Correspondence. He is confident that Dr. Price needs no assurance on the part of Dr. Priestley, that his sentiments have not been *knowingly* misrepresented; but must take the liberty to say, that he cannot help considering the voluntary *permission* of evil, or the *certain cause* of it, by a being who foresees it, and has sufficient power to prevent it, as equivalent to the express *appointment* of it.

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TREATISE ON NECESSITY, and this CORRESPONDENCE, which is here considered as the
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N. B. Where no Roman numeral is used, the first volume,
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